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Abstract 
This thesis presents three empirical studies investigating the capital market effects 
of the interplay between financial reporting discretion and insider trading. The 
empirical studies contribute to the emerging accounting literature which considers 
managers’ private signal conveyed by means of their trading on their own firm’s 
shares. 
 The first study examines whether the disclosure of directors trading improves 
market efficiency and contributes to the long standing controversy in the literature 
with regards to the informational efficiency of insider trading. The findings indicate 
that insider trading assist market participants to assess the implications of current 
for future earnings during an earnings announcement and consequently lead to 
more efficient prices. However, the information in insider trading subsumes the 
information in financial reporting discretion in this setting.  
The second empirical chapter investigates the interplay between financial reporting 
discretion and insider trading focusing on the setting of acquisitions financed with 
equity whereby managers have incentives to manipulate earnings and the 
opportunity to conceal the consequences from doing so. In this particular setting, it 
is shown that a combination of financial reporting discretion aiming to inflate 
earnings and insider purchases denoting overconfident managers is associated 
with acquirers’ long term underperformance.  
The third empirical chapter employs a setting characterised by an exogenous 
constraint over financial reporting discretion over the capitalisation of R&D 
expenditures. It is shown that constraining financial reporting discretion comes at 
the expense of a loss of information about future earnings. Moreover, constraining 
  
 
financial reporting discretion reduces also the usefulness of the insider purchases 
disclosure as a means for assessing the motivation for capitalisation.  
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1 Introduction 
The trading by corporate insiders’ in their own firm’s share, commonly known as 
insider trading, has been a major controversy in the literature. One the one hand, 
trading by insiders who are better informed than other investors can be detrimental 
to market efficiency in the sense that it may discourage information acquisition and 
trading by outsiders (Ausubel, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992) On the other 
hand, trading by informed investors disseminates their private information, and 
consequently leads to more efficient prices (Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 
1983b; Leland, 1992).   
Corporate insiders are in a unique position because they are aware of the future 
prospects of the firm. Given their position, insiders could employ their information 
advantage when trading on their own firm’s shares. In line with insiders’ information 
advantage, prior research shows that directors’ trading on their own firm’s share 
predicts subsequent share price changes and performance (e.g. Gregory et al., 
1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Specifically, purchases are 
shown to be followed by positive abnormal returns and sales by negative abnormal 
returns. Consequently, the disclosure of their trades is a significant source of 
information for market participants to unravel managers’ expectation about the 
future performance of the firm.  
Corporate insiders are, also, in charge of corporate decision-making and the 
information in financial statements. Investors would employ the information in 
financial statements in order to assess a firm’s future prospects and future cash 
flows and consequently, the value of a firm. Accounting standards allow managers 
to exercise their discretion so that the information in the financial statements 
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reflects the underlying economics, given their intimate knowledge of the firm. For 
instance, considerable discretion has been allowed to managers in estimating 
accruals. The primary role of accruals is to address timing and matching problems 
inherent in cash flows so that earnings reflect more closely the firm’s performance 
and enable the prediction of future earnings and cash flows. Another type of 
discretion examined here is the capitalisation of R&D expenditures which conveys 
information about the future prospects of R&D projects.  The underlying idea for 
allowing financial reporting discretion is to allow managers to communicate their 
private information and decrease the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. Whilst prior literature shows on average, that financial reporting 
discretion provides relevant information to capital markets (e.g. Subramanyam, 
1996), it also shows that discretion may also arise out of opportunistic motivations 
(e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Walker, 2013 for reviews of the literature). Although 
signalling and opportunistic choices can be identified ex-post, such identification 
by market participants can be often very difficult in real time. This type of noise in 
the information in financial reporting discretion compromises the quality of financial 
reporting and exacerbates the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2013). Moreover, the noise in financial reporting 
information can also arise when the discretion allowed to managers does not 
enable them to communicate efficiently their private information.    
Investors then, would rely on additional disclosure to interpret the information in 
financial statements (e.g. Francis et al., 2007) in order to infer managers’ private 
information. Prior research has employed a number of proxies for additional 
disclosure. Here, we employ insider trading as a direct signal of managers’ private 
information. Insider purchases signal managers’ increased expectations about the 
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firm’s future performance while insider sales would signal decreased managerial 
expectation of future performance. Insider trading and more specifically insider 
purchases are costly and thus credible signal of commitment about the future value 
of the firm. Not only insiders invest their own wealth in the firm’s shares but also, 
they take on more idiosyncratic risk as they under-diversify their portfolio (e.g. 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Veenman et al., 2011) Therefore, the disclosure of these 
transactions would be relevant information for investors. Consistently, prior 
literature (e.g. Beneish and Vargus, 2002) shows that market participants can 
employ insider trading in order to assess the likelihood of opportunistic earnings 
management. Recent literature also revives the interest in directors trading to 
interpret the information in financial reporting. Veenman (2012) shows that insider 
trading and more specifically insider purchases increase the precision of 
information in financial statements. In addition, Badertscher et al. (2011) show that 
the market use this disclosure to price accounting restatements. This finding 
indicates that the market employs directors’ signal when they are concerned about 
the quality of financial reporting. 
This thesis presents three empirical chapters (Chapters 3-5) that examine the 
capital market effects of the interplay between insider trading and financial 
reporting discretion. The thesis contributes to the insider trading literature by 
addressing questions that prior research has yet to address. Specifically, the 
empirical chapters presented in this thesis answer an array of questions: Does 
insider trading enable the dissemination of managers’ private information conveyed 
by financial reporting discretion? Or, does insider trading deter market participants 
from extracting information from financial reporting discretion? What can we learn 
about the managers’ motivations for engaging with financial reporting discretion by 
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looking at their insider trades? Under which circumstances can insider trading 
assist market participants to interpret financial reporting discretion?  
The empirical chapters presented in this thesis focus on legal insider trading in the 
UK that has been reported as required by the law. Chapter 2 discusses in further 
detail the regulation surrounding insider trading and defines legal and illegal insider 
trading. The thesis employs the terms “insiders”, “directors” and “managers” 
interchangeably to refer to corporate insiders who are assumed to have private 
information about their company and can influence financial reporting. In line with 
prior research in the UK, the insider trading examined here consists of trades by 
executive and non-executive directors on their own firm’s share.   
Chapter 2 discusses the definition and regulation of insider trading in the UK. Next, 
it discusses the insider trading literature focusing on the information role of 
directors’ trades and the relation between insider trading and financial reporting 
discretion as well as the evidence that we have so far on the capital market effects 
of this relation. The chapter concludes by identifying the settings that are employed 
here to investigate the capital market effects of the interplay between insider trading 
and financial reporting discretion and outlines the contribution of the research 
presented.  
Chapter 3 investigates whether the disclosure of directors insider trading enables 
the dissemination of managers’ private information conveyed by financial reporting 
discretion or deters market participants from extracting information from financial 
reporting discretion. In order to address this question, this chapter investigates 
whether the disclosure of insider trading results in more efficient prices in a setting 
of a pervasive market inefficiency, namely the post earnings announcement drift 
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(PEAD). Our findings confirm that the disclosure of informative insider trading 
mitigates the anomaly implying that informative insider trading conveys information, 
which assists market participants to unravel financial reporting discretion. However, 
these results do not extend to any other form of insider trading. It is shown that the 
disclosure of any other form of insider trading deters the efforts of market 
participants from using the information in financial reporting discretion to interpret 
the earnings surprise. This chapter contributes to the long lasting debate in the 
literature with respect to insider trading. On the one hand, insider trading is 
beneficial because of its informational role (Manne 1966; Lelenad, 1992; Carlton 
and Fischel; 1983), while on the other hand, insider trading harms investors’ 
confidence and adversely affect the market participants’ information acquisition 
efforts, trading and liquidity (Manove, 1989; Ausubel, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 
1992; Chung and Charoenwong, 1998). The empirical literature (e.g. Gregory et 
al., 1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Veenman, 2012) shows 
that the disclosure of insider trading is associated with significant market reactions, 
implying that it provides relevant information, consistent with the information role of 
insider trading. Our evidence provides only partial support for the argument that 
capital markets benefit from insider trading. This chapter also contributes to the 
literature examining whether insider trading provides relevant information for the 
valuation of the earning (e.g. Udpa, 1996; Roulstone, 2008; Veenman, 2012). The 
approach taken in those studies, however, cannot inform the extent to which insider 
trading has implication for market efficiency. This chapter contributes to this line of 
research by investigating the role of insider trading for market efficiency. 
Chapter 4 investigates what we can learn about the managers’ motivations for 
engaging with financial reporting discretion by looking at their insider trades when 
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managers have incentives to engage in opportunistic earnings management, and 
more importantly, have the opportunities to conceal its consequences. To address 
this, the chapter employs the setting of corporate acquisitions given that the post-
acquisition environment offers opportunities to conceal aggressive reporting. 
Furthermore, acquisitions financed with stock create the incentives to engage with 
opportunistic earnings management since the cost of the acquisition is inversely 
related to acquirers’ share price. While insider purchases are typically considered 
as credible signal indicating the absence of earnings management (e.g. Beneish 
and Vargus, 2002), the literature on acquisition (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007) considers them as a signal of managers’ 
overconfidence. The results presented in this chapter show that the long term 
underperformance of stock financed acquisitions is driven by firms exhibiting the 
combination between earnings management and insider purchases that are 
claimed here to be attributable to overconfident managers. This chapter contributes 
to the stream of literature that employs directors’ trading as a measure of 
overconfidence by identifying its role in explaining the post-acquisition under-
performance. Specifically, we show that its presence reinforces with high precision 
the optimism inherent into earnings management. This chapter also contributes to 
the stream of literature that attributes the long-term performance of stock 
acquisitions to earnings management (e.g. Louis, 2004). Our findings show that 
the underperformance due to earnings management is driven by those 
acquisitions, which exhibit evidence of managerial overconfidence.  
Chapter 5 examines the circumstances under which insider trading can assist 
market participants to interpret financial reporting discretion. Prior research (e.g. 
Beneish and Vargus, 2002) suggests that the market could employ the disclosure 
 18 
 
of directors’ trading to assess whether managers’ underlying motivation for 
earnings management is opportunistic or signalling. However, this stream of 
research has yet to investigate its role when discretion is exogenously constrained. 
Chapter 4 addresses this by focusing on the capitalisation of R&D and employs the 
transition from a discretionary capitalisation (SSAP 13) to a mandatory 
capitalisation (IAS 38) regime in the UK. Similarly to the evidence reported in prior 
research, we find that that insider purchases assist market participants to learn 
about the signalling motivation for engaging with capitalisation. However, this 
finding holds only under the discretionary capitalisation regime and not under the 
mandatory capitalisation. The results also show that constraining managerial 
discretion over the capitalisation of R&D results in significant loss of information 
with respect to future earnings. This chapter contributes to the stream of research 
investigating the interrelation by showing that the role of insider purchases to 
denote that earnings management is employed for signalling exists only when 
discretion is allowed. In addition, this chapter contributes empirical evidence 
supporting the concerns raised in prior research (e.g. Wyatt, 2008; Stark, 2008) 
with respect to the adoption of the standard in the UK. 
Finally, chapter 6 summarises the empirical findings presented in chapters 3 to 5 and 
discusses the conclusion drawn from this thesis. 
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2 Review of the insider trading literature 
2.1 The regulation of insider trading in the UK and the definition of inside 
information 
In the UK, inside information as defined by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)1 
and adopted from the European Market Abuse Directive (2003, enacted in 2005) 
is information of a “precise nature which is not generally available, relates, directly 
or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying investments or to one or more 
of the qualifying investments, and would, if generally available, be likely to have a 
significant effect on the price of the qualifying investments or on the price of related 
investments.”2 However, information from research or analysis is deemed to be 
generally available, and therefore it is not considered as ‘inside information’.  
FCA, which regulates insider trading, defines insiders those individuals who have 
access to ‘inside information’3: 
 as a result of their membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory body of an issuer of qualifying investments; 
 as a result of holding capital of an issuer of prescribed investments; 
 as a result of having access to the information through their employment, 
profession or duties; 
 as a result of criminal activities; or 
 which they have obtained by other means, e.g. a tip-off from a friend, and 
which they know, or could be reasonably expected to know, is inside 
information. 
 
Insider trading and in particular the trades by directors are regulated by The 
Companies Act 1985, The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993, The Financial Services 
                                            
1 Previously known as Financial Services Authority. 
2 Section 118C of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) 
3 Section 118B of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) 
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and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, Listing Rules and Disclosure Rules administered 
by the Financial Conduct Authority. While it is not illegal for a director to trade on 
the company’s share, it becomes illegal if these trades are incurred with price 
sensitive information. FCA has the power, under Section 123 of Financial Services 
and Markets Act (2000), to impose penalties such fine or imprisonment to insiders 
found guilty of trading on inside information. Furthermore, the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 introduced the wider offence on market abuse which 
supplements the criminal offences of insider trading. It is worth noting that FCA 
won its first successful criminal prosecution for insider trading in 2009.4 
The Disclosure Rule 3.1 administered by the Financial Conduct Authority states 
that any person discharging managerial responsibilities in the UK must notify the 
company about the occurrence of any transaction within four business days of the 
day which the transaction occurred. Then, the company should notify the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) no later than the following day, when the information about 
the trade is disseminated to the market. Therefore, directors’ trades should be 
announced to the market approximately six days after a directors’ trade. However, 
directors must receive a clearance to trade from the chairman in order to trade 
according to the London Stock Exchange Model Code (1977), currently part of the 
Listing Rules. 5 Considering that insiders typically notify the board of directors prior 
to the insider trading, the timeliness for the disclosure of directors trading is 
                                            
4 The “Updated Measurement of Market Cleanliness” (www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op25.pdf) 
report published in 2007 by the Financial Service Authority (FSA) identifies the presence of informed 
trading prior to acquisitions in the UK. In 2012 Brooke Masters reported in Financial Times  that informed 
trading by insiders prior to acquisition has decreased significantly following the successful convictions 
of insider trading 2009. Overall, the above evidence indicates poor enforcement prior to 2009 and thus, 
greater informed trading by insiders. 
5 Listing Rule 9.2 and 15. 
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improved. Consistently, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) note that 85% of the directors trades 
are announced to the market the same day they occur or the following. 
In addition, the London Stock Exchange Model Code (1977) prohibits insiders from 
trading up to two months preceding an annual earnings announcement and one 
month prior to an interim earnings announcement. In addition, directors are allowed 
to trade as early as the earnings announcement. Hillier and Marshall (1998) show 
that the Model Code is well enforced since directors’ trading prior to an earnings 
announcement is virtually non-existent. Furthermore, Hillier and Marshall (2002a) 
show that directors’ trading is concentrated in the period immediately before the 
start of the ban and in the period following the earnings announcement, with the 
incidence of trading being higher in the period following an earnings 
announcement. 
2.2 The role of insider trading in capital markets 
The concept of trading by managers on their own firm’s share has been a major 
controversy in the literature. The debate in this stream of research focuses on the 
implications of insider trading on the informational efficiency of the market. 
On the one hand, Manne (1966a, 1966b)  suggests that insider trading results in 
more efficient prices because managers’ trading decisions are a means of 
conveying private information to the markets. The dissemination of managers’ 
private information results in prices reflecting more information about the future 
relatively to the information that is available to market participants  when insiders 
abstain from trading (Leland, 1992; Chau and Vayanos, 2008). Consequently, 
investors could employ this signal to confirm or contradict their own information and 
trade accordingly (Clacher et al., 2009). In addition, Carlton and Fischel (1983a) 
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argue that investors would have demanded stricter regulation, had they believed 
that insider trading decreases firm value.  
On the other hand, permitting insiders to trade on their firm’s shares profitably on 
their asymmetric information is unfair and harms investors’ confidence and 
compromises market efficiency (Ausubel, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). This 
occurs because insider trading deters other traders from acquiring information and 
trading, and therefore it affects the distribution of information among investors. In 
addition, Manove (1989) argues that insider trading may discourage corporate 
investments since insiders could appropriate some part of the returns generated 
by corporate investments. Specifically, he analytically shows that when 
investments are riskier, insider trading would induce underinvestment, while under 
circumstance of less risky investment, insider trading would induce overinvestment. 
In addition, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) show that firms with greater extent of 
insider trading activity are associated with larger bid ask spreads. Overall, this 
stream of research suggests that permitting insider trading impairs market 
efficiency. 
However, despite those objections, insider trading is a pervasive feature of capital 
markets. In reality, those transactions are subject to regulations that appear to 
protect, at least to some extent, outside investors’ interests while allowing insider 
trading to enrich the information set available to market participants. Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2009) show that the first enforcement of insider trading regulation 
results in prices reflecting more information about the future performance of the 
firm. Similarly, Brochet (2010) show that regulation that accelerates the disclosure 
of insider trading results in greater market reactions at their announcement. 
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The above literature suggests that insider trading has a favourable information 
effect while it may significantly affect market’s confidence and consequently impair 
market efficiency. The work presented in this thesis attempts to shed further light 
in the controversy from the perspective of examining financial reporting discretion.    
2.3 Do insiders possess private information? 
Corporate insiders are in a unique position because they are in charge of corporate 
decision-making and are aware of the future prospects of the firm. Consequently, 
the disclosure of their trading decision is likely to communicate to the market their 
beliefs about the prospects of the firm. The seminal microstructure paper by Kyle 
(1985) and the subsequent analytical literature (e.g. Huddart et al., 2001), show 
how insiders’ information is transmitted into prices. This stream of research 
suggests that trading by insiders possessing private information would result in 
unanticipated trading volumes which would convey their information to the market. 
Then, market makers would set prices in response to these unanticipated trading 
volumes. Prices would drop following an insider sale and prices would jump 
following an insider buy. In other words, insider trading reveals new information to 
the market which results in the revisions in investors’ expectations and hence, 
share price movements. Consistently, in order to investigate whether insiders 
employ their inside information when trading, prior research observes return 
patterns around insider trading and around corporate events and other disclosures. 
The following sections discuss briefly the ample empirical evidence on the share 
price responses to insider trading.  
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2.3.1 Abnormal returns around insider trading 
One the earliest studies examining the market reaction associated with insiders’ 
trades in the US is Jaffe (1974). He finds significant abnormal returns up to eight 
months following a directors’ trade. This finding implies that insiders can predict 
future share price changes and supports the idea that insiders exploit their inside 
information to trade. Finnerty (1976) examines whether these abnormal returns 
differ for insider purchases and insider sales. He finds that both insider purchases 
and sales are followed by significant abnormal returns during the month following 
the trade. However, he shows that the magnitude of abnormal returns following 
insider sales is lower compared to purchases.  Subsequent studies in the US (e.g. 
Bettis et al., 1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003) find similar results; 
insider purchases are followed by positive abnormal returns and insider sales are 
followed by negative and lower in magnitude abnormal returns. These results 
suggest that prices may not fully reflect the information content of insiders’ trades. 
In other words, the market underestimates the use of inside information since the 
abnormal returns continue after the announcement of these trades to the market. 
Early evidence from the UK by King and Roell (1988)  confirms the evidence in the 
US suggesting that significant abnormal returns follow the announcement of insider 
trading. More specifically, they find that insiders’ purchases are associated with 
positive abnormal returns which are significant up to one year after the 
announcement of the trade. With regards to sales, they find that they are 
associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns. The authors conclude 
that the market underestimates the use of inside information with respect to the 
future performance of the firm.  This implies that directors’ trading contains 
information which is not fully absorbed by the market. Using a bigger sample of 
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trades, Gregory et al. (1994) re-examine the abnormal returns followed by insider 
trading. Their findings are consistent with the announcement effect of insiders’ buys 
that King and Roell (1988) find. More specifically, they find that purchases yield 
positive and significant abnormal returns whereas sales yield smaller and negative 
abnormal returns following the date of their announcement to the market. 
Subsequent studies in the UK report similar findings for the abnormal returns 
following the months of the insider trades (e.g. Gregory et al., 1997) or the days 
following the announcement of the trades (e.g. Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et 
al., 2006; Gregory et al., 2009). The evidence in Fidrmuc et al. (2006) also show 
that insider trading is more informative in the UK triggering greater market reaction 
in the UK compared to the US, attributing this difference to the more timely 
disclosure in the UK compared to the US. Prior to the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 directors should report their trades by the tenth day of the 
following month that the trades occurred, while after SOX insiders should report 
their trades within two business days (Brochet, 2010). In contrast to the UK, 
managers in the US do not have to receive the clearance to trade. These practises 
in the UK explain why insider trading in the UK triggers greater market reaction 
compared to the US. 
This stream of research aims to identify whether insiders trade based on their 
private information by observing the market reactions associated with these trades, 
since the actual private information that insiders trade upon is almost impossible to 
be identified (Tonks, 2010). Fidrmuc et al. (2006) observe that the empirical 
evidence on insider trading is sought by testing for significant abnormal returns 
either over a period of time after the trade such as 6, 12 or more months or on the 
day of the insider trades’ announcement. The evidence supports the notion that the 
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announcement of insider trading announcement triggers significant market 
reactions. This implies that the disclosure of insider’ trading could be useful for 
investors to observe managers’ private information. Furthermore, insider 
purchases trigger greater reactions than sales. This is because directors’ 
purchases are costly and thus, a credible signal of commitment about the future 
value of the firm. Not only insiders invest their own wealth in the firm’s shares but 
also, they take on more idiosyncatic risk as they under-diversify their portfolio (e.g. 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Veenman et al., 2011). On the other hand, sales are motivated 
for a number of reasons such as liquidity or portfolio diversification purposes (e.g. 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) which may be unrelated to insiders’ own private 
information, thus leading to lower information content compared to purchases. 
Consistently, Veenman et al. (2011) show that insider purchases are related to 
favourable future performance whilst sales are not. Overall, the empirical results 
reported in this stream of research suggest that insider purchases are followed by 
significant upward returns while sales by downward returns of lower magnitude or 
significance compared to purchases. In other words, insiders appear to buy before 
price increases and sell prior to price declines. Generally, insiders appear to trade 
on their foreknowledge of price changes and consistently with their private 
information about the future performance of the firm. In order to investigate whether 
insiders trade on inside information, prior research has also examined insider 
trading patterns prior to earnings announcements, corporate events and other 
news announcements. The next sections discuss the evidence from this stream of 
literature. 
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2.3.2 Insider trading around earnings announcements  
In order to investigate whether managers possess private information, prior 
research also investigates the interaction between insider trading and earnings 
announcements. An insider who expects favourable future earnings would take 
advantage of this information by purchasing shares prior to the earnings 
announcement in order to buy the shares at a lower price, and vice versa for 
adverse news. Consistently, Elliot et al. (1984) shows that insiders tend to increase 
purchases and decrease sales of shares twelve months prior to the announcement 
of extreme earnings increases. Similarly, Lustgarten and Mande (1995) show that 
insiders tend to purchase shares prior to the announcement of good earnings news 
and vice versa for bad news. More recently, Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) show 
this relationship is not linear and is attenuated for extreme earnings surprises. 
However, insiders may face litigation when they sell shares prior to the 
announcement of adverse earnings news. In line with this argument, Ke et al. 
(2003)  show that insiders in the U.S. tend to increase their  net sales three to nine 
quarters prior to a break of earnings increases. This evidence implies that 
managers not only employ their inside information about future earnings when 
trading, but also time their trades to avoid litigation.  
Udpa (1996) shows that insider trading prior to an earnings announcement 
mitigates the market reaction to the subsequent earnings announcement. In a 
similar vein, Roulstone (2008) shows that insider purchases and sales result in 
lower market reaction during the earnings announcement. These results suggest 
that the information in directors’ trading allows the market to develop inferences 
about future earnings. However, this stream of research has yet to identify which 
trades assist investors to develop inferences about future earnings and 
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consequently, lead to more efficient prices. For instance, trades that anticipate the 
earnings surprise are more likely to reveal managers’ private information about the 
forthcoming earnings, compared to those trades, which do not anticipate the 
earnings surprise. Chapter 3 investigates further this argument by identifying which 
trades are more likely to be informative and the extent to which they result in more 
efficient prices.    
Insiders may also delay their trades until the impact of the earnings information has 
been observed, and consequently trade after the earnings announcement. In other 
words, an insider who plans to buy (sell) and expects unfavourable (favourable) 
earnings news will postpone the trade until after the earnings announcement. In 
line with this argument, Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) find that insiders tend to 
buy (sell) more shares following adverse (favourable) unexpected earnings. 
Lustgarten and Mande (1995) also find similar evidence that insiders delay the 
purchase (sale) of shares until after bad (good) earnings news is announced. 
Similar evidence presented for the UK by Hillier and Marshall (2002a) shows that 
insiders tend to buy after bad earnings news and sell after good earnings news. 
This literature builds upon Seyhun (1998) to argue that an insider who anticipates 
a negative earnings surprise can refrain from trading until after the bad news is 
announced in order to buy shares at a lower price. Conversely, an insider who 
anticipates a positive earnings surprise can postpone trading until after the public 
news announcement to sell at a higher price, and similarly for insider sales 
following good news. Seyhun (1998) argues that the direction in these trades 
reveals that prices have completely incorporated the information in earnings.6 On 
                                            
6 Specifically, Seyhun (1998) argues: “Following their sales, insiders do not necessarily expect 
negative future performance. They only know that past expectation of good performance is 
completed and the stock price fully reflects insiders’ expectations.” (page 51) 
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the other hand, buys after the announcement of good news signal that past 
performance has yet to be completed and that prices do not completely incorporate 
insiders’ information. In line with this argument, Kolasinski and Li (2010) show that 
trades occurring in the same direction with the earnings surprise are followed by 
significant returns up to six months after the earnings announcement. More 
recently, Veenman (2012) shows that purchases occurring after an earnings 
announcement are more informative when they confirm the initial earnings surprise 
and concludes that their disclosure is a useful signal for market participants to value 
past earnings. However, this stream of literature has yet to examine the capital 
market consequences of those delayed informed trades on price efficiency. 
Chapter 3 attempts to fill this gap in the literature.  
2.3.3 Insider trading around corporate events and decisions 
Among the first studies to investigate whether insiders exploit this type of private 
information is Givoly and Palmon (1985) who examine whether insiders trade prior 
to news announcements. They find that the returns they earn from trading are 
irrelevant to the disclosure of the news and that insider trading is rather rare prior 
to news announcements. More recently, Korczak et al. (2010) employ a sample of 
UK firms and report that only a small portion of news are followed by insider 
trading.7 However, their results are not so surprising for at least three reasons. 
Firstly, insiders may trade well before the announcement of the event due to 
litigation concerns. Secondly, they may not trade based upon all the information. 
Lastly, the events considered in the above studies would differ in magnitude. 
Consequently, only a fraction of the events employed would generate profitable 
strategies for insiders to exploit. Therefore, insiders may use their long term 
                                            
7 They find evidence of insider trading in 5,345 out of the 78,251 news.  
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information advantage to trade as oppose to short term information. Thus, it is 
important to examine insider trading around specific corporate events and 
announcements where insiders are more likely to have an information advantage 
which may employ when trading. One of the most material information events for 
investors to assess the future performance of the firm is the announcement of 
earnings. Given that insiders would have superior knowledge of future earnings 
and performance, they may trade upon this information. The following section 
reviews the literature on directors’ trading around corporate events such as capital 
expenditures, dividend changes, acquisitions, voluntary disclosure and seasonal 
equity offerings. The literature with regards to insider trading around earnings 
announcements is examined separately.  
It is well established in prior literature that changes in the levels of dividends causes 
significant share price reactions, as it signals information about the future 
performance of the firm. For instance, Smith (1986) shows that the initiation of  
dividends cause significant favourable market reactions which are higher in 
magnitude than dividends increases or the issuance of special dividends. In other 
words, initiation of dividends would trigger positive market reactions signalling the 
good future prospects of the firms. Consequently, managers could purchase 
shares at lower prices in anticipation of future price increases. Then, insider 
purchases may reinforce the favourable news about dividend increases by 
enhancing the credibility of this disclosure about the future prospects of the firm.  
Consistently, John and Lang (1991) show that dividend increases accompanied by 
insider purchases are associated with greater favourable market reactions.  
Similar evidence has also been presented for other corporate events and 
decisions. For instance, John and Mishra (1990) show analytically that increases 
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in capital expenditure accompanied by insider purchases communicate managers’ 
private information with regards to their beliefs about the net present value of the 
investment. In addition, Gu and Li (2007) show that voluntary disclosure about the 
innovation strategy of high tech firms is more credible when it is accompanied by 
insider purchases. However, insiders could time their trades relative to the 
disclosure of news in order to avoid appearing trading upon inside information. For 
instance, Cheng and Lo (2006) show that insiders tend to purchase more shares 
following the announcement of bad news. Similarly, Noe (1999) show that insiders 
tend to trade in opposite direction of the management earnings forecast following 
its announcement. More importantly, he finds that insiders earn significant returns 
when they trade after the disclosure. In other words, insider trading following the 
disclosure signals the future performance of the firm.    
The joint signalling literature has also investigated the interaction between the 
announcement of seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) and insider trading. The 
literature on the performance of SEOs shows robust evidence that its 
announcement results in significant underperformance for the issuer (e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Clarke et al., 2001). Therefore, managers have strong 
incentives to sell shares at a higher price prior to the announcement of a SEO. 
Consistently,  Karpoff and Lee (1991) shows that insiders tend to sell shares prior 
to the announcement of the SEO. Johnson et al. (1996) show that the market 
reaction to a SEO is less adverse when accompanied by insider purchases as 
opposed to insider selling or the absence of insider trading.   
Another stream of the joint signalling literature focuses on corporate acquisitions 
or mergers. For instance, Elliot et al. (1984)  show that insiders tend to purchase 
shares prior to the announcement of a merger. In a similar vein, Seyhun (1990) 
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show that insiders are more likely to purchase shares when the announcement of 
the takeover is likely to trigger favourable market reactions. In other words, insider 
purchases appear to signal the favourable prospects of the takeover. However, 
more recent literature suggests that insider purchases may stem out of managers’ 
over-confidence or self-attribution bias and over-estimate the future performance 
of the firm. Consistently, this research (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Kolasinski 
and Li, 2012) shows that insider purchases prior to the announcement of an 
acquisition reveals managers’ over-confidence denoted by  the adverse market 
reaction to the magnitude and presence of insider purchases. Chapter 4 draws 
upon this literature to investigate the interaction between insider trading and 
financial reporting discretion in the context of acquisitions.  
2.3.4 Insider trading and financial reporting discretion  
Managers can exercise significant discretion in financial reporting with the intention 
to inform or mislead investors. Those mixed attributes may hamper the 
interpretation of earnings and increase the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders. Financial statement analysis may not fully reveal managers’ 
private information. Consequently, investors would rely on additional disclosure to 
interpret earnings (e.g. Francis et al., 2007), in order to infer managers’ private 
information and thus, address this information asymmetry. Considering managers’ 
intimate knowledge about financial reporting and its components, the disclosure of 
managers’ trading on their own firm’s shares may assist market participants to price 
earnings.  
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Noise in earnings could result from the accrual component of earnings, among 
other factors.8 Sloan (1996) shows that the accrual component of earnings has 
lower persistence than the cash flow component and concludes that prices fail to 
fully reflect the information contained in the accruals components. Xie (2001) 
shows that the findings in Sloan (1996) are attributable to the discretionary 
component of accruals. In other words, those findings imply that prices fail to fully 
reflect the implication of discretion that managers induced to accruals for future 
earnings. This finding may not be so surprising considering that accounting 
standards allow managers to exercise significant discretion when estimating these 
accruals in order to best communicate the underlying economics of the firm. 
Managers could opportunistically employ their discretion in order to achieve various 
objectives and earnings targets (e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Walker, 2013). 
Thus, discretionary accruals could arise from managers’ intention to inform or 
mislead. Francis et al. (2005) show that this factor causes significant information 
asymmetry, and managers could exploit it by trading on their own firm’s shares 
profitably (e.g. Aboody et al., 2005). In other words, managers’ trading decision 
may be related to the discretion they exercise in accruals. Sawicki and Shrestha 
(2008) and Sawicki and Shrestha (2014) establish an inverse relation between 
earnings management and net insider trading. In a similar vein, Core et al. (2006) 
show that insiders tend to purchase more shares in firms with low accruals and sell 
more shares in firms which report high accruals. The results in this stream of 
research suggest that managers are well informed about the persistence of 
                                            
8 For instance, the aggregated accounting information in financial reporting could potential hide part 
of the information required by investors to fully interpret earnings and the private information 
managers hold. Supplementary disclosure may address this information gap, but full disclosure 
comes at the expense of revealing proprietary information which may hurt the firm and its 
competitive advantage and position.  
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accruals and sophisticated enough to observe potential mispricing (Core et al., 
2006). Consequently, investors could rely on managers’ trading decisions in order 
to resolve the uncertainty with regards to the implications of discretionary accruals 
for future earnings. Consistently, Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that the 
persistence of the discretionary component of accruals in earnings is greater when 
those are accompanied by directors’ purchases and less persistent when 
accompanied by sales. Chapter 4 focuses on a context where managers have 
incentives to manipulate earnings in order to investigate the implications of 
discretionary accruals accompanied with insider purchases for future earnings.   
Recent literature, also, recognises behavioural factors which may affect financial 
reporting. For instance, Schrand and Zechman (2012) show that managers’ 
optimistic expectations about the future performance of the firm may lead to 
restatements arising from managers’ overconfidence that future earnings will 
absorb the reversal of accruals. Given the significant loss of market value during a 
restatement (e.g. Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Palmrose et al., 2004), insiders have 
strong incentives to sell their stock prior to its announcement. Summers and 
Sweeney (1998) show that insider trading could be a useful determinant to assess 
the likelihood of restatement. Furthermore, Li and Zhang (2006) show that insider 
sales decrease before the restatement announcement, probably due to litigation 
concerns. More importantly, they find that managers tend to purchase shares 
following the announcement, while Agrawal and Cooper (2008) show that insiders 
generate significant profits in this setting.  More recently, Badertscher et al. (2011) 
show that the insider trading significantly affects the market reaction to the 
announcement of the restatement. Specifically, they show that insider sales 
intensify the adverse reaction to the announcement, while purchases moderate the 
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adverse reaction. Those findings suggest that the market employs directors’ signal 
when they are concerned about the quality of financial reporting. Managers could 
also induce noise in the cash flow component of earnings by manipulating real 
activities. Roychowdhury (2006) shows that managers reduce discretionary 
expenses such as R&D and advertising, increase production to report lower cost 
of goods sold or accelerate the timing of sales through increased price discounts 
in order to meet various earnings benchmarks. In contrast to manipulating accruals, 
real activities manipulation affects the underlying operating activities of the firm 
(Gunny (2010). In other words, real earnings management has an adverse effect 
on the firm’s operations. Consequently, the benefits from insider trading may not 
offset the costs associated with real earnings management. Consistently, Sawicki 
and Shrestha (2014) do not establish any relation between insider trading and real 
earnings management. Their findings further reinforce the motivation to investigate 
the relation between insider trading and discretion induced in accruals or 
alternative mechanisms by which earnings can be manipulated. One such 
mechanism that is investigated here is the discretion upon the capitalisation of R&D 
expenditures. Prior research has shown that this type of financial reporting 
discretion has been either employed to signal the good prospects of the firm’s R&D 
projects or abused as a means to inflate and smooth volatile earnings. The 
investigation undertaken in the thesis explores whether the insider trading 
disclosure, and more particularly, purchases have been employed by firms to 
discern the purpose of capitalisation. More importantly, the setting that is employed 
here allows us also to observe the extent to which market participants continue to 
rely on insider trading disclosure when financial reporting discretion is constrained.  
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2.4 Concluding remarks and contribution of the thesis 
This chapter summarises the literature which investigates the information role of 
insider trading. Insider trading has been a major controversy in the literature, and 
early research attempts to address the implications of insider trading on the 
informational efficiency of the market. On the one hand, insider trading is beneficial 
because of its informational role (Manne 1966; Lelenad, 1992; Carlton and Fischel; 
1983), while on the other hand, insider trading harms investors’ confidence and 
adversely affect the market participants’ information acquisition efforts, trading and 
liquidity. The first empirical chapter contributes to this stream of research by 
investigating the impact of insider trading on market efficiency. Specifically, this 
chapter investigates whether its disclosure results to more efficient prices by 
employing a setting where the market is known to be inefficient, namely the post 
earnings announcement drift. This is the first study to employ this setting to 
examine the consequences of insider trading for market efficiency. 
The post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) or a return continuation along the 
sign of the earnings surprise occurs as the market exhibits a delayed response to 
the information received during the earnings announcement. Following prior 
research, the research design in this chapter employs the timing together with the 
direction of insider trading to identify transactions that are informative about the 
managers’ private information for future earnings. Our initial findings confirm that 
the disclosure of informative insider trading mitigates the drift implying that insider 
trading conveys information about the implications of the earnings surprise for 
future earnings. However, the results do not support that the disclosure of insider 
trading assists market participants to unravel financial reporting discretion. Instead, 
it is shown that the disclosure of insider trading deters the efforts of market 
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participants from using the information in financial reporting discretion to interpret 
the earnings surprise. 
The second empirical chapter investigates the market’s assessment of financial 
reporting discretion when managers have the incentives to engage in opportunistic 
earnings management, and more importantly, have the opportunities to conceal its 
consequences. The opportunity to investigate such a setting is offered here by the 
case of stock acquisition announcements. Acquisitions financed with stock are 
associated with incentives to engage with opportunistic earnings management 
since the cost of the acquisition is inversely related to acquirers’ share price. 
Moreover, the post-acquisition environment offers opportunities to conceal the 
consequences of aggressive financial reporting discretion. The results of the 
empirical investigation in this chapter demonstrate that insider trading, and more 
particularly insider purchases that take place before the acquisition announcement 
and after the latest earnings announcement characterise financial reporting 
discretion that stems out of managers’ overconfidence. More particularly, the 
combination between this type of insider trading and earnings management denote 
optimistic managers who are also overly confident about their ability to control the 
consequences of aggressive accounting in the post-acquisition environment. The 
findings in this chapter suggest that the market is able to see through earnings 
management at the acquisition announcements. Nevertheless, the long term 
acquirers’ underperformance is driven by the firms exhibiting the combination 
between earnings management and insider purchases that are claimed here to be 
attributable to overconfident managers. While prior literature in acquisitions 
employs directors’ purchases as a proxy for overconfidence, we contribute to this 
literature by showing that its presence reinforces with high precision the optimism 
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inherent into earnings management. Our findings are in line with recent research 
by Ben-David et al. (2013) which indicates that the two distinctive aspects of 
overconfidence are managerial optimism and precision.  
Finally, the stream of research which investigates the relation between insider 
trading and earnings management suggests that the market could employ the 
disclosure of directors’ trading to assess whether managers’ underlying motivation 
for earnings management is opportunistic or signalling. Consequently, investors 
may face additional costs in order to process the information in earnings in an 
attempt to infer managers’ private information. An obvious reaction would be to 
constrain managers’ discretion up to a level that curbs the scope for opportunistic 
financial reporting practices while preserving the signalling content of the 
information provided. Chapter 5 focuses on the capitalisation of R&D and employs 
the transition from a discretionary capitalisation (SSAP 13) to a mandatory 
capitalisation (IAS 38) regime in the UK as a natural experiment to investigate the 
implications of constraining financial reporting discretion. The findings suggest a 
significant loss of information with respect to future earnings when managers’ 
discretion is constrained. Moreover, the evidence reported in this chapter 
demonstrates also a role for the disclosure of insider trading and more particularly, 
insider purchases for assisting market participants to learn about the motivation for 
engaging with capitalisation. The reported findings suggest also that such role for 
insider purchases exists only when significant discretion is allowed.  
The thesis concludes by a discussion of limitations in the research reported here 
as well as the opportunities for further research.  
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3 Informative insider trading and price discovery: Evidence from the post 
earnings announcement drift anomaly 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been argued that insider trading is a mechanism that allows relevant 
information held by insiders to be incorporated into stock market prices (Manne, 
1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983b; Leland, 1992).9 However, others have pointed 
out that allowing insiders to trade upon their private information reduces investor 
confidence and deters other market participants from acquiring information and 
trading (Ausubel, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). More recent research (Udpa, 
1996; Roulstone, 2008; Veenman, 2012) demonstrates that the disclosure of 
insider trading accelerates the rate at which earnings information is incorporated 
into prices. We contribute to this research by examining whether insider trading 
enhances or reduces stock market efficiency within a pervasive market inefficiency 
setting, namely the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) phenomenon. The 
PEAD is a return continuation along the sign of the earnings surprise, and 
represents a delayed response to an earnings surprise. We distinguish between 
informative and non-informative insider trading signals around an earnings 
announcement, and we report that informative insider trading mitigates the PEAD 
by providing information about the interpretation of the earnings surprise for future 
earnings. Hence, our results suggest that these trades are a mechanism for 
ensuring more efficient stock market prices. In contrast, we find non-informative 
                                            
9 We use the terms “insiders” and “directors” interchangeably to refer to corporate insiders with 
private information about their company 
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trades carry no information about future earnings, and appear to be responsible for 
exacerbating the PEAD anomaly.   
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to employ the PEAD setting for 
examining the capital market consequences of insider trading. The UK stock 
market provides an appropriate setting to address these questions, since the 
regulatory framework and common practice in the UK allow us to identify 
informative insider trading transactions that are disclosed in a timely manner.  We 
take advantage of two features of the London Stock Exchange regulations. First, 
there is a clearly-defined trading ban prescribed by the London Stock Exchange 
Model Code (1977) forbidding insiders, normally interpreted to be executive and 
non-executive directors of the company, from trading for two months prior to the 
earnings announcement, and we use this trading ban to define informative trades.10 
In contrast, companies in the US often have voluntary self-imposed restrictions to 
insiders trading around the earnings announcement, which may differ across firms 
(Bettis, Coles, Lemmon, 2000). Second, the disclosure rules for corporate insider 
trades on the London Stock Exchange allow for the timely disclosure of insider 
trading.11 Following Garfinkel (1997), Seyhun (1998) and Hillier and Marshall 
(2002a), we distinguish between two types of insider trading, depending on their 
timing relative to the earnings announcement and the trading ban two months prior 
to the earnings announcement: active trades, which occur prior to the earnings 
announcement and passive trades which occur after the earnings 
                                            
10 The Model Code is part of the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange (see 
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/LR/9/Annex1) 
11 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) summarises the disclosure rules of the persons discharging 
managerial responsibilities for firms listed in the UK 
(see http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/DTR/3/1). 
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announcement.12 Further, we classify trades as informative and non-informative 
taking into account the direction of the trade in relation to the earnings surprise. 
“Active informative trades” are those trades by insiders that occur in the window 
immediately preceding the trading ban (so more than two months before the 
earnings announcement) and anticipate the earnings surprise component, that is 
being in the same direction as the earnings surprise. This is the most natural 
definition of how insiders exploit their private information, and because these trades 
occur sometime before the earnings announcement, are unlikely to fall foul of any 
insider trading regulations. “Passive informative trades” in contrast, are those 
insider trades that take place after the earnings surprise has been revealed and 
occur in the opposite direction to the earnings surprise, reflecting insiders’ beliefs 
that the stock market response to the announcement has been completed.13 By 
opposite direction we mean that insiders act in a contrarian fashion: buying after 
bad news or selling after good news. All other trades by insiders i.e. before the 
earnings announcement in the opposite direction to the earnings surprise, and after 
the earnings announcement in the same direction as the earnings announcement 
are classified as “non-informative insider trades”. We examine the effects of active 
and passive informative trading on the PEAD anomaly by calculating average 
abnormal returns in the six months after the earnings announcement (measured 
for six months from day +6 to day +137) and conditioning the sample on those 
                                            
12 Investigating insider trading occurring after the earnings announcement is important because 
insiders in the UK are allowed to trade as early as the earnings announcement day itself, which 
coincides with the end of the two months trading ban. 
13 For instance, Seyhun (1998) notes that an insider who plans to buy but has private information 
on the future release of bad news will refrain from buying until after the negative news is announced; 
conversely, an insider who plans to sell and has private information on the release of good news 
will postpone the trade until after the public news announcement. In the former case, the insider 
avoids having a capital loss from buying at a high price and in the later, the insider exploits the 
opportunity to sell at a higher price.  
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observations where there has been active informed trading, passive informed 
trading and non-informative trading.  
We report that the PEAD anomaly is alive and well for our sample of UK firms, 
based on 5,392 annual earnings announcements over the period 1990-2009, with 
the unconditional spread returns to a winner-loser hedge portfolio in the six months 
window after the earnings announcement, averaging a significant 4.54 percentage 
points. However, our results confirm that the disclosure of active and passive 
informative trades mitigates the PEAD anomaly. We find that if we condition on 
active informative trades the spread portfolio is reduced to an insignificant 1.41 
percentage points, and for passive informative trades the spread portfolio is 
reduced to an insignificant 1.84 percentage points. These results hold when we 
treat active and passive informative trades separately and when we aggregate 
active and passive informative trades together. We find that for aggregated 
informative trades the spread portfolio is an insignificant 1.92 percentage points. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of size, momentum and the book-to-
market factors.  
The evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that informative insider trading 
conveys information about the implications of the earnings surprise for future 
earnings earlier than would otherwise be the case and consequently reduces the 
PEAD anomaly. In contrast, the disclosure of non-informative insider transactions 
in those windows, elicit a subsequent drift which suggests that these trades appear 
to generate uncertainty among market participants. We further show that our 
results hold after controlling for information acquisition costs using the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals. Prior research shows that information acquisition costs 
and the ensuing information uncertainty prevent arbitrageurs to eliminate the PEAD 
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until more information is received. Nevertheless, the findings here suggest also that 
the disclosure of insider trading is a sub-optimal mechanism for promoting market 
efficiency as it deters market participants from engaging with a fundamental-based 
information acquisition process.  
This chapter contributes to the body of research that has investigated the influence 
of informative trading on the PEAD anomaly. Bartov et al. (2002) considers the 
effect of the presence of skilled investors while, Vega (2006) analyses an 
aggregate measure of information-based trading (PIN). However, Richardson et al. 
(2010) argues that the quality of these proxies may be questionable, especially for 
measures based on trade size, because of informed strategies that split orders. We 
measure information based trading by focusing on the trades of corporate insiders 
who are likely to have superior information due to their position in the company. 
Given the concerns in Richardson et al. (2010), the quality our measure of 
information based trading is unlikely to be questionable, in contrast to the proxies 
prior literature employed. While adding to the literature on PEAD, we also 
contribute to the research which investigates how the disclosure of insider trading 
accelerates the incorporation of earnings information into price (Udpa, 1996; 
Roulstone, 2008; Veenman, 2012). More specifically, Udpa (1996) and Roulstone 
(2008) show that insider trading prior to an earnings announcement reduce 
subsequent earnings surprises while Veenman (2012) shows that directors’ 
purchases help investors price past earnings. The approach taken in those studies, 
however, cannot inform the extent to which insider trading has implication for 
market efficiency. This chapter contributes to this line of research by investigating 
the role of insider trading for market efficiency. The present study is also related to 
Kolasinski and Li (2010) who show that insiders purchase (sell) shares following 
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the announcement of good news (bad news) when the market underreacts to 
earnings news in an attempt to exploit the under reaction. In contrast to Kolasinski 
and Li (2010), we focus on insider purchases following the announcement of bad 
news and insider sales following the announcement of good news. When we 
employ the insider trading in the same direction with the earnings surprise our 
results are similar to Kolasinski and Li (2010). In addition, we consider trades that 
also occur prior to the earnings announcement as well trades after the earnings 
announcement. Furthermore, their study examines the pre-SOX period where 
insider trades could take up to one month to be disclosed to the market.14 In 
contrast, we focus on the UK setting where insider trading transactions have been 
disclosed in a timely manner. Furthermore, the most common policy in the US 
prevents managers from trading in the days following the earnings announcement 
(Bettis et al., 2000). In contrast, in the UK directors may trade as early as the 
earnings announcement day itself (Hillier and Marshall, 2002a); hence insiders in 
the UK are better able to exploit any under-reaction to the earnings announcement 
news.  
The timeliness of insider trading transactions is also a critical feature of the process 
during which the market learns from insiders’ private information. Huddart et al. 
(2001) demonstrate analytically that timely disclosure of insider trades accelerates 
price discovery. Moreover, recent empirical evidence documents a positive relation 
between the timeliness of insider trading disclosure and its information content 
(Brochet, 2010). This is a pertinent issue, especially with regard to the disclosure 
of transactions immediately after the earnings announcement. We can reasonably 
                                            
14 Prior to the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the public disclosure of insider trades could be 
reported as late as the tenth day of the following calendar month.    
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assume that the UK regulatory environment combined with directors’ practices 
ensure that the disclosure of those trades is sufficiently timely. The Model Code 
requires directors to report their trades to the company no later than the fourth day 
after the transaction occurred. In turn, the company has to notify the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) no later than the following day, when the information about the 
trade is disseminated to the market. Therefore, directors’ trades should be 
announced to the market no more than six days after a director’s trade. However, 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) note that 85% of the directors trades  in the UK are announced 
to the market the same day they occur or the following day, since insiders, following 
the Model Code guidelines typically notify the board of directors prior to the insider 
trading (Hillier and Marshall, 2002b). Our data confirm Fidrmuc et al.’s (2006) 
findings. Specifically, 84.56% of shares of the shares traded in the period following 
an earnings announcement are disclosed in the same or the following day, while 
62.96% of the shares traded prior to the start of the trading ban are announced in 
the same or the following day.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and develops our hypotheses on the role of informative insider 
trading in addressing the PEAD anomaly. Section 3 explains the methodology that 
we employ to provide evidence on our research questions. Section 4 describes the 
data and the construction of our variables. Section 5 discusses our findings and 
section 6 presents the conclusions of the study.  
3.2 Hypothesis development 
In an efficient market, investors would promptly appreciate the full implications of 
earnings information. However, the post earnings announcement literature 
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provides significant evidence that defies the market efficiency axiom as market 
participants appear to be consistently sluggish in appreciating the implications of 
an earnings surprise for future earnings. The examination of the post earnings 
announcement drift anomaly began with the seminal work of Ball and Brown (1968) 
who were the first to report that firms with good earnings experience an upward 
drift in their share price while firms announcing bad earnings experience a 
downward drift, and thereby producing a return continuation, or drift.  This regularity 
has generated a large literature that attempts to explain why prices do not reflect 
all of the information contained in current earnings changes in a timely manner.15  
In this study, we provide evidence to that body of research on PEAD that has 
suggested that the PEAD is dissipated in the presence of informative insider 
trading.  This literature has argued that the market improves its inferences of 
earnings surprises for future earnings by observing the trades of individuals who 
have superior information.  Bartov et al. (2002) employs institutional investors as a 
proxy for sophisticated investors and finds that their holdings are negatively 
correlated with PEAD. More recently, Vega (2006) finds that shares of firms 
associated with high PIN, a measure of the probability of private information-based 
trading based on abnormal order flows (excess buying or selling), experience low 
or insignificant drift. While Bartov et al. (2002) considers the presence of skilful 
investors and Vega (2006) looks at an aggregate measure of information-based 
trading (PIN), Richardson et al. (2010) questions the quality of these proxies, 
                                            
15 A comprehensive literature review of the PEAD literature can be found in Richardson et al. (2010) 
and Kothari (2001). In summary, the PEAD  has been attributed to a risk explanation (Kim and Kim, 
2003), limits to arbitrage (Mendenhall, 2004; Ng et al., 2008), cognitive biases (Liang, 2003; 
Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009), investors’ lack of sophistication (Bartov et al., 
2000; Shanthikumar, 2004; Battalio and Mendenhall, 2005) and investors’ ‘‘rational structural 
uncertainty’’ (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005; Vega, 2006; Francis et al., 2007). 
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especially for measures based on trade size. The strategy of stealth trading 
(Barclay and Warner, 1993) and the increased use of algorithmic trading by 
institutional investors results in trades being smaller in size. Consequently, it 
becomes difficult to attribute small trades to less informed individuals. Instead, we 
identify information-based trading as being transacted by individuals who are privy 
to inside information: corporate insiders.  In contrast to institutional investors, these 
insiders are likely to be in a better position to compute the firm’s intrinsic value than 
other sophisticated investors, and are able to trade and take advantage of this 
knowledge, provided they are not violating any legal or regulatory rules (i.e., outside 
of the trading ban period in the UK). We draw upon the insider trading literature to 
define the specific transactions that are likely to be information-based in the context 
of earnings announcements. Seyhun (1998), Garfinkel (1997) and Hillier and 
Marshall (2002a) consider two types of insider transactions that are designed to 
exploit their private information and whose disclosure is likely to be  informative.  
The first type are those transactions that anticipate the subsequent earnings 
surprise component and are referred to as active informative trades; and a second 
type of contrarian transactions, referred to as passive informative trades that occur 
after the earnings announcement in the opposite direction to the earnings surprise.  
In line with the Kyle (1985) insider trading model, the trading activity by an informed 
trader will partially reveal her information to the market. Since insiders are uniquely 
informed, their trades will disseminate information to the market, so their decision 
to trade will have valuation implications.16 Insider trading taking place prior to an 
event is likely to assist market participants in pricing the event. Consequently, when 
                                            
16 There is an extensive literature documenting that the announcement of insider trades results in 
significant market reaction (Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2004; Brochet 2010 for the US, 
and in the Gregory et al., 1997; Fidrmuc et al., 2006)  
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insiders’ trades are revealed to the market, share prices become more efficient and 
less sensitive to the forthcoming event itself. In line with this reasoning, Udpa 
(1996) and Roulstone (2008) show that insider trading prior to an earnings 
announcement (active insider trading) allows the market to make inferences about 
future earnings. We extend this stream of research and identify those trades that 
are likely to be informative with regards to the upcoming earnings announcement. 
Following Hillier and Marshall (2002a), Garfinkel (1997) and Seyhun (1998), we 
focus specifically on insiders’ trades that anticipate the surprise component of 
earnings announcement. A positive (negative) surprise following insider purchases 
(sales) is likely to be surrounded by less uncertainty when the disclosure of 
directors’ trades has pre-empted the news in the earnings surprise. Therefore, our 
first hypothesis suggests that the price discovery process is accelerated when the 
disclosure of insider trading is in line with the direction of the forthcoming earnings 
announcement surprise:  
H1: Active informative insider trades that anticipate the earnings surprise 
attenuate the Post Earnings Announcement Drift anomaly.  
Seyhun (1998) suggests a second type of informed trading which he refers to as 
passive informed trading, which is when insiders delay their trades until the impact 
of an announcement has been observed and trade after this announcement. He 
argues that such trading occurs when insiders who want to buy (sell) trade after 
the release of short-term bad (good) news. These trades may reveal insiders’ 
information about the likely long-run performance of the firm. For instance, 
Veenman (2012) shows that directors’ purchases assist investors in pricing past 
earnings. Drawing upon Seyhun (1998), we argue that insider trading that occurs 
after the earnings announcement in the opposite direction to the surprise 
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announcement (buy trade following negative surprise, or sell trade following 
positive earnings surprise) accelerates price discovery by conveying insiders’ 
private information that past performance in reported earnings has been 
completed. To the extent that those trades are delayed transactions motivated by 
the insiders’ anticipation of the direction of the surprise, their disclosure conveys 
the insiders’ private information that prices fully reflect the information in the 
surprise. In the case of positive (negative) surprise, insiders’ sales (purchases) 
communicate that share prices have fully absorbed the good (bad) news given the 
insiders’ information set. Our second hypothesis is as follows:    
H2: Passive informative insider trades that occur after the earnings 
announcement in the opposite direction to the surprise announcement 
attenuate the Post Earnings Announcement Drift anomaly.  
Our first two hypotheses test separately whether either of the two types of 
informative insider trading, active and passive, attenuate or exacerbate the PEAD 
anomaly. Both of these hypotheses relate to the extent to which insider trading 
provides information to the market about future earnings earlier than would 
otherwise be the case. We also test the proposition that informative insider trading, 
irrespectively of their timing, contributes to price discovery. We test this hypothesis 
by aggregating active and passive informative trades to allow for a more precise 
inference about the consequences of the earnings surprise for future earnings. 
H3: Both active and passive informative insider trades jointly (aggregated 
informative insider trades) attenuate the Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
anomaly.  
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We now go on to explain the research methodology that we will adopt to test these 
three hypotheses.  
3.3 Research design  
In common with the extant literature on the PEAD, we investigate the association 
between the earnings surprise component and subsequent returns as follows:  
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ߙ଴ + ߙସܷܧ௜,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧         (3.1) 
where,  BHAR denotes size adjusted buy and hold abnormal returns measured 
from six days after the earnings announcement to six months later, where a month 
is defined in terms of 21 trading days; UE is the quintile rank of the earnings 
surprise, where the cut-off points are determined by the distribution of the earnings 
surprise in the previous year.17 We define unexpected earnings as the difference 
between the actual earnings per-share (EPS) and the forecasted EPS by the 
timeliest analysts prior to the earnings announcement (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; 
Ayers et al., 2011). As with prior research, we control for the effect of size, 
momentum and book-to-market (e.g. Core et al., 2006; Hirshleifer et al., 2008; 
Louis and Sun, 2011) by means of the quintile rank of the corresponding variable. 
We also control for the cross-sectional and time-series correlation by clustering 
standard errors by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). Following the evidence 
presented on PEAD for the UK (Hew et al., 1996; Liu et al., 2003) and the US (e.g. 
Ball and Brown, 1968; Ayers et al., 2011), we predict that the market under-reacts 
to the earnings surprise. In model (1), this will be represented by a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient ܽଵ denoting an abnormal returns drift along with 
                                            
17 This restriction is necessary since not all companies announce their earnings at the same time. 
This is a pertinent issue for UK companies since only a small percentage of firms have a fiscal year 
end at the end of December.  
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the sign of the earnings surprise UE. In our subsequent analysis, we follow 
Mendenhall (2004) and Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992)  to re-define  UE as  
RUE, a variable taking the value “-0.5” if an observation belongs to the bottom 
quintile rank of earnings surprise and “0.5” if an observation belongs to the top 
quintile rank of earnings surprise. Following this treatment, the difference between 
the extreme portfolios amounts to one and therefore, α1 represents the difference 
in the average abnormal returns between observations in the highest and the 
lowest unexpected earnings portfolios. Alternatively, α1 corresponds to the returns 
to a zero investment strategy going long in the highest and short in the lowest 
unexpected earnings portfolios. With regard to the intermediate portfolios, we 
follow Core et al. (2006) and set  RUE  to be equal to zero.  
In order to test our first two hypotheses, we adjust model (3.1) by partitioning the 
response to the earnings surprise conditional on the presence of active informative 
trading (Ainf) and passive informative trading (Pinf).18 More specifically, we modify 
(1) as:  
 ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܣ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଶ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଷܰܣ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସܣ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ +
ܾହܲ݅݊ ௜݂,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧                                                                     (3.2) 
where   Ainf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades anticipate the earnings 
surprise, and zero otherwise; Pinf_RUE  equals to RUE when directors trade after 
the earnings announcement in the opposite direction to the earnings surprise, and 
                                            
18A similar approach to splitting (truncating) independent variables is undertaken in Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) and  Skaife et al. (2013). We prefer splitting unexpected earnings based on the 
presence of informative insider trading, as opposed to including interaction terms, since the 
coefficient of the regressions corresponds to the difference in the average abnormal returns 
between observations in the highest and the lowest unexpected earnings portfolios. In other words, 
the coefficients in the regressions correspond to the zero investment strategies presented in Table 
3.3 after controlling for the effects of size, momentum and book-to-market which explain abnormal 
returns and consequently the drift following the earnings announcement.   
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zero otherwise; and  NAPinf_RUE equals to RUE in any remaining case, including 
observations without any insider trading. From hypotheses H1 and H2 we expect 
the coefficients b1 and b2 will be insignificant, indicating that either types of 
informative insider trading attenuate the drift.19 We also include the main effect 
variables Ainf and Pinf in order to control for possible effects of informative insider 
trading on the subsequent abnormal returns.  
In order to test our hypothesis (H3) that both types of informative trading, 
irrespectively of their timing, attenuates investors’ under-reaction to earnings 
announcement, we aggregate the two types of informative trading into a single 
variable (Inf) and adjust model (3.2) as follows: 
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଶܰܣ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܫ݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧      
     (3.3) 
So far, our research design relies on the assumption that it is only the specific 
informative insider trades that attenuate the PEAD. It is still an open empirical 
question whether the disclosure of any other type of insider trading within the 
windows that we employ here, have a similar effect on the market’s inferences 
about the information contained in these trades. Therefore, we want to examine 
whether the remaining transactions aggregated within the  NAPinf_RUE variable in 
(3.2) or (3.3) have a similar effect in mitigating the PEAD. We refer to these 
remaining transactions as non-informative. If we do not find any evidence that these 
                                            
19 We eliminate cases where insiders engage in both types of informative insider trading in order to 
avoid confounding the response coefficient to either  Ainf_RUE or Pinf_RUE. Although we 
acknowledge that insiders reversing their initial positions are an interesting category by itself, the 
limited number of observations prevents us from drawing conclusive evidence in this respect. 
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transactions have a mitigating impact on PEAD, this will corroborate the evidence 
on the role of informative trading as hypothesized above.  
In order to investigate this concern, we modify (3.2) by disaggregating the  
NAPinf_RUE to cases where directors’ trades do not anticipate the earnings 
surprise (NAinf_RUE), cases where directors trade in the same direction as the 
earnings surprise (NPinf_RUE) and cases where directors abstain from trading 
during the windows surrounding the trading ban period, as follows:  
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܣ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଶ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଷܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସܰܣ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ +
ܾହ݂ܰܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾ଺ܣ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾ଻ܲ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ଼ܾܰܣ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾଽܰܲ݅݊ ௜݂,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	ߝ௜,௧  
(3.4) 
where, NT_RUE is equal to RUE when directors abstain from trading during the 
windows surrounding the trading ban period, and zero otherwise;  NAinf_RUE is 
set equal to RUE when directors trades do not anticipate the earnings surprise, and 
zero otherwise;  NPinf_RUE is equal to RUE when directors trade in the same 
direction as the earnings surprise, and zero otherwise.  
Extending our hypothesis H1, insider trades that occur in the window before the 
earnings announcement and do not anticipate the earnings surprise provide 
contradictory information which may confuse market participants at the date of the 
earnings announcement. Consequently, such trades reinforces market uncertainty 
in the interpretation of the surprise and results to the formation of the PEAD. 
Therefore, we predict a positive and significant coefficient for  NAinf_RUE. 
Extending our hypothesis H2, we also predict a similar finding with respect to the 
coefficient of   NPinf_RUE. More specifically, insider trades after the earnings 
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announcement that follow the direction of the surprise represent insiders’ beliefs 
based on their private information that share prices have yet to reflect fully the news 
in the earnings announcement. In other words, insiders purchases (sales) following 
good (bad) news convey the message that insiders conduct those transactions 
because they anticipate share prices to further increase (decrease). We believe 
that this also creates uncertainty among market participants about the implications 
of the surprise for future earnings and contributes to a subsequent drift. In line with 
this argument, Kolasinski and Li (2010) show that insiders purchases (sales) 
following the announcement of good (bad) leads to higher subsequent returns in 
the same direction with the surprise. Evidence consistent with the above 
predictions, will provide corroborative evidence to support further H1 and H2 that 
only those trades which we define as active or passive informative mitigate the 
anomaly. Finally, we expect that in the absence of any insiders’ trades, returns will 
exhibit a drift that is consistent with the overall evidence on PEAD and therefore, 
we predict a positive and significant coefficient for NT_RUE. Note also that, similar 
to (3.2), we add the main effect variables  NAinf and  NPinf to control for possible 
effects of non-informative insider trading on subsequent abnormal returns.  
We inform our H3 hypothesis by testing the impact of the disclosure of informative 
trading on the PEAD as opposed to disclosure of non-informative trading. We 
modify (3.3) by disaggregating NAPinf_RUE to cases with non-informative (active 
or passive) insider trading (Ninf_RUE) and cases where directors abstain from 
trading (NT_RUE), as follows: 
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଶܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷ݂ܰ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ +
ܾହܰ݅݊ ௜݂,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	ߝ௜,௧                (3.5) 
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From the preceding discussion, we predict that the disclosure of non-informative 
insider trading is not likely to mitigate the drift. Consequently, we expect that the 
coefficient of  Ninf_RUE will be positive and significant.. Empirical evidence 
supporting this prediction will provide corroborative evidence in support of H3 that 
only those trades which we define as informative mitigate the anomaly. In line with 
H3, we expect the coefficient of inf_RUE to be insignificant denoting that the 
presence of informative insider trading attenuates the drift and assists in price 
discovery.  
3.4 Data and empirical proxies 
3.4.1 Data 
Our initial sample includes 19,205 annual earnings announcements from 1990 to 
2009 available in Bloomberg and I/B/E/S of non-financial companies.20 We obtain 
analysts’ forecasts from the detailed file from I/B/E/S and we define earnings 
surprise similarly to prior research (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; Ayers et al., 2011), as 
follows: 
UE= (Actual_EPSi,t-Forecasted_EPSi,t)/Pi,t-1 
where,Actual_EPS is the actual earnings per share reported in I/B/E/S for year t; 
Forecasted_EPS is the single most recent forecast made by the timeliest analysts 
prior to the earnings announcement;21 and  Pi,t-1 is the stock price at the previous 
                                            
20 We further exclude earnings announcement taking place after 200 days from the fiscal year end. 
21 Following Bartov et al. (2002), we only consider the latest forecast preceding the earnings 
announcement by at least three days. We acknowledge that using the latest forecast is quite 
common (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Ayers et al., 2011) and is known to be 
more closely related to the market reaction at the earnings announcement (Brown and Kim, 1991). 
We further exclude forecasts preceding the earnings announcement by more than 200 days to 
prevent stale forecasts being included in the analysis. Bartov et al. (2002) also follow a similar 
approach.   
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fiscal year end. Consistent with prior studies, UEi,t is converted into quintiles of 
earnings surprise based on the magnitude of the surprise. We acknowledge that 
not all companies announce earnings at the same time and the distribution of 
earnings surprise might not be known prior to the portfolio formation date. 
Therefore, we define the quintiles of the earnings surprise based on the distribution 
of the preceding year’s surprises. These procedures reduce our sample by 11,275 
observations.22 We further eliminate 1,213 observations due to missing market 
data from Datastream. Following the calculation of discretionary accruals the 
sample is further reduced by 961 observations.23 In order to limit the influence of 
extreme observations we trim market data and all the variables used to estimate 
the discretionary accruals variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their 
distributions.24 Finally, we exclude further 174 firm-year observations which exhibit 
insider trading in both the periods surrounding the trading ban or show insider 
trading violating the trading  ban; the insufficient number of observations within the 
extreme quantiles of earnings surprise do not allow us to consider them as a 
separate category. This process yields a final sample of 5,392 observations 
corresponding to 979 firms. Table 3.1 summarises the sample selection procedure.  
 
  
                                            
22 The significant drop of our sample due to the requirement of analyst forecast available in IBES is 
not so surprising and is in line with prior research in the UK employing analysts’ forecasts from 
IBES. For instance, instance Liu et al., (2003) employ a sample of 835 firms from 1988 to 1998, 
while Athanasakou et al. (2011) employ a sample of 1,061 firms from 1994 to 2004.  
23 Companies with accounting reporting period of less than 340 and more than 380 days are also 
excluded from the sample (similarly to García Lara et al., 2005).  
24 Given the use of quintile ranks for all the variables, apart from the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
measuring the drift, there should be no further influence of outliers, consistently with the extent 
research on the PEAD anomaly.  
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Table 3.1: Sample selection 
Annual earnings announcements 19,205 
Missing analysts data 11,275 
Missing market data 1,213 
Missing accounting data 961 
Outliers 190 
Other exclusions 174 
Final Sample 5,392 (979 firms) 
 
3.4.2 Abnormal returns 
We calculate the post earnings announcement returns as the buy and hold size-
adjusted returns beginning from +6 day and ending 6 months later, relative to the 
earnings announcement.25 We estimate the benchmark returns on both an equal 
and a value-weighted basis.  Our calculations of abnormal returns follow closely 
the procedure described in prior research in the UK (e.g. Gregory et al., 2010). To 
construct the size control portfolios, each year, all UK firms are ranked in decile 
portfolios according to their market capitalisation at the beginning of the year. The 
return for each size control portfolio is then tracked from January of year t, with the 
returns being value-weighted according to their initial market capitalisations. A 
further problem that we confront is that Datastream would report missing returns if 
firms in the sample are de-listed. This has the potential to create an upward bias in 
the estimated BHAR returns, since some of these de-listings are bankruptcies. In 
computing BHAR returns, de-listed firms were treated on the basis of the following 
rule. If a de-listed firm has preserved its value (such as a merger or an acquisition), 
we replace the return of that firm by the return of the benchmark. If the delisting is 
                                            
25 In order to alleviate the concerns expressed in prior research (Ince and Porter, 2006) with regards 
to returns estimated from the Return Index (RI) data-item from Datastream, we calculate returns 
using prices and dividends from Datastream and screen daily returns in the same way Specifically, 
we replace returns equal to missing if the return on any given day is above 300% or (1 + Rt)(1 + 
Rt−1) −1 is less than 50%. 
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due to a total loss of value (bankruptcy), we replace the return by −1. In making 
this distinction, we use the LSPD G10 description. The most important codes are 
7, 16, 20 and 21 which are the types of delisting most likely to be firms that are 
either worthless or a long way from giving shareholders any terminal value, and so 
we treat these cases as if investors lost all their investment. By contrast, the 
remaining types of de-listing would seem to be value preserving.  
Finally, the UK market is characterised by the high frequency of missing returns 
due to thin trading. In order to address thin trading, we calculate both trade-to-trade 
returns and lumped returns (Maynes and Rumsey, 1993; Campbell et al., 2010).26 
More specifically, trade to trade returns are calculated returns from non-missing 
price days. For a stock with a missing price, the corresponding portfolio return is 
added to the next non-missing price day’s portfolio return for a trade to trade 
abnormal return calculation. On the other hand, lumped returns consist of trade to 
trade returns on non-missing price days and zero on missing price days with no 
adjustment to the portfolio return when returns are missing, given that procedure 
does not allow for missing returns. 27 
3.4.3 Insider trading  
We obtain information on directors’ trading from the Hemmington Scott Directors’ 
Trading Dataset for the period from 1996-2008 and before that year, from Directus 
Ltd. In line with prior research in the UK (e.g. Pope et al., 1990; Gregory et al., 
1994; Hillier and Marshall, 2002b; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), we define insider 
transactions as purchases or sales by both executive and non-executive 
                                            
26 We report the results for trade to trade returns. However, using lumped returns yields qualitative 
the same results.  
27 In addition, to avoid abnormal returns being influenced by thin trading we also require at least 50 
trading days within the period where we measure PEAD. 
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directors.28 Motivated by prior literature (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Core et al., 
2006; Sawicki and Shrestha, 2008; Beneish et al., 2012), we use a firm-specific net 
measure of insider trading aggregating all directors’ trading activity. Following prior 
research (e.g. John and Lang, 1991; Beneish, 1999), we calculate the net 
purchases ratio (NPR) defined as follows: 
NPR = [PURCHASES – SALES]/[PURCHASES+SALES] 
where PURCHASES is the number of shares purchased by directors and SALES 
is the number of shares sold. A positive NPR could be the result of directors 
purchasing more shares or selling fewer shares and vice versa for a negative NPR. 
A positive NPR indicates net insider buying, whereas a negative NPR indicates net 
insider selling.29 In order to ensure that we capture insiders’ private information, 
NPR is estimated by using only open market purchases and sales of common 
shares. The need to focus on open market transactions is also confirmed by the 
findings in Veenman et al. (2011) who show that only open market purchases are 
associated with positive future news as opposed to stock options conversions. The 
main interest of the present study is insider trading transactions that take place and 
are disclosed in the period prior to the start of the trading ban (NPRbefore) as well 
as the period following an earnings announcement (NPRafter). Following Hillier 
and Marshall (2002a), we calculate NPRbefore within the 10 days prior the start of 
the trading ban.  Moreover, we calculate the NPRafter ratio within the first five days 
from the earnings announcement. The five days window is employed here in order 
to capture the disclosure of early trades which are more likely to be motivated by 
                                            
28 We do not examine illegal insider trading; rather, we focus on legal insider trading by directors.  
29 We have also used the value of shares purchased and sold and the results are qualitative the 
same.   
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the insiders’ information advantage. Figure 3.1 shows the periods which we 
measure director’s trading as well as the period which we measure abnormal 
returns.   
 
Figure 3.1:Timeline for insider trading and drift measurement relative to earnings announcement 
 
Notes: 
Figure 1 depicts the period of directors trading measurement as well as drift measurement relative 
to the earnings announcement.  
 
 
3.4.4 Discretionary accruals 
We use the Modified Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals which 
predicts the level of “non-discretionary” accruals as a function of the growth in 
revenues and gross property, plant and equipment. We estimate discretionary 
accruals in a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, a total accruals variable for 
firm i, year t and sector j (two- digit ICB industry classification30)  is regressed upon 
the change in revenues and gross property, plant and equipment where all 
variables are scaled by the beginning total assets for each year. 31The second 
                                            
30 The two digit ICB provides 15 industry classifications whereas the equivalent SIC leads to 66 
industries classifications, excluding missing and financial observations. We require at least 6 
observations for each industry-year sub-sample (similarly to García Lara et al., 2005). 
31 The accounting data are sourced from Worldscope for all the UK domicile companies. The total 
accruals are estimated as Income Before Extra Items (WC04001) – Total Funds From Operations 
(WC04201) - Other Funds From Operations (WC04831). Other accounting data employed here are: 
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stage predicts the non-discretionary component of accruals using the estimated 
coefficients from the first stage. Note that in second stage, the influence of the cash 
sales is also taken into account by introducing the change in receivables, similarly 
to Dechow et al.  (1995).32 The “non-discretionary” part of the accruals then 
represents an estimate of the expected level of accruals and the remaining 
component is presumed to include managements’ discretion on accruals. 
Moreover, since performance might also be a determinant of  the level of accruals, 
the estimated discretionary accruals here are also “performance adjusted” in the 
manner advocated by Kothari et al. (2005)  by adding return on assets (ROA) as 
an additional explanatory variable in both stages.  
Since firms do not announce their earnings at the same time, the variables used to 
calculate discretionary accruals are not available for all firms in the same industry-
year portfolio. Therefore, the entire distribution of discretionary accruals is typically 
unknown to the investors at the earnings announcement and, as a result, the hedge 
portfolio strategies that underlie our investigation cannot be implemented. Similarly 
to Louis and Sun (2011), we address this issue by estimating the accrual model 
one year prior to the portfolio formation and then apply the estimated coefficients 
to the second stage of the estimation process. Furthermore, similarly to the 
                                            
change in sales (WC01001), total assets (WC02999) and change in receivables (WC02051).In 
order to mitigate the influence of outliers, extreme values of the distribution to the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of the above variables are excluded from the analysis. The use of the Worldscope 
database is motivated by the wish to ensure comparability with previous research as well as for 
data availability reasons. Notably, Worldscope data can be downloaded by either Datastream or 
Thomson One Banker. In order to ensure the maximum coverage available, both sources have 
been employed and subsequently, the two datasets are merged based their SEDOL or their ISIN 
number. 
32 The change in receivables is included in order to control for managers’ attempts to manipulate 
earnings through discretionary revenues. For instance, managers may use their discretion to 
recognise revenues for which cash has yet  to be received or have yet to be earned. This situation 
would result in reporting increased sales and accruals through increased receivables (Dechow et 
al., 1995). 
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treatment of UE, discretionary accruals are then converted to tercile ranks based 
on their (absolute) magnitude with the cut-off points determined at the year before. 
3.5 Analysis 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of net purchase ratio before and after the 
earnings announcement, earnings surprise (UE) and post earnings announcement 
equally and value weighted abnormal returns (BHAR-EW and BHAR-VW 
respectively) by quintile of earnings surprise. The descriptive statistics of the net 
purchases ratio reveal insiders appear to refrain from trading prior to the earnings 
announcement and they tend to trade more after the earnings announcement, 
possibly due to the anticipation of reputation or litigation concerns.  In line with prior 
evidence in the UK (e.g. Gregory et al., 2011), we also we find that insiders 
purchase more shares in both periods we employ. This finding may not be so 
surprising given that during the points in time where we capture insider trading, we 
expect to see a lot of information based trading rather the usual trading for liquidity 
purposes and therefore sales in big blocks. Firms on the top quintile of earnings 
surprise outperform firms in the bottom quintile of earnings surprise by 4.54% 
based on equally weighted returns (4.68% value weighted) and are statistically 
significant. In other words, a strategy going long on firms belonging to the top 
quintile of earnings surprise and short on firms belonging to the bottom quintile 
would yield a 4.54% (4.68%) return. The returns pattern among the quintiles of 
earnings surprise as well as the spread between the top and bottom portfolios are 
evidence indicating the presence of the PEAD anomaly and are consistent with the 
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findings reported in prior research in the UK (Hew et al., 1996; Liu et al., 2003) and 
for the US (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Ayers et al., 2011).  
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Portfolio 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1) 
NPRafter      
 
 N 128 171 163 167 111 
 
 Mean 0.6094 0.6175 0.5897 0.4691 0.5609 
 
 Median 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
NPRbefore      
 
 N 77 183 167 137 70 
 
 Mean 0.4547 0.5145 0.5969 0.5105 0.5389 
 
 Median 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
N 1126 1172 1000 1115 979  
UE       
  Mean -0.3851 -0.0013 0.0007 0.0039 0.1245  
  Median -0.0154 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0033 0.0216  
|DAC|       
 Mean 0.0680 0.0646 0.0564 0.0644 0.0683  
 Median 0.0521 0.0500 0.0428 0.0533 0.0520  
BHAR-EW       
  Mean -0.0004 0.0071 0.0136** 0.0196*** 0.0449*** 0.0454*** 
  p-values 0.4792 0.1312 0.0268 0.0019 0.0000 0.0001 
  Median -0.0030 0.0141 0.0088 0.0148** 0.0444*** 0.0474*** 
  p-values 0.7874 0.1289 0.1304 0.0151 0.0000 0.0001 
BHAR-VW       
  Mean -0.0003 0.0054 0.0119** 0.0208*** 0.0464*** 0.0468*** 
  p-values 0.4829 0.2006 0.0490 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 
  Median -0.0005 0.0105 0.0037 0.0136*** 0.0459*** 0.0464*** 
  p-values 0.7752 0.2266 0.2212 0.0093 0.0000 0.0001 
 
Notes: 
NPRafter is the net purchase ratio calculated within the first five days from the earnings 
announcement; NPRbefore is the net purchase ratio calculated within the ten days prior to the start 
of the ban; UE is the earnings surprise calculated as the difference between the I/B/E/S actual 
reported earnings and the single most recent forecast deflated by the stock price; |DAC| is the tercile 
rank of the magnitude of the total discretionary accruals;  BHAR-EW is the equally weighted buy 
and hold abnormal return where with size defined as the market capitalisation at the beginning of 
the year; BHAR-VW is the value weighted buy and hold abnormal return where with size defined as 
the market capitalisation at the beginning of the year.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.3 shows the abnormal returns of the extreme portfolios of earnings surprise 
as well as the corresponding spread for the sub-samples of observations formed 
based on the definitions of informative trading employed here. More specifically, 
Panel A shows the abnormal returns for the “active” informative trading sub-
sample, Panel B for the “passive” informative trading sub-sample and Panel C 
aggregates the two-types of informative insider trading into a single aggregated 
“informative” trading sub-sample. The hedging strategies yield spreads that are 
insignificant across all three sub-samples. Consistent with hypotheses H1, H2, and 
H3, the results of those univariate tests suggest that the presence of informative 
trading accelerates the incorporation of earnings information into prices.  
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Table 3.3: Hedging returns of informative insider trading 
Portfolio 
Quintile 1 5 Spread (5-1) 
Panel A: Active informative trading 
N 20 53   
BHAR-EW     
  Mean 0.0154 0.0295 0.0141 
  p-values 0.3609 0.2624 0.5699 
  Median 0.0214 0.0097 -0.0117 
  p-values 0.4553 0.5680 0.9408 
BHAR-VW    
  Mean 0.0132 0.0319 0.0187 
  p-values 0.3812 0.2451 0.5926 
  Median 0.0255 0.0115 -0.0140 
  p-values 0.3905 0.5210 0.9408 
Panel B: Passive informative trading  
N 103 24   
BHAR-EW     
  Mean 0.0081 0.0265 0.0184 
  p-values 0.3777 0.2916 0.6229 
  Median 0.0487 0.0435 -0.0052 
  p-values 0.7873 0.5872 0.9754 
BHAR-VW    
  Mean 0.0060 0.0268 0.0208 
  p-values 0.4082 0.2885 0.6391 
  Median 0.0450 0.0387 -0.0063 
  p-values 0.8642 0.6071 0.9411 
Panel C: Informative trading 
N 123 77  
BHAR-EW    
  Mean 0.0093 0.0285 0.0192 
  p-values 0.3419 0.2074 0.6852 
  Median 0.0331 0.0398 0.0067 
  p-values 0.6297 0.4756 0.8793 
BHAR-VW    
  Mean 0.0072 0.0303 0.0231 
  p-values 0.3760 0.1926 0.7197 
  Median 0.0343 0.0382 0.0039 
  p-values 0.7069 0.4357 0.8125 
Notes: 
BHAR-EW is the equally weighted buy and hold abnormal return where with size defined as the 
market capitalisation at the beginning of the year; BHAR-VW is the value weighted buy and hold 
abnormal return where with size defined as the market capitalisation at the beginning of the year.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.5.2 Discussion of findings 
Table 3.4 presents our evidence on the PEAD in the UK drawing upon multivariate 
tests where we control for the effects of size, momentum and the book-to-market 
ratio (e.g. Core et al., 2006; Hirshleifer et al., 2008; Louis and Sun, 2011) by means 
of the quintile rank of the corresponding variable. It can be seen that the evidence 
on PEAD is robust after the inclusion of those control variables out of which, 
momentum and book-to-market appear to exert a significant influence on the 
abnormal return after the announcement. While we establish statistical significant 
evidence by means of UE, we also understand that the drift is also economically 
significant. More specifically, the coefficient of RUE denotes that a zero investment 
strategy going long in the highest and short in the lowest unexpected earnings 
portfolio yields a significant equally weighted abnormal return of 3.33% (3.48%, if 
returns are value weighted) after controlling for known determinants.  
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Table 3.4: The impact of earnings surprise on the post earnings announcement returns 
ܤܪܣܴ௜ = 	 ܽ଴ + ܽଵܷܧ௜,௧ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧  
ܤܪܣ ௜ܴ = 	 ܾ଴ + ܾଵܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
      
UE 0.0073* 0.0080*   
  (0.0820) (0.0589)   
RUE   0.0333* 0.0348* 
    (0.0731) (0.0603) 
QMM 0.0205*** 0.0199*** 0.0205*** 0.0200*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0047) 
QBM 0.0145** 0.0145** 0.0145** 0.0144** 
  (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
QMV -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0028 
  (0.4235) (0.5205) (0.3237) (0.4226) 
Constant -0.1041*** -0.1037*** -0.0806*** -0.0783*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Observations 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0217 0.0213 0.0218 0.0212 
F  28.49 27.78 28.25 27.39 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: 
BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return; UE is the earnings surprise calculated as the difference 
between the I/B/E/S actual reported earnings and the single most recent forecast deflated by the 
stock price; RUE equals -0.5 if the firms belongs to the lowest quintile of earnings surprise and 0.5 
if a firm belongs to top quintile of earnings surprise; QMM is the quintile rank of momentum 
measured as the buy and hold market adjusted returns over the 6 months up to the earnings 
announcement; QBM is the quintile rank of the book to market ratio; QMV is the quintile rank of the 
market value of the company measured at the fiscal year end for each company.  
p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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The findings from testing hypotheses H1 and H2 by means of the model outlined 
in (3.2) are reported in Table 3.5.  Consistently with our univariate tests, we have 
no evidence of PEAD in the presence of active or passive informative trade as 
denoted by the corresponding low coefficients of Ainf_RUE and Pinf_RUE. In those 
cases, abnormal returns appear to be not significantly different from zero which is 
in contrast with the coefficient of NAPinf  which demonstrates evidence of a 
significant drift (equally weighted  abnormal returns: 3.64%; value weighted: 3.77%, 
significant at 10%). However, before we jump to the conclusion that either form of 
informative trading accelerates the incorporation of information in returns, we wish 
to rule out that other forms of insider trading may also have a similar effect. This 
investigation is undertaken in Table 3.6 which presents our findings from estimating 
model (3.4). In Table 3.6 it becomes obvious that trading along the earnings 
surprise conveys that insiders have private information that the past expectation 
arisen from the surprise is not yet complete. Insiders purchases (sales) in this case, 
anticipate that share prices will further increase (decrease) and our findings confirm 
that this anticipation incites uncertainty among market participants about the 
implications of the earnings surprise. Such uncertainty could explain the significant 
drift that we observe in the presence of non-informative passive insider trading 
disclosures (NPinf_RUE), i.e., value weighted abnormal returns at 11.79% (11.64% 
equally weighted), significant at 5%.  
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Table 3.5: Active-Ainf and Passive-Pinf and Aggregated informative trading 
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܣ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଶ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଷܰܣ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସܣ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾହܲ݅݊ ௜݂,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	ߝ௜ ,௧ 
 Active Passive 
Active and Passive 
informative 
 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Ainf_RUE 0.0083 0.0127   0.0084 0.0128 
 (0.8789) (0.8157)   (0.8774) (0.8146) 
Pinf_RUE   0.0065 0.0095 0.0065 0.0095 
   (0.9168) (0.8779) (0.9163) (0.8775) 
NAPinf_RUE 0.0345* 0.0360* 0.0350* 0.0365* 0.0364* 0.0377* 
 (0.0658) (0.0553) (0.0656) (0.0556) (0.0590) (0.0512) 
Ainf -0.0109 -0.0105   -0.0107 -0.0102 
 (0.7390) (0.7478)   (0.7445) (0.7523) 
Pinf   0.0016 0.0005 0.0012 0.0002 
   (0.9655) (0.9890) (0.9729) (0.9959) 
Q5MM       
       
Q5BM 0.0205*** 0.0200*** 0.0205*** 0.0200*** 0.0206*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0048) 
Q5MV 0.0146** 0.0145** 0.0145** 0.0144** 0.0145** 0.0145** 
 (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0109) (0.0112) 
Constant -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0028 
 (0.2974) (0.4007) (0.3426) (0.4419) (0.3152) (0.4199) 
Observations 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0215 0.0209 0.0215 0.0209 0.0212 0.0206 
F test 19.08 18.49 18.97 18.37 14.41 13.95 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return;Ainf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades 
anticipate the earnings surprise, and zero otherwise;  Pinf_RUEequals to RUE when directors trade 
in a contrarian fashion, and zero otherwise; and  NAPinf_RUE equals to RUE in any remaining 
case, including observations without any insider trading; Q5MM is the quintile rank of momentum 
measured as the buy and hold market adjusted returns over the 6 months up to the earnings 
announcement; QBM is the quintile rank of the book to market ratio; QMV is the quintile rank of the 
market value of the company measured at the fiscal year end for each company.  
p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Disclosure of informative (active-Ainf and passive- Pinf) and non-informative (active- 
NAinf and passive- NPinf) insider trading. 
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܣ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଶ݂ܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଷܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସܰܣ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾହ݂ܰܲ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ ܾ଺ܣ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾ଻ܲ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ଼ܾܰܣ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾଽܰܲ݅݊ ௜݂,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
Notes: 
BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return; Ainf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades 
anticipate the earnings surprise, and zero otherwise; Pinf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trade 
in a contrarian fashion, and zero otherwise;  NAinf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades do 
not anticipate the earnings surprise, and zero otherwise; NPinf_RUE equals to RUE when directors 
trade in the same direction with the earnings surprise after the earnings announcement, and zero 
otherwise; NT_RUE equals to RUE when directors abstain from trading; Controls include: 
momentum, book to market ratio and the market value of the company.   
p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Non-informative -
Active 
Non-informative -
Passive 
Active informative, 
Passive informative 
Non-informative -
Active, 
Non-informative -
Passive 
 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Ainf_RUE     0.0087 0.0131 
     (0.8733) (0.8106) 
Pinf_RUE     0.0062 0.0092 
     (0.9201) (0.8813) 
NT_RUE 0.0323* 0.0340* 0.0289 0.0306 0.0308 0.0323 
 (0.0861) (0.0704) (0.1449) (0.1229) (0.1502) (0.1320) 
NAinf_RUE 0.0896 0.0882   0.0893 0.0879 
 (0.2319) (0.2525)   (0.2336) (0.2543) 
NPinf_RUE   0.1178** 0.1164** 0.1179** 0.1164** 
   (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0140) (0.0147) 
NAinf 0.0270 0.0272   0.0275 0.0277 
 (0.4346) (0.4362)   (0.4274) (0.4296) 
NPinf   -0.0097 -0.0088 -0.0095 -0.0087 
   (0.6563) (0.6806) (0.6665) (0.6910) 
Ainf     -0.0100 -0.0096 
     (0.7611) (0.7694) 
Pinf     0.0020 0.0010 
     (0.9555) (0.9781) 
Constant -0.0806*** -0.0783*** -0.0819*** -0.0796*** -0.0822*** -0.0799*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0216 0.0210 0.0219 0.0213 0.0212 0.0205 
F test 18.99 18.41 19.62 19.03 10.06 9.740 
P-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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On the other hand, we have rather mixed evidence with respect to the non-
informative active trading disclosures (i.e., not anticipating the earnings surprise). 
Despite the lack of statistical significance of the drift associated with the type of 
trading, we note that the magnitude of the corresponding coefficient NAinf_RUE is 
quite large (equally weighted abnormal returns: 8.93%; value weighted abnormal 
returns: 8.79%). Such large magnitude (note the comparison with the magnitude of 
drift in the presence of active informative trading disclosures) may still denote that 
the prior disclosure of such trades provides contradicting information which, to 
some extent, confuses market participants at the earnings announcement. 
Those results, lead us to confirm that the presence of informative trading disclosure 
as defined by prior research accelerates the incorporation of information around 
earnings announcements and prevents the drift formation.  Interestingly, the PEAD 
appears to arise only in the presence of “passive” non-informative insider trading. 
The results reported in Table 3.7 summarise this conclusion. Disclosure of 
directors’ trades which we define as non-informative is associated with a strong 
evidence of PEAD (equally weighted abnormal returns: 8.64%; value weighted: 
8.53%, significant at 1%). This finding is in line with the evidence presented in 
Kolasinski and Li (2010) who show that the drift is stronger when insiders trade in 
the same direction with the earnings surprise. Furthermore, we can’t find any 
evidence of drift in the presence of informative trades. Given also the lack of 
statistical evidence of drift in the case where directors abstain from trading, it could 
be said that PEAD could be attributed to a large extent to disclosure of directors’ 
trades that increase the investors’ uncertainty. 
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Table 3.7: Disclosure of informative and non-informative insider trading. 
ܤܪܣ ௜ܴ,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଶܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷ݂ܰ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾହܰ݅݊ ௜݂,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
 Informative Non-informative  
Informative & Non-
informative 
 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Inf_RUE 0.0011 0.0055   0.0011 0.0054 
 (0.9800) (0.9007)   (0.9811) (0.9018) 
NT_RUE 0.0364* 0.0377* 0.0279 0.0297 0.0308 0.0323 
 (0.0588) (0.0509) (0.1664) (0.1401) (0.1487) (0.1306) 
NInf_RUE   0.0864*** 0.0853*** 0.0864*** 0.0853*** 
   (0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0053) 
Inf -0.0036 -0.0038   -0.0028 -0.0030 
 (0.8788) (0.8676)   (0.9058) (0.8957) 
Ninf   0.0098 0.0104 0.0098 0.0103 
   (0.4913) (0.4739) (0.4992) (0.4833) 
Q5MM 0.0205*** 0.0200*** 0.0205*** 0.0201*** 0.0206*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0044) 
Q5BM 0.0145** 0.0144** 0.0145** 0.0144** 0.0145** 0.0144** 
 (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0120) 
Q5MV -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0025 
 (0.3137) (0.4190) (0.3947) (0.4789) (0.3849) (0.4750) 
Constant -0.0808*** -0.0785*** -0.0820*** -0.0797*** -0.0821*** -0.0798*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Observations 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0216 0.0210 0.0220 0.0213 0.0217 0.0210 
F test 19.06 18.46 19.70 19.09 14.90 14.42 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return; inf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades anticipate the 
earnings surprise and directors trade in a contrarian fashion to the earnings surprise after the earnings 
announcement, and zero otherwise; Ninf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades do not anticipate the 
earnings surprise and directors trade in the same direction with the earnings surprise after the earnings 
announcement, and zero otherwise; NT_RUE equals to RUE when directors abstain from trading; Controls 
include: momentum, book to market ratio and the market value of the company.   
p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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3.5.3 Additional evidence 
Our predictions and results so far, suggest that a positive effect of insider trading 
supporting the arguments of the proponents for allowing insider trading (Manne, 
1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983b; Leland, 1992) is confined only to informative 
trading. We think that we could shed further light on the controversy around the 
consequences of insider trading by also questioning whether insider trading deters 
market participants from the information acquisition process (e.g. Fishman and 
Hagerty, 1992). To this end, we draw upon the findings of recent research (Francis 
et al., 2007) which documents a significant association between the presence of 
PEAD and the magnitude of abnormal accruals.33 Francis et al. (2007) use 
discretionary accruals as a measure of imprecision of the earnings signal which 
prevents arbitrageurs to eliminate the PEAD. Here, we consider that discretionary 
accruals can be employed by managers to either signal or manipulate. Those 
mixed attributes hamper the interpretation of earnings surprise and increase 
information acquisition costs in this respect. Prior research on the interaction 
between earnings management and insider trading (Aboody et al., 2005) uses the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for information available to insiders, 
but not to outside investors. We argue then, that in order to address the uncertainty 
surrounding an imprecise earnings signal and the information asymmetry 
suggested in Aboody et al. (2005), outsiders need to invest in private information 
search activities. Additionally, the poorer the quality of earnings and the earnings 
imprecision, the more costly is the process of information gathering and 
                                            
33 Those findings refer specifically to the use of modified Jones performance adjusted abnormal 
accruals (Francis et al., 2007, p.427). We note that the main tests in Francis et al. (2007) are based 
on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) methodology. Given that first, Francis et al. (2007) report similar 
findings by using both methodologies and second as the Dechow and Dichev (2002) methodology 
induces a bias towards larger and more stable firms due to its data demands, we refrain from using 
the latter  here and we opt for the  modified Jones  performance adjusted abnormal accruals model.  
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processing. Therefore, we employ the variation in the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals as a means to introduce the concept of information acquisition costs in 
our research design. Consequently, it is important to consider the impact of the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals since in our test so far we observe an 
aggregate effect of earnings on future returns. Motivated by the findings reported 
in Francis et al. (2007), we expect that the information acquisition process will be 
more costly and thus, will take longer, in the presence of increased discretionary 
accruals. 34 In order to test this argument, we extend (3.5) to accommodate the 
effect of informative insider trading conditionally upon the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals (|DAC|), as follows:  
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଶܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷ݂ܰ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾସ|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧ ∗
݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾହ|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧ ∗ ܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ +∗ ܾ଺|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧ ∗ ܰ݅݊ ோ݂௎ா௜,௧+ܾ଻݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ଼ܾܰ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ +
ܾଽ|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	ߝ௜,௧  (3.6) 
To the extent that insider trading deters the information acquisition process, we 
would expect that the magnitude of accruals will not affect our initial evidence of 
the magnitude of drift in the presence of insider trading. Moreover, following Francis 
et al. (2007), we expect the coefficient of interaction between the earnings surprise 
when insiders abstain from trading and discretionary accruals to be positive and 
significant.  
We report the empirical application of (3.6) in Table 3.8. With respect to the cases 
where directors abstain from trading, we confirm the evidence in Francis et al. 
                                            
34 Investors who typically occur such private information acquisition costs are sophisticated 
investors. Balsam et al. (2002) document that sophisticated investors are typically faster in 
identifying and assessing earnings management than unsophisticated investors. The relation 
between PEAD and sophisticated investors established by Bartov et al. (2002) concurs with this 
argument.  
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(2007) on the relation between PEAD and discretionary accruals. The insignificant 
coefficient of NT_RUE denotes that in the absence of insider trading, market 
participants rely on their private information to unravel the implications of the 
earnings surprise. Here, given the low information acquisition costs, such 
endeavour is affordable and results to the resolution of uncertainty as implied by 
the lack of evidence about a subsequent drift. However, the incremental effect of 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals as denoted by the coefficient of 
|DAC|*NT_RUE is positive and significant. Given the mixed attributes of 
discretionary accruals, this finding suggests that their presence in the earnings 
surprise involves substantial information acquisitions costs which impede and 
delay the price discovery.35  
                                            
35 In order to alleviate any concerns that our results may be driven by the lack of statistical power, 
we also adjust this model and include interaction terms instead of introducing truncated variables 
and our results are qualitatively similar. As we discuss in footnote 7, we report the results when we 
split unexpected earnings since the coefficients we observe correspond the drift following the 
earnings announcement 
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Table 3.8: Informative and non-informative trading and the post earnings announcement drift: The 
impact of information acquisition costs 
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾଶܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷ݂ܰ݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ ܾସ|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧ ∗ ݂݅݊_ܴܷܧ௜,௧+ܾହ|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧ ∗ ܰܶ_ܴܷܧ௜,௧ +
∗ ܾ଺|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧ ∗ ܰ݅݊ ோ݂௎ா௜,௧+ܾ଻݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ଼ܾܰ݅݊ ௜݂,௧ + ܾଽ|ܦܣܥ|௜,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
 Informative Non-informative 
Informative & Non-
informative 
 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Value 
weighted 
Inf_RUE 0.0112 0.0133   0.0110 0.0131 
 (0.8498) (0.8203)   (0.8525) (0.8229) 
NT_RUE -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0075 -0.0057 -0.0099 -0.0082 
 (0.9097) (0.9651) (0.7477) (0.8062) (0.7235) (0.7700) 
NInf_RUE   0.0606** 0.0617** 0.0605** 0.0616** 
   (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0104) 
|DAC|* Inf_RUE -0.0228 -0.0178   -0.0225 -0.0174 
 (0.7911) (0.8395)   (0.7940) (0.8425) 
|DAC|* NT_RUE 0.0783** 0.0774** 0.0716** 0.0715** 0.0813** 0.0807** 
 (0.0228) (0.0220) (0.0254) (0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0246) 
|DAC|* NInf_RUE   0.0517 0.0473 0.0518 0.0474 
   (0.4039) (0.4443) (0.4024) (0.4428) 
Inf -0.0033 -0.0035   -0.0024 -0.0026 
 (0.8901) (0.8796)   (0.9182) (0.9090) 
Ninf   0.0099 0.0105 0.0099 0.0105 
   (0.4917) (0.4733) (0.4992) (0.4822) 
|DAC| 0.0086 0.0078 0.0090 0.0083 0.0087 0.0080 
 (0.2687) (0.3017) (0.2471) (0.2747) (0.2689) (0.2989) 
Constant -0.0864*** -0.0836*** -0.0877*** -0.0850*** -0.0878*** -0.0851*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 5,392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0228 0.0221 0.0230 0.0223 0.0228 0.0220 
F test 13.29 12.87 13.80 13.37 10.40 10.06 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: 
BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return; inf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades anticipate 
the earnings surprise and directors trade in a contrarian fashion to the earnings surprise after the 
earnings announcement, and zero otherwise; Ninf_RUE equals to RUE when directors trades do 
not anticipate the earnings surprise and directors trade in the same direction with the earnings 
surprise taking after the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise;  NT_RUE equals to RUE 
when directors abstain from trading;|DAC|  is the tercile rank of the magnitude of the total 
discretionary accruals; Controls include: momentum, book to market ratio and the market value of 
the company.   
p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In our previous tests, we have significant evidence that informative trading leads to 
more efficient prices. Nevertheless, the findings reported in this test reveal that this 
is a sub-optimal mechanism as it subsumes information acquisition. This 
conclusion is supported mainly by our findings that the disclosure of informative 
trading exerts such a pervasive influence that no drift ensues, irrespectively of the 
level of information acquisition costs. We also entertain the possibility the 
disclosure of this type of insider trading is a useful source of information about the 
attributes of the discretionary accruals. If that happens, then, we should consider 
first, that the insignificant coefficient of inf_RUEi,t is guided by the low information 
acquisition costs as in our baseline case of the absence of insider trading; second, 
the insignificant incremental effect of discretionary accruals denotes that investors 
use the information in this disclosure to decode the implications of discretion for 
future earnings. However, our findings on the influence of the disclosure of non-
informative insider trades reinforce the idea that insider trading discourages 
information acquisition efforts through an investigation of the firm’s fundamentals. 
We find that the disclosure of this type of trading is associated with a subsequent 
drift irrespectively of the level of discretionary accruals. More particularly, the 
coefficient of Ninf_RUEi,t, denoting the drift in the presence of disclosure of non-
informative insider trades under conditions of low information acquisition costs, is 
statistically significant (equally weighted abnormal returns: 6.05%; value weighted: 
6.16%, significant at 5%). This result can be interpreted as market participants 
disregarding their own information acquisition efforts that otherwise, e.g. in the 
absence of any insider trading, would lead them to price discovery. Instead, market 
participants’ interpretations are led by the disclosure of non-informative insider 
trades which incite uncertainty. Moreover, the incremental effect of the magnitude 
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of discretionary accruals appears to be not significant denoting a pervasive and 
adverse effect of the disclosure of non-informative trades, irrespectively of the 
information acquisition costs involved. Given the combined evidence on the 
influence of the disclosure of insider trading, we conclude that insider trading deters 
information acquisition efforts.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The present study contributes to a long-standing debate on the capital market 
effects of insider trading. It is argued that directors’ dealings convey information 
that make share prices to move toward the level they would command if the inside 
information were publicly available and thus, contribute to market efficiency. On the 
other hand, others have argued that insider trading compromises investor 
confidence and deters market participants from the information acquisition process. 
We shed further light by employing the setting of a pervasive market anomaly, 
namely the PEAD within the UK context which is characterised by specific practices 
and regulation that enable our investigation.  Following prior research’s definitions 
of informative insider trading, we find that their disclosure conveys information 
about the implications of the earnings surprise for future earnings earlier than would 
otherwise be the case and consequently attenuates the PEAD anomaly. The 
evidence is reinforced by our findings that this effect does not extend to disclosures 
of non-informative trades which appear instead, to elicit a subsequent drift. 
Therefore, we provide only partial support for the argument that capital markets 
benefit from insider trading.  Moreover, our findings provide support for the 
arguments against insider trading as we document a pervasive and sometimes, 
insidious, influence of the insider trades disclosure on the price discovery process. 
Based on tests where we introduce the concept of information acquisition costs, 
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we show that the disclosure of informative insider trading subsumes the efforts of 
market participants to use financial reporting information to interpret the earnings 
surprise. While this implies a sub-optimal mechanism of price discovery in the case 
of informative trades, this becomes insidious in the case of non-informative trades.  
While we believe that our findings contribute both to the debate on insider trading 
and the literature on the explanations of PEAD, we recognise that those maybe 
subject to the specific practices and guidelines on insider trading in the UK.  We 
have yet to see a similar study in the US context as its insider trading regulation 
could make this exercise very challenging. More particularly, in the US, the 
regulation of insider trading is based on the principle of the “Disclose or Abstain” 
Rule. However, there are no guidelines for a clearly defined  trading ban period but 
instead, companies adopt their own blackout policies whose duration and timing as 
well as observance may vary across firms (Bettis et al., 2000). We hope that future 
research may wish to undertake this challenge and confirm our findings in this 
setting. 
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4 Assessing the impact of earnings management on stock acquisitions: The 
role of insider purchases   
4.1 Introduction 
The present study builds upon prior research which identifies the market’s 
mispricing of the acquirer’s fundamentals (Erickson et al., 2012) and most 
specifically, discretionary accruals as a driver of acquisitions underperformance  
(Louis, 2004). We revisit the earnings management mispricing hypothesis in Louis 
(2004) with respect to stock acquisitions. According to this hypothesis, the use of 
earnings management prior to stock acquisitions is attributable to managers’ 
incentives to firstly, enhance the share exchange ratio in order to reduce the cost 
of the acquisition and secondly, to protect current shareholders’ interest dilution 
(Erickson and Wang, 1999). Louis (2004) argues that investors are initially misled 
by inflated earnings and subsequently, revise their expectations downwards when 
pre-acquisition earnings management reverses or managers guide them to do so. 
Moreover, he supports the earnings management mispricing hypothesis by refuting 
the alternative hypothesis that earnings management may reflect managers’ 
overconfidence or, over-optimistic expectations. To this end, he draws upon 
evidence that indicators of the firm’s operations are not consistent with managers’ 
favourable views of the firm’s prospects (e.g. he finds no evidence of strong 
demand anticipation by means of inventory build-up preceding a stock acquisition 
as opposed to a cash acquisition). However, this approach for establishing 
managers’ overconfidence before an acquisition may be flawed. Managers’ 
overconfidence with respect to an acquisition is more likely to occur in relation to 
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the future performance of the combined entity and it is not necessarily obvious in 
their expectations with respect to the continuing operations of the acquiring firm. 
In the present study, we take into account developments in the finance literature 
on acquisitions that have established a relation between managers’ overconfidence 
and acquisitions’ underperformance (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Billett and 
Qian, 2008; Kolasinski and Li, 2012). This stream of research  develops the ideas 
of managerial hubris presented by Roll (1986). In summary, overconfident 
managers issue bids founded on mistaken estimates of target firm and more 
particularly, on over-optimistic estimations of the merger synergies. As a result, 
they are more likely to undertake value destroying projects than rational managers 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). We extend this literature by adopting a recent 
definition of overconfidence presented by Ben-David et al. (2013) who show that 
overconfident managers are optimistic managers who overestimate the mean of 
firm’s cash flows (optimism) and under-estimate the volatility of their firms’ future 
cash flows (precision). We apply this framework in our context by capturing 
managers’ optimism in terms of earnings management and precision in terms of 
their purchases of the acquiring firms’ shares.  
First, overconfident managers overestimate the magnitude of the combined entity’s 
future earnings. We capture managers’ optimism with respect to future earnings by 
means of their discretion upon accruals. The issue is especially pertinent for stock 
acquisitions where the acquirer has the incentives to manage earnings in order to 
boost the exchange ratio. We identify managers’ optimism in their beliefs that the 
combined acquirer’s and target’s fundamentals will be able to absorb the 
consequences of the acquirer’s aggressive accounting reversal. This argument 
builds upon prior research which points out that acquisitions provide managers with 
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opportunities to increase earnings and thus avoid the near term unwinding of 
earnings management (Fairfield et al., 2007). Moreover, recent research points out 
that managers can take advantage of the differences in accounting policies and 
assumptions  and use their  integration as a “black box” to camouflage the 
consequences of pre-acquisition aggressive accounting (Erickson et al., 2012).  
Second, overconfident managers underestimate the volatility in future earnings that 
may arise during the integration period. Difficulties and unforeseen problems in the 
integration of the target into the acquirer may have adverse implications for the 
earnings persistence. Such circumstances may also compromise the managers’ 
ability to contain the consequences of the pre-acquisition earnings management 
reversal. Recent research shows that the post-acquisition integration period is 
likely to be characterised by significant information uncertainty that contributes to 
acquirers’ wealth losses (Erickson et al., 2012). That allows us to identify 
overconfident managers as those who first, engage with earnings management to 
deliver an optimistic measure of performance and second, convey a costly signal 
that those optimistic estimates are very precise. To this end, we operationalize the 
second feature of overconfident managers, i.e. managers’ precision, by looking at 
insider net purchases. We argue that managers’ commitment of personal wealth in 
the presence of earnings management is an indication of their own beliefs about 
the combined entities’ superior performance, which will not be affected by 
integration difficulties or the earnings management reversal. More specifically, here 
we focus on net insider purchases taking place in the period after the latest 
earnings announcement and before the acquisition.36  This particular timing is 
                                            
36 In our tests, we introduce also the net insider purchases that take place before the latest earnings 
announcement in the model for completeness.  
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motivated by Veenman (2012). He demonstrates that this timing of insider 
purchases conveys the precision of insiders’ private information in reported 
earnings with respect to future earnings. 
Our initial findings using a sample of UK acquisitions confirm the inverse 
relationship between discretionary accruals and both short term37 and long term 
market reactions in the case of stock acquisitions, also documented for U.S.A. firms 
in Louis (2004).38  We also present evidence that discretionary accruals affect 
adversely the combined firm’s operating performance within two years after the 
acquisition. However, the long-term post-acquisition underperformance is confined 
only to acquirer firms whose managers exhibit both the features that we define here 
as overconfidence indicators.  
Our findings contribute to the research investigating the long-run post-acquisition 
underperformance. In a recent study, Erickson et al. (2012) attribute the acquirer’s 
long-term underperformance to increases in information uncertainty arising from 
the prolonged integration process of M&As and complicated financial reporting with 
unpredictable outcomes. Based on our results, the information uncertainty effect 
pertains to the uncertainty with regard to the ability of overconfident managers to 
                                            
37 Louis (2004) fails to find a statistically significant relationship between discretionary accruals and 
abnormal returns over the three days around the merger announcements; he attributes this to the 
market anticipating the acquisition announcement. Thus, he obtains his results by extending the 
return measurement window over the period from 21 days before to one day after the merger 
announcement. On the contrary, our results suggest that the market does not anticipate the 
acquisition announcement and we document a significant relationship between discretionary 
accruals and abnormal returns over the three days around the merger announcements that is also 
significant even after controlling for the run-up effect.  
38 A possibly intriguing result is a positive, albeit no significant, reaction to discretionary accruals 
when managers are net purchasers prior to the earnings announcement. It seems that the market 
perceive those specific transactions as having already credibly signalled the absence of 
opportunism in those discretionary accruals at the earnings announcement. This result is also in 
line with Beneish and Vargus (2002). Consistently with this interpretation, our further tests do not 
establish any evidence of earnings management reversal during the post-acquisition period 
examined here. 
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contain the consequences of the pre-acquisition earnings management during the 
integration period. Notably, in cases of simple optimism, whereby managers 
engage with earnings management but not insider purchases, we don’t have any 
statistically strong evidence of under-performance. That reinforces our claim that 
acquirers’ underperformance is led by a market reaction to overconfidence rather 
than mispricing. Our findings allow also to clarify that insider purchases alone do 
not consist an indication of overconfidence in acquisitions. Instead, a well-designed 
measure should take into account the circumstances under which those purchases 
have taken place (e.g. the presence of earnings management and their timing of 
execution relative to the earnings announcement). Our findings then, contribute 
also to the finance literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Doukas and Petmezas, 
2007)  which uses various measures of insiders’ holdings and transactions in their 
firms’ shares as a measure of overconfidence.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section develops 
the hypothesis concerning the joint signals of discretionary accruals and directors’ 
trading on the market reaction to a takeover announcement. Section 3 presents the 
research design employed in the chapter. Section 4 describes the data and the 
sample. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and section 6 presents the 
conclusions of the study.  
4.2 Hypothesis development  
4.2.1 Earnings management prior to acquisitions  
The primary role of accruals is to address timing and matching problems inherent 
in cash flows so that earnings reflect more closely the firm’s performance. To this 
end, considerable discretion has been allowed to managers in estimating accruals 
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with the purpose of enabling them to communicate their private information and 
mitigate information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. 
Subramanyam (1996) finds that on average, the market attaches value to 
discretionary accruals, probably because the discretionary component increases 
the ability of earnings to reflect fundamental value. However, a significant body of 
research on earnings management has documented that such discretion over the 
level and the timing of accruals has been employed opportunistically by managers 
in order to achieve various objectives. In the cases where earnings management 
is deployed in relation to an upcoming event, announcement of the event reveals 
managers’ incentives to distort the level and timing of accruals causing investors 
to revise their beliefs about future performance. For instance, accrual manipulation 
preceding events such as seasonal equity offerings (Shivakumar, 2000) and stock 
acquisitions (Louis, 2004) seems to determine the market reaction around the 
event.  
In the case of stock acquisitions, the number of shares offered by the acquirer to 
gain control of the target is determined by a negotiated exchange ratio which is 
computed based on the acquiring firm’s share price. Given the inverse relation 
between the exchange rate and the share prices, the managers of the acquiring 
firm have incentives to manage earnings in an attempt to increase share prices and 
hence, reduce acquisitions costs. The lower cost of the acquisition would also 
minimize the likelihood of both earnings and voting power dilution of the existing 
shareholders (Erickson and Wang, 1999).39 Consistently prior research (Erickson 
                                            
39 Target shareholders would have incentives to detect earnings management. Louis (2004) notes 
a number of reasons why target shareholders may agree upon the exchange ratio. That could be  
for reasons of retirement or illiquid stock ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). The acquirer can 
also buy their agreement through the acceleration in the exercise of stock options, by granting them 
 87 
 
and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) in the US; Botsari and Meeks (2008) in the UK) 
documents a statistically significant occurrence of earnings management 
preceding stock acquisitions.  
Recent accounting research has noted the reversal of earnings management as a 
key feature of the accrual accounting process (Dechow et al., 2012; Allen et al., 
2013). In the present setting, we acknowledge that the reversal of accruals takes 
place within the combined entities’ fundamentals, following a significant shock into 
the firm’s business model arising from the acquisition. Consequently, the effect of 
the reversal of pre-acquisition accrual distortions in the post-acquisition period is 
more likely to differ from the reversal of the acquiring firm’s accruals alone. When 
referring to the time series properties of accruals, Owens et al. (2013) point out that 
acquisitions are “non-articulation” events associated with significant business 
shocks that violate stationarity. In a related vein, Collins and Kim (2012) point out 
that M&A activities can severely distort firms’ growth measures as well as the lead-
lag relation between accruals and cash flows from operations. Furthermore, the 
integration of the target would result in combining two separate streams of 
fundamentals that are subject to different accounting policies and factual 
assumptions (Erickson et al., 2012).    
 
Research on earnings management prior to acquisitions has mainly focused on the 
underlying incentives. We argue that a better understanding of this empirical 
regularity and its capital market effects requires also the consideration of its 
reversal and the opportunities that open up for the concealment of its 
                                            
generous severance pay, or by keeping them in top positions. In addition, the target’s managers 
can simply be duped into accepting the acquirer’s inflated stocks. 
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consequences in the post-acquisition environment.  Those opportunities may arise 
from synergies developing out of merging two streams of fundamentals subject to 
different accounting policies (e.g., for inventory, depreciation, or revenue 
recognition) and factual assumptions (e.g., rates used in various pension 
computations, salvage values, useful lives, necessity of valuation allowances, etc.) 
as Erickson et al.(2012) point out. They may also arise out of the substantial 
transitory growth components showing up after the acquisition as discussed by 
Collins and Kim (2012).  
Here, we argue that during a stock acquisition announcement, investors realise the 
incentives and the opportunities for earnings management and adjust prices 
accordingly. Similar to the hypothesis and empirical evidence in Louis (2004), our 
first hypothesis follows:  
H1: The market reaction during the announcement of stock acquisitions is 
negatively associated with the extent of earnings management. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the post-acquisition environment is fraught 
with complicated financial reporting issues, difficulties in integration of the target 
and other unforeseen problems (Erickson et al., 2012). In other words, even 
insiders cannot fully anticipate for certain whether and when the pre-acquisition 
earnings management will affect future performance. Considering this framework, 
it could be inferred that pre-acquisition earnings management may also be related 
to the managers’ overconfidence that its reversal could be addressed through 
financial reporting synergies among the merged streams of fundamentals.  
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The concept of managerial overconfidence in acquisitions has been widely 
discussed in the finance literature. Therefore, we draw upon this literature in order 
to further develop our hypotheses.  
4.2.2 Managerial overconfidence and the impact of earnings management on the 
performance of acquisitions 
4.2.2.1  Managerial overconfidence in the finance literature 
A significant stream of research on acquisitions’ underperformance attributes it to 
managerial overconfidence. This stream of research has been developed upon the 
seminal chapter of Roll (1986) and the concept of “hubris” hypothesis. According 
to the hubris hypothesis, overconfident managers have a strong conviction that 
their valuations are right and that the market does not reflect the full economic 
value of the combined firm. The emphasis in the hubris hypothesis is on managerial 
optimism and the managers’ overbearing presumptions that their valuations are 
correct. Furthermore, an important feature of the Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis is 
that management intentions may be fully consistent with honourable stewardship 
of corporate assets, but actions need not always turn out to be right. The lack of 
agency problems in Roll’s perspective comes at a contrast with the mainstream 
explanations of acquirers’ underperformance (e.g. the Jensen (1986)’s  free cash 
flow hypothesis; the managerial “perks” hypothesis, e.g., Harford and Li (2007); the 
overvaluation hypothesis, e.g. Schleifer and Vishny (2003) and even the mispricing 
of earnings management hypothesis  by Louis (2004)). Elaborating upon the hubris 
hypothesis, Malmendier and Tate (2008) point out that since overconfident 
managers overestimate merger synergies, they misperceive some merger 
opportunities with negative synergies to be value-creating. Thus, overconfident 
managers are more likely to undertake value destroying projects than rational 
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managers would forgo. The emphasis in this interpretation of overconfidence is on 
managers’ over-optimistic cash flow expectations and their tendency to undertake 
value destroying projects. In a similar vein, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Billett 
and Qian (2008) show that the inverse relation between acquirers’ 
underperformance and the occurrence of high order acquisitions can be also 
attributed to overconfidence.  
Overall, this literature focuses on overconfident managers’ bad choice of 
acquisitions as a result of their over-optimistic expectations. Although implied, this 
research does not elaborate on the other aspect of hubris as Roll (1986) has 
defined it, i.e., the managers’ “overbearing presumptions”.  The two features are 
inextricably tied to each other. Heaton (2002) points out that people are more 
optimistic about outcomes that they believe they can control and to which they are 
highly committed. In more recent research, Ben-David et al. (2013) define 
overconfident managers as optimistic managers who overestimate the mean of 
firm’s cash flows (optimism) and in the same time underestimate the volatility of 
their firms’ future cash flows (precision).   
4.2.2.2 The market response to earnings management during and after 
acquisitions: mispricing or managerial overconfidence?  
In our context, an overconfident manager would engage in aggressive accounting 
prior to a stock acquisition under the assumption that the combined acquirer’s and 
target’s accruals and cash flows will be able to absorb the reversal of pre-
acquisition earnings management. Prior research also points out that acquisitions 
provide managers with opportunities to increase earnings and thus avoid the near 
term unwinding of earnings management (Fairfield et al., 2007). Managers can take 
advantage of the differences in accounting policies and factual assumptions as a 
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“black box” to camouflage the consequences of prior aggressive accounting. 
Furthermore, Erickson et al. (2012) points out that the process of combining two 
separate streams of fundamentals that are subject to different accounting policies 
and factual assumptions aggravates information uncertainty among investors. 
Information uncertainty may be further compounded by difficulties in the integration 
of the target into the acquirer and other unforeseen problems. Therefore, 
manipulating earnings prior to a stock acquisition denotes optimistic managers who 
believe that they can obfuscate the adverse consequences of aggressive 
accounting. Most important, it also denotes managers who have the “overbearing 
presumption” that they are able to deliver this outcome despite complex accounting 
issues that can’t be anticipated. 
Based on prior research (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Doukas and Petmezas, 
2007), we draw evidence about the managers’ precision of optimistic expectations 
out of insider purchases. However, the literature on directors’ trading in corporate 
finance typically considers purchases as a credible and costly signal of 
commitment about the future value of the firm given that managers put their own 
wealth at stake while they hold an under-diversified portfolio (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; 
Veenman et al., 2011). Consistently, John and Mishra (1990) shows that an 
increase in insider holdings lends credibility to investment  announcements such 
as capital expenditures. Furthermore, prior empirical research shows that insider 
purchases preceding corporate announcements and other voluntary disclosures 
assist the market to better assess the future performance of the firm (John and 
Lang, 1991; Gu and Li, 2007; Badertscher et al., 2011).  
Here, we rely in particular on Veenman (2012) who argues that the presence of 
insider purchases taking place after the earnings announcement enhances the 
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precision of information in reported earnings about future earnings. This particular 
feature can also inform our hypothesis here and explain why insider purchases 
have been employed by the finance literature as an indicator of overconfidence. 
While earnings management captures the first component of managers’ 
overconfidence, i.e., optimism, insider purchases, being a costly signal, reinforce 
the optimism inherent into earnings management with high precision, or, the 
second component of overconfidence.  
Louis (2004) attributes the long-term post-acquisition market response to earnings 
management to investors that are unable to fully undo the influence of earnings 
management at the acquisition announcement. In contrast, we argue that investors 
learn gradually about the managers’ ability to contain the earnings management 
reversal by observing their reports over the integration period. Initially, and given 
the increased uncertainty of the post-acquisition environment, investors have no 
means to assess the managers’ ability to mitigate the reversal of past earnings 
management during the integration process until further information becomes 
available. However, during the post-acquisition announcement period, the market 
observes the deviation between the initial precision of managers’ optimistic 
projections and the information uncertainty in the post-acquisition period which 
could not be fully anticipated earlier. This deviation would motivate doubts when 
managers have been overly precise about their judgement and ability during the 
acquisition announcement. This relationship is likely to vary with the extent of their 
initial optimism. That leads us to the second hypothesis: 
H2a: The short term market reaction to earnings management is not affected 
by managers’ overconfidence and more particularly, the over-precision of 
their projections as conveyed by insider purchases.  
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H2b: The long term market reaction to earnings management after an 
acquisition is driven by a reaction to managers’ overconfidence and more 
particularly, the over-precision of their projections as conveyed by insider 
purchases.  
4.3 Research design  
4.3.1 The interpretation of pre-acquisition discretionary accruals during acquisition 
announcements 
Our first set of tests revisit the mispricing of earnings management hypothesis. This 
set consists of the baseline tests for the tests we conduct here to investigate our 
hypothesis empirically.  
We use a similar model to that employed in Louis (2004) in order to inform the 
relationship between acquirer’s returns (ABRET) and discretionary accruals 
(DACC), for stock and cash acquisitions, as follows:  
ܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ = ∑ (ߙ଴,௦ + ߙଵ,௦ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	 ߝ௜,௧ଵ௦ୀ଴                 
 (4.1) 
 
where, ABRETi is the value weighted size adjusted abnormal returns; DACC is the 
discretionary accruals. We measure acquisition announcement returns from two 
days before to two days after the acquisition announcement.40 We also examine 
long term returns for over one, two and three years from the month of the 
                                            
40 The results are similar when using equally weighted size adjusted returns, with size defined as 
the market capitalisation at the beginning of the year. In order to alleviate the concerns expressed 
in Ince and Porter (2006) with regards to returns estimated from the Return Index (RI) data-item 
from Datastream, we calculate returns using prices and dividends from Datastream and screen daily 
returns in the same way Specifically, we replace returns equal to missing if the return on any given 
day is above 300% or (1 + Rt)(1 + Rt−1) −1 is less than 50%. 
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acquisition announcement. Following Louis (2004), the research design identifies 
the effects of discretionary accruals for stock and cash acquisitions separately. 
Although our hypotheses are developed with stock acquisitions in mind, we also 
test the corresponding coefficients for cash acquisitions. Since the incentives for 
earnings management are not evident in this case, we don’t have any predictions 
for those cases. Moreover, evidence of insignificant coefficients in the case of cash 
acquisition will reinforce that our hypotheses for stock acquisition are in the correct 
direction.  We denote the method of payment by the subscript s, taking the value 
of one for stock acquisitions and zero otherwise. Consistently with hypothesis H1, 
we expect the coefficient α1,s to be negative and significant, indicating that the 
announcement returns of stock acquisitions are driven by the market’s discount 
upon share prices for earnings management.  
All the models employed in this study include a number of control variables. We 
include a size variable  measured as natural logarithm of market value (Ln_MV) 
(Louis, 2004; Moeller et al., 2005; Masulis et al., 2007);  the book to market ratio 
capturing growth expectations (BM); and leverage as a proxy for financial distress 
risk (LEVERAGE) (Masulis et al., 2007; Gregory and Wang, 2011). Furthermore, 
as is common in the literature we control for acquisition specific parameters such 
as:41 private versus public status of the target firm (LISTED)  (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004);  internationalization aspects of the acquisition (CROSS-
BORDER) (Schoenberg, 2000; Pantzalis et al., 2008); intra-industry  acquisitions 
(INTRA-INDUSTRY) (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; King et al., 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2006); value  of the underlying deal (DEALVALUE) (Bayazitova et al., 
                                            
41 Reviews of this literature include Martynova and Renneboog (2008), Agrawal et al. (1992) and 
King et al. (2004). 
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2012); and bidder’s prior  performance which captures the rumour phase of the 
acquisition (RUNUP) (Louis, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). We also add 
earnings announcement returns (EACAR) in order to control for the initial valuation 
of discretionary accruals at the time of the earnings announcement and thus, to 
ensure that the coefficients of discretionary accruals in our model capture the re-
assessment of this information.  
4.3.2 The influence of insider purchases on the market interpretation of earnings 
management during acquisition announcements 
Following our discussion, we disaggregate the relationship between returns and 
discretionary accruals based on the presence and timing of insider purchases 
relative to the latest earnings announcement preceding the acquisition 
announcement.  
ܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ = ෍ߙ଴,௦ + ܾଵ,௦ܰܤܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ + ܾଶ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	ଵ
௦ୀ଴+ ܾଷ,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾସ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾହ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଺,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଻,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧	+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	ߝ௜,௧ 
(4.2) 
where, NBDACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors abstain from 
purchasing shares during the financial year preceding the acquisition and up to the 
acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; BUYbeforeEA_DACC stands for  
discretionary accruals when directors engage with insider purchases during the 
financial year preceding the acquisition, and zero otherwise; BUYafterEA_DACC 
stands for discretionary accruals when directors engage with purchasing shares 
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after the latest earnings announcement and up to the acquisition announcement, 
and zero otherwise; BUYbefore&afterEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals 
when directors engage with purchasing shares during the financial year preceding 
the acquisition and up to the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise. Those 
four variables correspond to the discretionary accruals variable in equation (4.1), 
albeit disaggregated according to the timing and the presence of insider purchases. 
Equation (4.2) includes the corresponding main effects as binary variables taking 
the value of one depending on the timing of insider purchases and zero otherwise.  
Following the baseline tests described in (4.1), we run the regression presented in 
equation (4.2) in relation to short term and long term market reactions. With regards 
to the short term market responses (hypothesis H2a), our prediction is that 
coefficients b1,1, b3,1 and b4,1 should be negative and significant. The coefficient b2,1 
is of particular interest here. As insider purchases taking place before the latest 
earnings announcement and probably long before the acquisition, their information 
may not be related to the acquisition event. In this case, we follow Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) to argue that those transactions are associated with a higher 
persistence of earnings, or smaller extent of earnings management reversal. If this 
holds, then insider purchases before the earnings announcement may be a 
credible signal for the absence of earnings management and thus, our prediction 
is that the coefficient b2,1 is not negative.  
According to the hypothesis H2b, the long term market reaction to earnings 
management after a stock acquisition is driven by managers’ overconfidence and 
more particularly, the precision of insiders’ optimistic expectations. Therefore, we 
expect that only the combination of earnings management and insider purchases 
after the earnings announcement, purported to capture overconfidence, will be 
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negatively associated with returns. However, the inverse association between 
discretionary accruals and long term returns could be attributable to a delayed 
response to earnings management. As long as a delayed response explains this 
association, the coefficient of b1,1 would also be negative and significant. On the 
other hand, an insignificant coefficient would reinforce our hypothesis that such 
penalty does not occur when optimistic expectations are not conveyed with similar 
precision. This finding would also imply that investors have the ability to fully undo 
earnings management during the acquisition announcement. We also don’t expect 
to find any evidence of significant response to earnings management in any other 
remaining case. 
4.4 Data and empirical proxies  
4.4.1 Mergers and acquisitions data 
The sample employed here draws upon the data available in the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database and consists of completed mergers and acquisitions of 
UK listed companies that were announced between 1st January 1994 and 31st 
December 2008. 42 Consistently with prior research on acquisitions completed by 
UK firms (Botsari and Meeks, 2008), we apply no restrictions on the listing status 
or the location of the target company in order to secure a broad a range of 
acquisition activity. A transaction is included in the sample if it satisfies the following 
criteria: 
(i) The bidder acquires a majority interest in the target company;  
                                            
42 Martynova and Renneboog (2009) and Gregory and Wang (2011) suggest that  the SDC 
coverage of acquisitions prior to 1994  is not very reliable.  
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(ii) The  transaction consideration is either pure share-exchange (100% stock) or 
a hybrid case which includes both a cash and a separately identifiable share 
element or wholly in cash (100% cash);43  
(iii) The deal value is above £1 million;44 
(iv) The bidder is a non-financial company (i.e., firms under the ICB Industry 
Codes 8000-8999 are excluded); 45  
(v) Accounting and market data are available in Worldscope and Datastream;46 
(vi) The acquisition event date can be clearly identified in relation to the bidder’s 
preceding earnings announcement date;  
(vii) We introduce a “clear period” for companies performing multiple acquisitions 
of three consecutive earnings announcements, as illustrated in Fig.1. in order 
to avoid capturing discretionary accruals which are subject to the influence of 
the reversal of accruals associated with prior acquisitions. 
 
  
                                            
43 Botsari and Meeks (2008) note that the guidelines concerning the conduct of acquisitions in the 
UK require that there should be a cash alternative consideration in an otherwise all share offer (Rule 
9 and 11 of ‘The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers’). Therefore, acquisitions financed with 
shares and cash (hybrid) are in essence stock acquisitions.  
44 A similar sample selection choice has also been applied elsewhere (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller 
et al., 2004; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007)   in order to avoid the results being driven by very small 
deals.  
45 The industry classification employed by SDC is based on the SIC codes. Adopting an alternative 
classification such as the ICB is deemed necessary in order to ensure a better match between the 
SDC and Worldscope/Datastream databases.  
46 We also require companies to have an accounting reporting period of less than 380 and more 
than 340 days (similarly to García Lara et al., 2005).    
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Figure 4.1: Timeline for consecutive acquisition announcements 
 
Notes: 
Figure 4.1 depicts the “clean period” of three consecutive earnings announcements for multiple 
acquisitions performed by the same acquirer. This choice is driven by the intention to avoid 
capturing the market reactions that are attributed to the consequences of the reversal of financial 
reporting discretion relating to a prior acquisition. EA is the earnings announcement relative to the 
acquisition announcement. 
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The initial sample includes 11,795 completed acquisitions announced by UK firms 
over the sample period between 1994-2008. We exclude 7,406 acquisitions that 
are not classified as acquisitions of majority interest while 591 acquisitions are 
excluded because they have a deal value below £1 million. The sample is reduced 
by 1,446 acquisitions which do not meet the criteria for the method of payment. We 
follow Botsari and Meeks (2006) and classify firms as stock acquisitions if the 
consideration offered is 100% stock or the consideration includes both a cash and 
a separately identifiable share element or wholly in cash,47 while any remaining 
acquisition is classified as cash. The sample is further reduced by 673 acquisitions 
for which we cannot identify the earnings announcements date either in I/B/E/S or 
Bloomberg and 777 acquisitions which cannot be matched with accounting data in 
Worldscope. Our sample is further reduced by 527 acquisitions due to our filter for 
multiple acquisitions. Finally, we exclude 18 acquisitions because they relate to 
reverse takeovers and 12 observations due to missing returns from Datastream. 
The final sample consists of 345 acquisitions announced by 304 acquirers, split 
between 169 stock acquisitions and 176 cash acquisitions. This sample size is 
comparable to prior literature in the UK. For instance, Botsari and Meeks (2006) 
use a sample of 48 stock acquirers announced between 1997 and 2001, Gao and 
Mohamed (2012) employ a sample of 210  cash acquisitions announced from 1984 
to 2007, Gregory (2005) uses a sample of 217 acquisitions announced between 
1984 and 1992 and (Gregory and Wang, 2011) employ a sample of 152 cash 
acquisitions announced from 1984 to 2002.48 Moreover, the smaller number of 
                                            
47 Consistently with Botsari and Meeks (2006), when acquiring companies intend to use stock as 
method of payment, they also have an incentive to manage earnings upwards. 
48 We note, however, that our sample appears smaller compared to the sample employed in Doukas 
and Petmezas (2007). We speculate that the difference in the sample size is explained by different 
selection criteria. More specifically, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) employ a sample of acquisitions 
announced between 1980 and 2004, whereas our sample covers the period between 1994 and 
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acquisitions classified as stock relative to acquisitions classified as cash is also 
consistent with prior research in the UK which employs private target as well  (e.g. 
Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Botsari and Meeks, 
2008). 49,50 Table 4.1 summarises the data selection procedure.  
 
Table 4.1: Table of observations 
UK acquirers  11,795 
Less:  
Transactions not classified as acquisitions of majority interest 7,406 
Deal value is less £1m 591 
Transactions not classified as share or cash exchange and hybrid 1,446 
Missing earnings announcements 673 
Missing accounting data or financial acquirer 777 
Multiple acquisitions  52751 
Reverse takeovers 18 
Missing returns  12 
Final sample 345 (304 firms) 
 
 
4.4.2 Insider purchases  
We focus on directors’ purchases in the acquiring firm and obtain information on 
directors’ trading from the Hemmington Scott Directors’ Trading Dataset for period 
from 1996-2007 and before that from Directus Ltd. In line with prior research in the 
UK (e.g. Pope et al., 1990; Gregory et al., 1994; Hillier and Marshall, 2002b; 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006), we define insider transactions as purchases by both 
                                            
2007. In addition, Doukas and Petmezas define “single acquirers” bidders engaging in less than 
five acquisitions within a three-year period, whereas we define “single acquirers” acquisitions 
announced after at least three earnings announcements (criterion vii of the sample selection 
criteria).   
49 More specifically, Faccio and Masulis (2005) notes that UK companies acquiring a public target 
are more likely to use stock financed deals. Given that we apply no restrictions on the listing status 
of the target our results are not surprising.   
50 We acknowledge that the evidence reported for the UK contrast the evidence in the US. For 
instance, Andrade et al. (2001) report a higher percentage of stock financed acquisition in the US.  
51 It includes 191 deals which were announced in the same year. 
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executive and non-executive directors.52 Motivated by prior literature (Beneish and 
Vargus, 2002; Core et al., 2006; Sawicki and Shrestha, 2008; Beneish et al., 2012), 
we use a firm-specific net measure of inside purchases aggregating all directors’ 
trading activity. Following this stream of literature, we calculate the net purchases 
ratio (NPR) defined as follows: 
 
NPR = [PURCHASES – SALES]/[ PURCHASES+SALES] 
 
where, PURCHASES are the number of shares purchased by directors and SALES 
are the number of shares sold. A positive NPR could be the result of directors 
purchasing more shares or selling fewer shares and vice versa for a negative NPR. 
A positive NPR indicates net insider buying, whereas a negative NPR indicates net 
insider selling.53 In order to ensure that the trades that are observed are associated 
with insiders’ private information, the insider trading measure is estimated by using 
only open market purchases and sales of common shares, since those trades are 
more likely to be informative about the future prospects of the firm.  The need to 
focus on open market transactions is also confirmed by the findings in Veenman et 
al. (2011) who show that only open market purchases are associated with positive 
future news as opposed to stock options conversions.  
                                            
52 We do not examine illegal insider trading; rather, we focus on legal insider trading by directors. 
In the US insiders are defined as officers, directors, key employees and shareholders holding more 
than 10% of any equity class. The majority of insider trading literature in the US focuses only on 
officers and directors (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Officers are referred as executives in the UK, 
whereas directors are referred as non-executives in the UK (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Fidrmuc et al. 
(2006) provide a detailed discussion of the regulatory differences between the UK and the US with 
respect to the definition of insiders and (illegal) insider trading, the frequency of information releases 
and trading bans, the length of the period within which insiders must report their trades and the level 
of the enforcement of the regulation. 
53 Following Sivakumar and Waymire (1994), when the number of shares purchased equal the 
number of shared bought and the direction of trading cannot be determined, we classify those cases 
as observations with no insider trading.   
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As already discussed, we observe the influence of insider trading transactions 
across two different windows. Drawing from the findings in Veenman (2012) we 
aggregate insider trading transactions taking place after an earnings 
announcement but before the acquisition announcement. Following Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) and Sawicki and Shrestha (2008), our second measure of insider 
trading aggregates transactions that take place during the fiscal year preceding the 
acquisition announcement. Figure 4.2 illustrates these two periods which we use 
to measure directors trading relative to the acquisition announcement.  We 
establish that insider trading transactions take place in 282 out of 345 acquisitions. 
More specifically, we observe directors trading in 131 stock acquisitions and 151 
cash acquisitions. Furthermore, we find that directors are net purchasers in 71 
stock acquisitions and 100 cash acquisitions. 54, 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
54 The high percentage of acquisitions with insider purchases does not surprise us since it is well 
established that corporate insider purchases occur more frequently than insider sales (Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001 in the US; and Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006 in the UK). However, 
sales by value are much bigger than buys as they occur in bigger blocks, with the result that insiders 
in aggregate are net sellers over the time. However, in the context of acquisitions insiders may have 
constraints to sell their shares due to adverse signalling and reputations concerns (Akbulut, 2012) 
and therefore, abstain from selling prior to the announcement of the acquisition.   
55 We also note that directors purchases occur before 53 (71) stock (cash) acquisitions and after 
the earnings announcement in 33 (69) stock (cash) acquisitions.  
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Figure 4.2: Timeline for insider trading relative to the acquisition announcement 
 
Notes: 
Figure 4.2 depicts the period of directors trading measurement relative to the acquisition announcement.  
 
 
4.4.3 Earnings management prior to acquisition announcements  
We use the modified Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals (DACC) which 
predicts the level of “non-discretionary” working capital accruals as a function of 
the growth in revenues.56 We follow Hribar and Collins (2002) and Meeks and 
Botsari (2008)57 who suggest that the accruals measure should be estimated from 
cash flow statement figures rather than from balance sheet numbers, as the 
difference between income before extra-ordinary items reported in the cash flow 
statement and cash flows from operations, adjusted for the depreciation depletion 
                                            
56 Beneish (1998) and Young (1999) justify a focus on modelling working capital accruals instead 
of total accruals by pointing out that changes in depreciation policy cannot be made very frequently 
without attracting adverse attention and that modelling other long-term accruals such as 
environmental liabilities and pension obligations is far too complex. For similar reasons, Louis 
(2004) also focuses on current accruals.  
57 Collins and Hribar (2002) attribute the inconsistency between the “balance sheet” versus the 
“cash flow” approach for measuring accruals to non-articulation events such as reclassifications, 
acquisitions, divestitures, accounting changes, and foreign currency translations. The estimation 
procedure here is deliberately more prudent and thus, is drawing data out of the cash flow 
statement. 
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and amortization expense.  We estimate discretionary accruals in a two-stage 
procedure. In the first stage, a working capital accruals variable for firm i, year t and 
sector j, scaled by the beginning total assets, is regressed upon the change in 
revenues scaled by the beginning total assets for each year and all available firm 
observations under the same two-digit ICB industry classification j and year t. 58,59 
The second stage regression predicts the non-discretionary level of working capital 
accruals using the estimated coefficients from the first stage. Note that in second 
stage, the influence of the cash sales is also taken into account by introducing the 
change in receivables, similarly to Dechow et al.  (1995).60 
An important feature of the research question in this study is financial reporting 
discretion that is specifically related to the acquisition. To this end, the first stage 
of regression estimating the “non-discretionary” part of accruals is estimated on a 
sample that excludes firm-year observations associated with an acquisition 
announcement. Based on recent research (Collins and Kim, 2012; Owens et al., 
2013), acquisitions are “non-articulation” events, often associated with significant 
business shocks whereby the lead-lag relation between financial statement items 
                                            
58 Two digit ICB provides 15 industry classification whereas the equivalent SIC leads to 66 industries 
classifications, excluding missing and financial observations. We require at least 6 observations for 
each industry-year sub-sample (similarly to García Lara et al., 2005). 
59 The accounting data are sourced from Worldscope for all the UK domicile companies. The 
working capital accruals are estimated as Income Before Extra Items (WC04001) – Total Funds 
From Operations (WC04201) - Other Funds From Operations (WC04831) + Depreciation, 
Amortisation & Depletion (WC04051). Other accounting data employed here are: change in sales 
(WC01001), total assets (WC02999) and change in receivables (WC02051). In order to mitigate the 
influence of outliers, extreme values of the distribution to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the above 
variable are excluded from the analysis. We then winsorise all the remaining variables we employ 
at the top and bottom 1%.  The use of the Worldscope database is motivated by the wish to ensure 
comparability with previous research as well as for data availability reasons. Notably, Worldscope 
data can be downloaded by either Datastream or Thomson One Banker. In order to ensure the 
maximum coverage available, both sources have been employed and subsequently, the two 
datasets are merged based their SEDOL or their ISIN number. 
60 The change in receivables is included in order to control for managers’ attempts to manipulate 
earnings through discretionary revenues. For instance, managers may use their discretion to 
recognise revenues for which cash has not yet received and have yet to be earned. This situation 
would result in reporting increased sales and working capital accruals through increased 
receivables (Dechow et al., 1995). 
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is distorted. Hence, introducing such observations in the first stage may lead to 
inconsistent discretionary accruals estimates. This is a point that may have 
escaped prior research and affected its inference, e.g. Louis (2004).  
The non-discretionary level of accruals prediction procedure in the second stage 
applies the coefficients estimated in the first stage to the particular sample in the 
present study comprising of firms which engage with an acquisition.  The “non-
discretionary” part of the accruals in our sample then represents an estimate of the 
expected level of accruals had the firm not been involved in an acquisition. Finally, 
since performance might be also a determinant of  the level of accruals, the 
estimated discretionary accruals here are also “performance adjusted” in the 
manner advocated by Kothari et al. (2005)  and implemented in Botsari and Meeks 
(2008), by adjusting the level of discretionary accruals with the median level of 
discretionary accruals of matched firms for the respective industry-year and quartile 
of ROA.  
4.4.4 Measuring long term abnormal returns 
The post-acquisition performance is estimated as the size adjusted buy and hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) over one, two and three years following the 
announcement of the acquisition, similar to Louis (2004). Our approach to measure 
long term abnormal returns follow closely the procedure described in prior research 
in the UK (e.g. Gregory et al., 2010). We construct the size control portfolios for 
each year using all UK firms. Then, we rank these firms in decile portfolios 
according to their market capitalisation at the beginning of the year. The return for 
each size control portfolio is then tracked from January of year t, with the returns 
being value-weighted according to their initial market capitalisations. We calculate 
buy and hold returns for all companies with available returns data in Datastream. 
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However, our results are similar when we replace missing returns. We follow the 
procedure discussed in Gregory et al. (2010) given that Datastream reports missing 
returns if firms in the sample are de-listed. This has the potential to create an 
upward bias in the estimated BHAR returns, since some of these de-listings relate 
to bankruptcies. If a de-listed firm has preserved its value (such as a merger or an 
acquisition), we replace the return of that firm by the return of the benchmark. If the 
delisting is due to a total loss of value (bankruptcy), we replace the return by −1. 
We source bankruptcies from LSPD using G10 description and more specifically 
codes 7, 16, 20 and 21. These codes are most likely to be firms that are either 
worthless or a long way from giving shareholders any terminal value, and so we 
treat these cases as if investors lost all their investment. By contrast, the remaining 
types of de-listing would seem to be value preserving.  
4.5 Analysis  
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics on the composition of the sample by industrial sector and by 
year of announcement are presented in Table 4.2. Panel A shows that bids in the 
“technology” and “industrial goods & services” sector dominate the sample (21.74% 
and 48.99% respectively) and this is consistent across both stock-financed 
acquisitions (26.63% and 41.42%) and cash-financed (17.05% and 56.25%). The 
time-series phenomenon of mergers waves can be clearly seen in Panel B, with a 
notable concentration of both cash-financed (57.40%) and stock-financed (59.09%) 
acquisition deals during the  1994-2001 (5th) wave (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). Similarly, we note the impact of the 2003-2006 (6th) merger wave 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) in our sample.  
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Table 4.2 
Panel A: Composition of the sample by industry classification 
 
  Full sample Stock exchange Cash exchange 
ICB ICB Name Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
23 Construction & Material 14 4.06 4.06 2 1.18 1.18 12 6.82 6.82 
27 Industrial Goods & Services 169 48.99 53.04 70 41.42 42.6 99 56.25 63.07 
35 Food & Beverages 5 1.45 54.49 1 0.59 43.2 4 2.27 65.34 
37 Personal & Household Goods 16 4.64 59.13 9 5.33 48.52 7 3.98 69.32 
45 Health Care 17 4.93 64.06 9 5.33 53.85 8 4.55 73.86 
53 Retail 5 1.45 65.51 5 2.96 56.8 0 0 73.86 
55 Media 39 11.3 76.81 23 13.61 70.41 16 9.09 82.95 
57 Travel & Leisure 5 1.45 78.26 5 2.96 73.37 0 0 82.95 
95 Technology 75 21.74 100 45 26.63 100 30 17.05 100 
Total  345 100  169 100  176 100  
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Table 4.2 
Panel B: Composition of the sample by year 
 
  Full sample Share exchange Cash financed 
Year Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
1994 25 7.25 7.25 16 9.47 9.47 9 5.11 5.11 
1995 35 10.14 17.39 14 8.28 17.75 21 11.93 17.05 
1996 27 7.83 25.22 17 10.06 27.81 10 5.68 22.73 
1997 9 2.61 27.83 4 2.37 30.18 5 2.84 25.57 
1998 21 6.09 33.91 10 5.92 36.09 11 6.25 31.82 
1999 32 9.28 43.19 10 5.92 42.01 22 12.5 44.32 
2000 33 9.57 52.75 19 11.24 53.25 14 7.95 52.27 
2001 19 5.51 58.26 7 4.14 57.40 12 6.82 59.09 
2002 7 2.03 60.29 3 1.78 59.17 4 2.27 61.36 
2003 7 2.03 62.32 4 2.37 61.54 3 1.70 63.07 
2004 24 6.96 69.28 13 7.69 69.23 11 6.25 69.32 
2005 19 5.51 74.78 12 7.10 76.33 7 3.98 73.30 
2006 32 9.28 84.06 15 8.88 85.21 17 9.66 82.95 
2007 38 11.01 95.07 20 11.83 97.04 18 10.23 93.18 
2008 17 4.93 100 5 2.96 100 12 6.82 100 
Total 345 100  169 100  176 100  
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Table 4.3 reports the differences between the characteristics of firms who conduct 
cash and stock acquisitions. Consistent with prior research (Erickson and Wang, 
1999; Louis, 2004; Botsari and Meeks, 2008), firms that embark on stock-financed 
deals exhibit significant earnings management in terms of discretionary accruals 
(mean: 0.0164, p-value<5%). In contrast, there is no evidence of management for 
firms who conduct cash-financed deals (mean 0.0075, p-value>10%). Financial 
reporting in stock acquisitions appears to be driven by incentives to boost share 
prices with the aim firstly to improve the share-exchange ratio during the acquisition 
and therefore to reduce the cost of acquisition, and secondly, to protect current 
shareholders’ interest dilution (Erickson and Wang, 1999). The descriptive 
statistics also confirm prior evidence documenting a more positive market reaction 
among cash than stock acquisitions (Moeller et al., 2004 for the US; and Draper 
and Paudyal, 2006 for the UK). Specifically, there is evidence of significant positive 
returns exhibited by cash acquisitions (mean 0.0093, p-value<0.01) as opposed to 
stock acquisitions (mean 0.0054, p-value>0.10) where returns are not significantly 
different from zero. In line with Louis (2004) we find that the median one, two and 
three returns are significantly negative for stock acquisitions. Firms that engage 
with stock acquisitions appear to underperform significantly compared to cash 
acquisitions. The descriptive statistics also confirm the evidence documented by 
Akbulut (2012) that directors’ purchases occur more often than directors’ sales prior 
to an acquisition.  
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for cash and stock acquirers 
  Full sample Stock Cash 
Stock-
Cash 
DACC        
Mean 0.0118** 0.0164** 0.0075 0.0089 
p-value 0.0124 0.0231 0.1323 0.1988 
Median 0.0080*** 0.0105* 0.0049 0.0056 
p-value 0.0322 0.0659 0.2390 0.5454 
ABRET     
Mean 0.0074*** 0.0054 0.0093*** -0.0040 
p-value 0.0088 0.1623 0.0016 0.2617 
Median 0.0039*** 0.0014 0.0064*** -0.0050 
p-value 0.0046 0.3642 0.0009 0.2127 
ABRET1Y     
Mean -0.0189 -0.0665** 0.0267 -0.0933** 
p-value 0.2057 0.0297 0.1852 0.0214 
Median -0.0464 -0.0644** -0.0221 -0.0423** 
p-value 0.1355 0.0108 0.6480 0.0264 
 (n=345) (n=169) (n=176)  
ABRET2Y     
Mean -0.0548* -0.0969** -0.0145 -0.0824 
p-value 0.0516 0.0235 0.3780 0.1101 
Median -0.1456*** -0.2458*** -0.0933** -0.1524* 
p-value 0.0000 0.0003 0.0295 0.0778 
 (n=343) (n=168) (n=175)  
ABRET3Y     
Mean -0.0069 -0.0349 0.0196 -0.0545 
p-value 0.4444 0.3246 0.3767 0.2896 
Median -0.1614*** -0.2068*** -0.1220 -0.0848** 
p-value 0.0005 0.0007 0.1450 0.0500 
 (n=332) (n=161) (n=171)  
NPRbeforeEA    
Mean 0.0291 -0.0345 0.0902* -0.1247* 
p-value 0.2371 0.2736 0.0591 0.0626 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 
p-value 0.1524 0.9169 0.0429 0.1423 
NPRafterEA     
Mean 0.1100*** 0.0043 0.2114*** -0.2071*** 
p-value 0.0010 0.4629 0.0000 0.0015 
Median 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
p-value 0.0008 0.8037 0.0000 0.0033 
Notes:  
DACC stands for the performance matched discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones 
model; ABRET is the cumulative value weighted abnormal return measured from two days before 
to two days after the acquisition announcement; ABRET1Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns 
measured over 12 months from the announcement of the acquisition; ABRET2Y  is the buy and 
hold abnormal returns measured over 24 months from the announcement of the acquisition; 
ABRET3Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 36 months from the announcement 
of the acquisition; NPRbeforeEA stands for the Net Purchase Ratio based on the evidence on 
insider trading during the fiscal year preceding the acquisition announcement; NPRafterEA stands 
for the Net Purchase Ratio based on the evidence on insider trading taking place after the earnings 
announcement but before the acquisition; p-values are reported in parentheses and additionally, *, 
** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.  
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Table 4.4 shows the announcement returns to stock and cash acquisitions for the 
sub-samples of observations formed based on the presences and timing of 
directors’ purchases or not. More specifically, Panel A shows the abnormal returns 
for the sub-sample of acquisition where directors abstain from purchasing shares, 
Panel B for the sub-sample with directors’ purchases after the earnings 
announcement, Panel C for the sub-sample with directors’ purchases before the 
earnings announcement and Panel D, for the sub-sample whereby directors 
purchase throughout the financial year ending prior to the acquisition and up to 
acquisition announcement. The descriptive statistics show that the acquisition 
announcement returns for stock acquisitions are insignificantly different from zero 
when directors abstain from purchasing shares (mean 0.0011, p-value:>0.10). A 
negative reaction to stock acquisitions, as well as a significant difference from the 
reaction to cash acquisitions occurs only when directors purchase shares after the 
earnings announcement. Our descriptive statistics exhibit the negative reaction in 
Panel B, where directors trade after the earnings announcement only (-0.0212, p-
value<0.10) and in Panel D where directors trade after as well as before the 
earnings announcement (-0.0159, p-value<0.10). We also observe a significant 
difference between the returns in cash and stock acquisitions in panels B and D 
(mean returns are -0.0224, p-value<0.05 and -0.0293, p-value<0.05, respectively). 
Such evidence could lead to premature inferences about insider purchases being 
an indicator of overconfidence and as such, affecting adversely the market’s 
reaction. Notably, the market reaction to stock acquisitions where directors have 
been net purchasers only before the earnings announcement is significantly 
positive (0.0373, p-value<0.01) but also it is significantly larger than the reaction to 
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cash acquisitions (0.0291, p-value<0.05). This finding is in line with the prediction 
that insider purchases that are contemporaneous with the development of 
discretionary accruals are also associated with a higher earnings persistence 
(Beneish and Vargus, 2002).  In the setting of acquisitions, we re-interpret their 
inferences to imply that those particular insider purchases credibly signal the lack 
of opportunistic earnings management.  
Finally, the acquisition announcement returns of cash acquisitions are positive 
throughout all Panels here and significant in Panels A, C and D. However, our 
inferences here could be influenced by various risk or other acquisition related 
parameters. We address those concerns in our multivariate tests as well.  
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Table 4.4: Market reaction to cash and stock acquirers and the impact of directors’ purchases 
  Stock Cash Stock-Cash 
Panel A: No Buys  
Observations 98 76  
Mean 0.0011 0.0107** -0.0096 
p-value 0.4366 0.0113 0.1415 
Median 0.0007 0.0059** -0.0052 
p-value 0.5926 0.0297 0.2966 
Panel B: Buys after earning announcement   
Observations 18 29  
Mean -0.0212* 0.0012 -0.0224** 
p-value 0.0515 0.4292 0.0444 
Median -0.0094 0.0020 -0.0114 
p-value 0.1221 0.8542 0.1202 
Panel C: Buys before earning announcement  
Observations 38 31  
Mean 0.0373*** 0.0082* 0.0291** 
p-value 0.0035 0.0664 0.0305 
Median 0.0136*** 0.0068** 0.0068 
p-value 0.0089 0.0396 0.1581 
Panel D: Buys before and after earning announcement  
Observations 15 40  
Mean -0.0159* 0.0134* -0.0293** 
p-value 0.0832 0.0612 0.0313 
Median -0.0088 0.0090* -0.0178* 
p-value 0.1914 0.0546 0.0563 
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4.5.2 Discussion of findings 
Table 4.5 presents the empirical implementation of model (4.1) in our sample.61 
Consistently with investors undoing the effects of earnings management, the 
coefficient of  DACCi,s in stock acquisitions is negative and significant (-0.1208, p-
value<0.05).  
Louis (2004) argues that investors are fooled by earnings management and they 
don’t fully capture its effects at the acquisition announcement. Consequently, he 
establishes a negative relation between pre-acquisition discretionary accruals and 
subsequent post-acquisition returns. As it is shown in Table 4.6, we also establish 
a similar relationship for abnormal returns measured over one, two and three years 
ahead. However, as the evidence reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 shows, such 
conclusion is premature.  
  
                                            
61 Models (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated here by means of an OLS regression with robust standard 
errors (to allow for heteroscedasticity) and allowing for clustering at the firm level and year fixed 
effects.  
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Table 4.5: Acquirers’ performance and earnings management 
ܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ = ෍(ߙ଴,௦ + ߙଵ,௦ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	 ߝ௜ ,௧ଵ
௦ୀ଴
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
ABRET is the cumulative abnormal return measured from two days before, to two days after the 
acquisition announcement market-adjusted returns using the FT All Share Index. DACC represents 
discretionary accruals; RUNUP is the acquirer’s price run-up measured as the buy and hold return 
calculated over the 60 days ending to 30 days before the acquisitions announcement using the 
FTSE All share index as the market return; EACAR is the acquirer’s market adjusted returns 
cumulated over one  day before to four  days  after the earnings announcement; BM is the book to 
market ratio; Ln_MV is the natural logarithm of the market value at the year end; LEVERAGE is the 
leverage ratio calculated as total debt divided by total assets. LISTED is a binary variable that equals 
to 1 if the target is listed and 0 otherwise; CROSS-BORDER is a binary variable that equals to 1 if 
  STOCK CASH 
DACC -0.1208** -0.0193 
 (0.0317) (0.4975) 
RUNUP 0.0060 0.0073 
  (0.8440) (0.7439) 
EACAR -0.0262 -0.0869 
  (0.7556) (0.2749) 
BM 0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.9255) (0.9629) 
Ln_MV -0.0057 -0.0029 
  (0.2198) (0.2488) 
LEVERAGE    0.0186 0.0365 
  (0.6285) (0.2174) 
LISTED -0.0181 0.0019 
  (0.1274) (0.8452) 
CROSS-BORDER  0.0009 0.0051 
  (0.9474) (0.4411) 
INTRA-INDUSTRY -0.0223** -0.0038 
  (0.0295) (0.5826) 
DEALVALUE -0.0050*** -0.0030 
  (0.0003) (0.2558) 
YEAR CONTROLS 
  
 
YES 
CONSTANT 0.0443 0.0159 
  (0.1869) (0.5121) 
    
Observations 345 
R-squared 0.1684 
F 3.323 
p-value 0.0000 
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the target does not operate in the UK and 0 otherwise; INTRA-INDUSTRY is a binary variable that 
equals to 1 if the target operates in the same SIC industry classification; and DEAL-VALUE equals 
the value of the deal.  The statistical significance of the coefficients is based on robust standard 
errors (to allow for heteroscedasticity) allowing for clusters at the firm level (in brackets); 
additionally, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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Table 4.6: Long term acquirers’ performance and the influence of earnings management 
 
ܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ = ෍(ߙ଴,௦ + ߙଵ,௦ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	 ߝ௜ ,௧ଵ
௦ୀ଴
 
 
 
Notes:  
ABRET1Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 12 months from the announcement of 
the acquisition; ABRET2Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 24 months from the 
announcement of the acquisition; ABRET3Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 36 
months from the announcement of the acquisition; DACC represents discretionary accruals; Controls 
included but not reported here are and defined as in table 4.5. The statistical significance of the 
coefficients is based on robust standard errors (to allow for heteroscedasticity) allowing for clusters at 
the firm level (in brackets); *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 ABRET1Y ABRET2Y ABRET3Y 
 STOCK CASH STOCK CASH STOCK CASH 
DACC -0.6765** -0.6092* -0.8030** -0.5637 -0.9072** -0.4362 
 (0.0129) (0.0876) (0.0162) (0.4067) (0.0390) (0.5346) 
      
Controls/Year 
effects 
YES YES YES 
      
CONSTANT 0.0290 -0.0691 -0.0273 0.1816 0.1089 0.0821 
  (0.8503) (0.6772) (0.8938) (0.4736) (0.7101) (0.7823) 
       
Observations 345 343 332 
R-squared 0.1874 0.1289 0.0927 
F 0.0927 0.0268 -0.0176 
p-value 3.858 3.157 1.905 
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We inform the relation between discretionary accruals and the short term market 
reaction by introducing the presence and the timing of net insider purchases 
denoting their credibility. In line with H2a, the results reported in Table 4.7 indicate 
that the relation between discretionary accruals and announcement returns is 
negative when managers trade only after the earnings announcement (-0.2285, p-
value<0.10) or they don’t trade at all (-0.1117, p-value<0.10). Had we followed 
Veenman (2012), we could have argued that the presence of insider purchases 
enhances the precision of discretionary accruals and prevents investors from 
understanding their reversal. To the extent that this interpretation holds, we should 
have observed a milder initial reaction during the acquisition announcement. The 
milder reaction would have been associated with the trust to the managers’ 
precision of private information with regard to their estimates of the reversal of 
earnings management. However, this is not the case since the corresponding 
coefficient in Table 4.7, although larger, is not significantly different from the 
coefficient of discretionary accruals in the absence of any net insider purchases. 
Therefore, at the acquisition announcement, investors treat all cases where there 
is no evidence of credible signalling for the absence of opportunism as having over-
stated their earnings. Our research design allows us to identify a case of credible 
signal for the absence of earnings management in the form of net insider purchases 
before the earnings announcement. As Beneish and Vargus (2002) show, this type 
of information is associated with higher earnings quality. The positive sign of the 
estimated coefficient for discretionary accruals in the presence of net purchases 
before the earnings announcement (0.0368, p-value>0.10) confirms those 
predictions. Finally, we observe a substantial negative reaction to discretionary 
accruals when managers trade throughout the financial year prior the acquisition 
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and up to its announcement, albeit not statistically significant (-0.2894, p-
value>0.10). It could be argued that the lack of significance may be attributed to 
the contradictory indications conveyed by insider purchases taking place before 
the earnings announcement.  
The test results reported in Table 4.8 confirm that the interpretation of the 
continuing negative relation between discretionary accruals and post-acquisition 
returns in Louis (2004) is premature. Specifically, we find that the negative 
response to discretionary accruals in the presence of net insider purchases after 
the earnings announcements is consistently large and significant (one year ahead: 
-1.5810, p-value<0.01; two years ahead:-2.5202, p-value<0.05 and three years 
ahead, -3.4966, p-value<0.01). No other combination between discretionary 
accruals and net insider purchases after the earnings announcement explain the 
long term returns. These results suggest that the reaction to earnings management 
is complete at the acquisition announcement, unless discretionary accruals are 
accompanied with insider purchases after the earnings announcement. Now, it 
becomes obvious that the results reported in Table 4.6 are driven by a reaction to 
overconfidence. 
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Table 4.7 Acquisition announcement returns and the influence of net purchases before and after 
the earnings announcements 
ܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ = ෍ߙ଴,௦ + ܾଵ,௦ܰܤܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ + ܾଶ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾଷ,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	ଵ
௦ୀ଴ + ܾସ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾହ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଺,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଻,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	ߝ௜ ,௧ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
ABRET is the cumulative abnormal return measured from two days before, to two days after the 
acquisition announcement market-adjusted returns using the FT All Share Index. NBDACC stands for  
discretionary accruals when directors abstain from purchasing shares during the financial year 
preceding the acquisition and up to the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; BUYbeforeEA 
is a binary variable taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases taking place 
during the financial year; BUYbeforeEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors 
engage with insider purchases during the financial year preceding the acquisition, and zero otherwise; 
BUYafterEA is a binary variable taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases 
taking place after the earnings announcement but before the acquisition announcement; 
BUYafterEA_DACC stands for discretionary accruals when directors engage with purchasing shares 
after the latest earnings announcement and up to the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; 
BUYbefore&afterEA is a binary variable taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider 
 STOCK CASH 
NBDACC  -0.1117* 0.0074 
  (0.0620) (0.8013) 
BUYbeforeEA 0.0240 -0.0033 
  (0.1174) (0.7097) 
 BUYbeforeEA_DACC 0.0368 -0.1066 
 (0.8066) (0.3581) 
BUYafterEA -0.0261* -0.0140 
  (0.0742) (0.1648) 
BUYafterEA_DACC  -0.2285* -0.0503 
  (0.0564) (0.4784) 
BUYafter&beforeEA -0.0098 -0.0017 
 (0.4738) (0.8753) 
BUYafter&beforeEA_DACC -0.2894 -0.0943 
 (0.1446) (0.5322) 
   
Controls/Year effects YES 
   
CONSTANT 0.0406 0.0131 
  (0.2368) (0.5939) 
    
Observations 345 
R-squared 0.2156 
F 0.0888 
p-value 3.090 
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purchases taking place after the earnings announcement but before the acquisition announcement and 
during the financial year; BUYbefore&afterEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors 
engage with purchasing shares during the financial year preceding the acquisition and up to the 
acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; Controls included but not reported here are and defined 
as in table 4.5. The statistical significance of the coefficients is based on robust standard errors (to allow 
for heteroscedasticity) allowing for clusters at the firm level (in brackets); *, ** and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 4.8: Long term acquirers’ performance and the influence of net purchases before and after 
the earnings announcements 
 
ܣܤܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ = ෍ߙ଴,௦ + ܾଵ,௦ܰܤܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ + ܾଶ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾଷ,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	ଵ
௦ୀ଴ + ܾସ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾହ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଺,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଻,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	ߝ௜ ,௧ 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
ABRET1Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 12 months from the announcement of 
the acquisition; ABRET2Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 24 months from the 
announcement of the acquisition; ABRET3Y  is the buy and hold abnormal returns measured over 36 
months from the announcement of the acquisition; NBDACC stands for  discretionary accruals when 
directors abstain from purchasing shares during the financial year preceding the acquisition and up to 
 ABRET1Y ABRET2Y ABRET3Y 
 STOCK CASH STOCK CASH STOCK CASH 
NBDACC  -0.4936 -0.5482 -0.5836 0.0079 -0.5930 -0.2636 
  (0.1910) (0.2048) (0.1135) (0.9891) (0.2199) (0.5788) 
BUYbeforeEA -0.0682 0.0373 0.0310 0.2301 0.2503 0.3297 
  (0.4210) (0.7072) (0.8168) (0.1378) (0.2147) (0.1740) 
 BUYbeforeEA_DACC -0.4446 -0.4280 -0.1227 -1.2428 0.7668 -3.2292 
 (0.4390) (0.8472) (0.9147) (0.7861) (0.5914) (0.6057) 
BUYafterEA -0.0517 -0.0333 0.1795 0.1970* 0.4726* 0.2934* 
  (0.6544) (0.6428) (0.3539) (0.0766) (0.0765) (0.0573) 
BUYafterEA_DACC  -1.5810*** 0.3660 -2.5202** -0.1940 -3.4966*** -0.5830 
  (0.0039) (0.5890) (0.0295) (0.8690) (0.0046) (0.7112) 
BUYafter&beforeEA -0.0569 0.0528 0.0603 0.2521* 0.3384 0.2521* 
 (0.6134) (0.5491) (0.7324) (0.0510) (0.3731) (0.0933) 
BUYafter&beforeEA_
DACC 0.7778 -1.9821* 1.1997 -2.2686 3.0038 -0.1770 
 (0.5240) (0.0658) (0.5924) (0.1871) (0.6016) (0.9180) 
     
Controls/Year effects YES YES YES 
     
CONSTANT 0.0260 -0.1064 -0.0956 0.0592 -0.0689 -0.0152 
  (0.8661) (0.5308) (0.6493) (0.7995) (0.7994) (0.9566) 
      
Observations 345 343 332 
R-squared 0.2051 0.1577 0.1433 
F 0.0766 0.0206 -0.00152 
p-value 2.969 2.645 1.747 
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the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; BUYbeforeEA is a binary variable taking the value 
of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases taking place during the financial year; 
BUYbeforeEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors engage with insider purchases 
during the financial year preceding the acquisition, and zero otherwise; BUYafterEA is a binary variable 
taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases taking place after the earnings 
announcement but before the acquisition announcement; BUYafterEA_DACC stands for discretionary 
accruals when directors engage with purchasing shares after the latest earnings announcement and up 
to the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; BUYbefore&afterEA is a binary variable taking 
the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases taking place after the earnings 
announcement but before the acquisition announcement and during the financial year; 
BUYbefore&afterEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors engage with purchasing 
shares during the financial year preceding the acquisition and up to the acquisition announcement, and 
zero otherwise; Controls included but not reported here are and defined as in table 4.5. The statistical 
significance of the coefficients is based on robust standard errors (to allow for heteroscedasticity) 
allowing for clusters at the firm level (in brackets); *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 ` 
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Overall, our results show that during the acquisition announcement, rational 
investors have no means to know to which extent the precision of managers’ 
optimistic expectations has any realistic basis. Investors though are aware of the 
complexity of merging two firms’ fundamentals. They are also aware that 
competent or lucky managers may ultimately achieve what they implicitly promise 
through their net purchases. Thus, we argue that market participants observe 
managers’ actions and reports in the post-acquisition period in order to assess their 
ability to deliver the outcomes that have been initially promised. The higher the 
extent of earnings management, the more difficult the task of concealing its reversal 
becomes and thus, the more overconfident managers appear. Notably, a similar 
relation holds in the case where managers are not net buyers. Nevertheless, in this 
case, there is no implicit promise that the earnings management reversal will be 
mitigated and therefore, their ability is not judged upon this specific ability and 
consequently, there is no significant adverse market reaction. Therefore, we argue 
that the combination of earnings management and insider purchases after the 
earnings announcement is penalised by disappointed investors over overconfident 
managers’ ability to take control of the process of merging two firm’s fundamental 
streams. On the other hand, investors do not appear to penalise overconfidence in 
the sense conceived in the finance literature and expressed by net insider 
purchases. Our results do not capture any such evidence from the net insider 
purchases effects. In fact, those variables indicate mostly a positive albeit typically 
insignificant response to long term market reactions in the case of stock 
acquisitions.  
Our discussion of results relies considerably upon the notion of the earnings 
management reversal. We investigate whether and when discretionary accruals 
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reverse and report the results of our investigation in Table 4.9. The tests examine 
the relationship between discretionary accruals and subsequent operating 
performance in terms of return on assets over one, two and three years ahead, 
where return on assets is defined as earnings before interest and taxes scaled by 
contemporaneous total assets. Due to the database constraints in terms of the 
necessary data for the dependent variable in those tests, the number of 
observations employed does not correspond to the number of observations in our 
main tests. Hence, we are duly cautious when drawing inference from those tests 
to explain our earlier results. However, when we perform our earlier tests for this 
reduced sample our results are unchanged which provides at least some 
confidence to our conclusions. 
The findings reported in Table 4.9 suggest that there is statistically significant 
evidence of earnings management reversal over two years from the acquisition. 
Those findings confirm Fairfield et al. (2007)’s arguments that acquisitions provide 
managers with opportunities to conceal the unwinding of earnings management, at 
least in the short term. Furthermore, we don’t observe any significant evidence of 
earnings management reversal in cases where such purchases had occurred (-
0.1891, insignificant). The results support our argument that discretionary accruals 
accompanied with insider purchases before the earnings announcement signal the 
absence of earnings management. Investors also appear quite rational to not react 
negatively during and after the acquisition announcement in those cases. On the 
other hand, we observe significant evidence on the reversal of earnings 
management in cases where we have a significant negative market reaction during 
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the acquisition.62 The magnitude of the reversal appears to follow the pattern in 
those reactions both in the case of the absence of insider purchases and in the 
case of insider purchases after the earnings announcement (-0.6756, p-
value<0.05; -0.9399, p-value<0.05, respectively). Furthermore, we don’t have 
significant evidence that the reversal of earnings management is more pronounced 
in the second case.  Therefore, there is no obvious difference in timing and the 
magnitude of the impact of discretionary accruals on future operating performance. 
In addition, we note the adverse long term implication of earnings management in 
the presence of insider purchases after the earnings announcement but not 
otherwise, as presented in Table 4.8. Taken together, the significant post-
acquisition reactions are more likely to be driven by cost of capital effects. In other 
words, during the post-acquisition period, investors observe the reversal of 
earnings management and compare the realised outcome to the initial precision of 
managers’ precision of optimistic expectations. This deviation puts the managers’ 
ability at question and as a result, investors require a higher rate of return to 
compensate against the risk involved in manager’s ability to deal with the post-
acquisition complexity. 
  
                                            
62 This result may suggest that the earnings management reversal is unavoidable. However, the 
results here capture an average effect. It is always possible that some managers achieve to prevent 
the earnings management reversal to affect the post-acquisition operating performance and justify 
the precision of their optimistic projections. On the other hand, overconfident managers tend to 
exhibit more flawed judgement. For instance, Hribar and Yang (2010) show that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to miss their own forecasts.  
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Table 4.9: Long term acquirers’ operating performance and the influence of net purchases before 
and after the earnings announcements 
ܴܱܣ௜,௧ = ෍ߙ଴,௦ + ܾଵ,௦ܰܤܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ + ܾଶ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾଷ,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	ଵ
௦ୀ଴ + ܾସ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ_ܦܣܥܥ௜,௧ 	+ ܾହ,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଺,௦ܤܷܻ݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ ܾ଻,௦ܤܷܻܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁&݂ܽݐ݁ݎܧܣ௜,௧ 	+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧) + 	ߝ௜ ,௧ 
Notes:  
ROA1Y  is the return on assets one year after the acquisition; ROA2Y  is the return on assets two years 
after the acquisition; ROA3Y  is the return on assets three years after the acquisition; NBDACC stands 
for  discretionary accruals when directors abstain from purchasing shares during the financial year 
preceding the acquisition and up to the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; BUYbeforeEA 
is a binary variable taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases taking place 
during the financial year; BUYbeforeEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors 
engage with insider purchases during the financial year preceding the acquisition, and zero otherwise; 
BUYafterEA is a binary variable taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider purchases 
 ROA1Y ROA2Y ROA3Y 
 STOCK CASH STOCK CASH STOCK CASH 
NBDACC  -0.3479 0.0408 -0.6756** 0.0903 -0.8304 0.1572 
  (0.2432) (0.7084) (0.0379) (0.4743) (0.2876) (0.4402) 
BUYbeforeEA -0.0170 0.0107 0.0673 0.0468 0.0837 0.0487 
  (0.5899) (0.7293) (0.1492) (0.1266) (0.1537) (0.1508) 
 BUYbeforeEA_DACC 0.4619 0.7751 -0.1891 -0.3894 0.1306 0.1838 
 (0.1564) (0.3128) (0.7496) (0.3654) (0.7829) (0.7248) 
BUYafterEA 0.0385 0.0215 0.0015 0.0412 0.0561 0.0143 
  (0.2341) (0.4258) (0.9878) (0.2552) (0.5235) (0.7406) 
BUYafterEA_DACC  -0.5433 -0.0558 -0.9399** -0.1921 -0.2688 0.2089 
  (0.2118) (0.8899) (0.0174) (0.6412) (0.6075) (0.6080) 
BUYafter&beforeEA 0.0026 0.0456* 0.0635 0.0640** 0.0947 0.0349 
 (0.9187) (0.0608) (0.3001) (0.0445) (0.1634) (0.3876) 
BUYafter&beforeEA_D
ACC 0.5222 0.1208 0.4767 0.1128 0.5865 -0.4946 
 (0.1731) (0.5188) (0.4319) (0.7276) (0.4435) (0.1917) 
     
Controls/Year effects YES YES YES 
     
CONSTANT -0.0824 0.0447 -0.2673* 0.0052 -0.3508** -0.1722 
  (0.1723) (0.5489) (0.0645) (0.9508) (0.0338) (0.2179) 
      
Observations 338 313 269 
R-squared 0.4271 0.3316 0.2666 
F 0.332 0.211 0.107 
p-value 10.01 5.207 3.552 
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taking place after the earnings announcement but before the acquisition announcement; 
BUYafterEA_DACC stands for discretionary accruals when directors engage with purchasing shares 
after the latest earnings announcement and up to the acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; 
BUYbefore&afterEA is a binary variable taking the value of one if there is evidence of  net insider 
purchases taking place after the earnings announcement but before the acquisition announcement and 
during the financial year; BUYbefore&afterEA_DACC stands for  discretionary accruals when directors 
engage with purchasing shares during the financial year preceding the acquisition and up to the 
acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise; Controls included but not reported here are and defined 
as in table 4.5. The statistical significance of the coefficients is based on robust standard errors (to allow 
for heteroscedasticity) allowing for clusters at the firm level (in brackets); *, ** and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
In this study, we employ the presence and more importantly, the timing of directors’ 
net insider purchases to identify overconfidence in the use of earnings 
management prior to acquisitions. We argue that in an acquisition context, 
overconfident managers overestimate the magnitude of the combined entity’s 
earnings by believing that the adverse consequences of aggressive accounting can 
be concealed during the integration process. The issue is especially pertinent for 
stock acquisitions where earnings management is employed to enhance the 
exchange ratio for the benefit of the acquirer’s shareholders. In the same time, 
overconfident managers underestimate the probability of new, difficult or 
contentious accounting issues and possible business integration problems that 
may compound those issues. Given this information uncertainty associated with 
the integration period, overconfident managers’ subjective estimates tend to be 
unjustifiably precise. We show that market participants understand both the 
incentives and the opportunities for earnings management and adjust share prices 
during the acquisition announcement. We also show that the post-acquisition 
reaction to earnings management is a reaction to the precision by which managers’ 
optimistic expectations have been initially conveyed.  
In contrast to Louis (2004), our approach does not support a mispricing or market 
inefficiency explanation for the relation between earnings management and market 
reaction during and after an acquisition. Following the Roll’s hubris hypothesis, we 
attribute it to overconfident managers. Takeovers reflect decisions taken by 
individuals who have the opportunity to conduct a few acquisitions during their 
career. Hence, they may be more prone to make mistakes in terms of the first 
(optimism) and second moment (precision) of their subjective probability 
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distribution of the combined entity’s future cash flows. In our setting, where serial 
acquirers are excluded, this becomes even more likely.  
We argue that the market learns about managers’ overconfidence gradually, over 
the course of the integration process by following up their actions and reports; this 
learning leads to an inverse relation between pre-acquisition earnings 
management and long term returns. Brav and Heaton (2002) argue that mistakes 
or risk premiums that result from incomplete information can generate financial 
anomalies. Specifically, they refer to investors who make optimal statistical 
decisions but they lack critical structural knowledge. It is likely that our approach 
here lies within a “rational structural uncertainty” explanation as market participants 
have an incomplete set of information about the valuation parameters initially and 
update their beliefs subsequently, as new information arrives during the integration 
period. 
An interesting question that may also arise is how and whether overconfidence and 
its adverse effects can be mitigated through a regulatory mechanism. Armour and 
Skeel (2006) point out to the differences in the litigiousness in the regulation of 
acquisitions between the UK, which is our case here, and the U.S.A. In the more 
litigious environment of the U.S.A, there is evidence that acquirers often face 
lawsuits after stock acquisitions with the most common complaint being managers 
issuing false and misleading statements and consequently misguiding investors 
(Gong et al., 2008). Interestingly, it is difficult to envisage a lawsuit against 
managers who have engaged with insider purchases as this puts them is the same 
position as the deceived investors. Moreover, even the large incidence of lawsuits 
does not have the expected result to inspire caution as Gong et al. (2008) claim 
which could also be an indication of overconfidence. Future research could 
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establish whether and how differences in the litigiousness and other institutional 
features across jurisdictions affect managers’ overconfidence in the context of 
acquisitions (e.g. whether less litigious regulation encourages managers to 
become overconfident).  
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5 Constraining financial reporting discretion: Evidence from the 
capitalisation of development expenditures in the UK 
5.1 Introduction 
Accounting choice is a mechanism by which better informed insiders can impart 
information to less informed parties about the timing, magnitude and risk of future 
cash flows (Fields et al., 2001). However, under conditions of high uncertainty, 
accounting choice hands in to insiders an information advantage. This implies 
significant costs to financial statement users who need to unravel insiders’ 
accounting choices and more particularly, the underlying motivations. An obvious 
reaction to those information processing costs is to constraint the level of discretion 
up to a level that curbs the opportunism and in the same time, allows for the 
communication of private information.  In this chapter, we show that such attempts 
may achieve the desired outcome at the expense of a loss of information about 
future benefits.  
Prior research has only hinted so far to the loss of information out of constraining 
insiders’ discretion. For example, Stark (2008) comments that removing discretion 
over the treatment of development expenditures, as it happened with the transition 
from SSAP 13 to IAS 38 in the UK, removes a useful way for firms to communicate 
information to the stock markets. We also develop our study on constraining 
discretion based on this specific setting. Specifically, we employ the transition from 
an accounting standard which allows firms the discretion, but not the compulsion, 
to capitalise development expenditures under certain conditions (SSAP 13) to a 
similar accounting standard which disallows this discretion (IAS 38) as it happened 
 134 
 
in the UK. We refer to the former as a discretionary capitalisation regime and the 
latter as a mandatory capitalisation regime.  
Stark (2008) underplays the implications of constraining discretion upon 
capitalisation for the efficient operation of the UK market. Based on prior research 
(Nixon, 1997; Oswald, 2008), he points out that managers are reluctant to take 
advantage of the allowed discretion to capitalise development expenditure and 
notes that only a small percentage of firms engage with capitalisation. However, 
he does not take into account that forcing managers to comply with a mandatory 
capitalisation standard, results to an extension of the scope of capitalisation over 
firms that previously resisted to this choice.  Consistently, we find that the transition 
to a mandatory capitalisation regime is marked by a widespread application of the 
standard upon firms whose projects that appear to fulfil the capitalisation criteria.  
Stark (2008) as well as Oswald and Zarowin (2007) explain that managers are 
reluctant to capitalise due to measurement and record keeping costs and the 
possibility of conveying information by alternative channels, for example, voluntary 
disclosure. As opposed to disclosure, capitalisation is costly because recognised 
amounts are subject to audit. In addition, Barth et al. (2003) shows that recognition 
results in prices reflecting more information given the costs unsophisticated 
investors face to extract information from voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the 
recognition of capitalised expenditures increases managers’ exposure to potential 
penalties in case that expected benefits are not realised. Such costs involve future 
impairments with the associated market penalties or even, litigation. Thus, 
managers’ reluctance to engage with capitalisation, even when their projects fulfil 
the standards’ criteria, implies that their own private information prescribes an 
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uncertainty threshold that is at least higher than the uncertainty threshold in the 
accounting standard.  
In the present study, we argue that the adverse consequences of constraining 
discretion are related to the uncertainty threshold to which managers are forced to 
comply with and may not reflect the firm’s underlying economics. An early warning 
on this issue comes from Wyatt (2005) who stresses that the accounting standard 
needs to be benchmarked to the economics of the intangible investments so that 
compliance results in firms reporting in accordance with their firm's economics. To 
the extent that capitalised assets aggregate a number of projects which fulfil the 
criteria but they have diverse success rates, investors may doubt the reliability of 
the future benefits arising from those assets. Consistently, our empirical findings 
point to a loss of information about future earnings reflected in current share price 
returns as a result of constraining discretion.  
The impact of constraining discretion should not be evaluated based on its costs 
only. Following prior research, we also argue that the opportunistic and signalling 
motivations co-exist during a regime of discretionary capitalisation. We show that 
market participants are aware of insiders’ information advantage under those 
conditions and employ the disclosure of insider purchases to unravel the 
uncertainty around the purpose of capitalisation. In this context, insider purchases 
represent insiders’ information advantage or the insiders’ relatively higher 
information precision over the outsiders’ information precision under conditions of 
uncertainty. Our results show a statistically significant influence on the assessment 
of reported earnings for firms that engage with capitalisation. Specifically, the 
presence (absence) of insider purchases strengthens (weakens) the relation 
between the revisions in expectations about current earnings and returns. This 
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result suggests that investors, under a discretionary capitalisation regime, use this 
disclosure to assess whether the earnings inflation arising from capitalisation is due 
to signalling or opportunism.  
We argue that disallowing discretion, not only eliminates the scope for opportunism 
but also, it levels the imbalance in information precision between insiders and 
outsiders. This is achieved by forcing an uncertainty threshold which enables 
expenditures for projects with variable rates of success to find their way on the 
balance sheet. Hence, the insiders’ information advantage is addressed sub-
optimally since both insiders and outsiders have a similarly noisy information set. 
Those ideas are confirmed in our tests where, under a mandatory capitalisation 
regime, we have no significant evidence about insiders’ information advantage as 
identified under the discretionary capitalisation regime.  
We acknowledge that the transition from a discretionary capitalisation (SSAP 13) 
to a mandatory capitalisation regime (IAS 38) has not been a major issue for the 
investing community. In a related vein, in a recent update (July, 2014) with regard 
to the revisions of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, IASB 
tentatively decided that no guidance is needed in the Conceptual Framework on 
the role of constrained discretion in the identification of assets. We contribute to 
this debate by shedding light on the costs and benefits of constraining discretion 
upon capitalisation. More specifically, we attempt to draw attention to the sub-
optimal trade-off between the benefits of curbing the insiders’ opportunity to abuse 
an accounting choice with respect to the identification of an intangible asset and 
the cost of losing relevant information in an attempt to suppress insiders’ 
information advantage. This chapter also contributes to the stream of literature that 
has expressed concerns over the adoption of the standard. While Stark (2008) and 
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Wyatt (2008) have expressed their concerns over the adoption of IAS 38, we 
provide empirical support these concerns and show that prices reflect less forward 
looking earnings information. Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the joint 
signal literature which considers insider trading and financial reporting discretion 
(e.g. Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Veenman, 2012). Our results show that a 
necessary condition for insider purchases to be useful disclosure to unravel 
managers’ private information in financial reporting is that significant discretion in 
financial reporting is permitted.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
prior research and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research 
design employed in the chapter. Section 4 describes the data and the sample. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results and section 6 presents the conclusions 
of the study.  
5.2 Hypothesis development 
5.2.1 Discretionary versus mandatory capitalisation: Implications for 
communicating future benefits. 
R&D projects are characterised by a particular type of information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders. Outsiders cannot easily infer relevant information 
by observing the productivity of R&D projects in other firms or by referring to an 
organised market for R&D (Aboody and Lev, 2000). On the other hand, insiders 
are in an advantageous position to observe the links between those projects and 
value creation (Wyatt, 2008). The capitalisation of development expenses 
addresses this information asymmetry since this gives to managers the ability to 
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communicate their own private information on the value creation process of R&D 
projects and thus, the predictability of related future benefits.63   
Accounting standard setters have prescribed the capitalisation of development 
expenses at either a mandatory (e.g. IAS 3864) or a discretionary (e.g. SSAP 13) 
basis. Both mandatory and discretionary capitalisation treatments rely on the 
compliance with a list of similar criteria to establish that the project’s future 
expected benefits are certain enough. The criteria outline an “uncertainty threshold” 
whereby expenditures should be capitalised if the uncertainty of expected future 
benefits falls below this threshold, and expensed otherwise (Mohd, 2005). In the 
case of discretionary capitalisation, managers have the choice to set a higher 
“uncertainty threshold” (but not a lower one) and thus, forego the capitalisation 
even if a project meets the criteria. We argue that discretionary capitalisation allows 
managers to act upon their private information and best estimates. On the other 
hand, this option is not permitted in the case of mandatory capitalisation. Managers 
must uphold to the “uncertainty threshold” and, possibly ignore private information 
discouraging capitalisation that is not accounted for in the standard, for the sake of 
complying with the standard. Consequently, the inherent concern in the case of 
mandatory capitalisation is whether expenditures whose associated future benefits 
are not reliable enough find their way into the balance sheet.   
                                            
63 Using Australian data, Wyatt(2005) demonstrates that the choice to capitalise R&D  expenditures 
is associated the strength of the technology affecting the firm’s operations, the length of the 
technology cycle time and property rights related factors that affect the firm's ability to appropriate 
the investment benefits.  
64 IAS 38 maintains a certain level of discretion since it permits management to apply their 
judgement in deciding whether the, mostly qualitative, conditions for capitalisation have been 
satisfied (Prencipe et al., 2008). Consistently, we argue that IAS 38 constraints discretion instead 
of “removes” discretion.  
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Those concerns over the mandatory capitalisation of R&D are not new ones to 
preparers of financial statements in the UK. Stark (2008) reviews the history of the 
development of SSAP 13 in the UK and points out that there has never been a 
widespread demand for capitalisation of development expenditures. Moreover, 
according to the survey results reported by Nixon (1997), 60% of the respondents 
oppose a recommendation for mandatory capitalisation as proposed in the Corfield 
Report (1990). Interestingly, both Nixon (1997) and Stark (2008) note that the vast 
majority of UK firms have a strong preference for the conservative solution of 
immediate expensing for R&D. Similarly for large software firms in the USA and 
with reference to SFAS No. 86, Mohd (2005) shows that companies choose to 
expense, despite their software products being successful and the criteria for 
capitalisation being met.65  Those early findings suggest that managers are 
reluctant towards the capitalisation of R&D expenditures. Oswald (2008) explains 
that this could be attributed to measurement and record keeping costs as well as 
consideration of analysts’ preferences towards expensing. More important, he 
notes the managers’ private concerns about the implications of capitalisation for 
the quality of current and future earnings.  
The managers’ reluctance to engage with capitalisation, as noted in Stark (2008), 
gives us hints that the managers’ own uncertainty threshold is at least equal or 
even higher than the uncertainty threshold set out by accounting standard setters. 
Following along these lines, we investigate whether discretionary capitalisation 
results into R&D assets whose future expected benefits are more reliable and more 
homogeneous in terms of probable rates of success than mandatory capitalisation. 
                                            
65 We acknowledge that the US GAAP disallows the capitalisation of R&D expenditure (SFAS No. 2) 
and only permits the capitalisation of software development costs (SFAS No. 86) 
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Existing ample evidence indicates that this accounting choice provides value 
relevant information (Smith et al., 2001; Ke et al., 2004; Oswald, 2008; Wyatt, 
2008). However, Wyatt (2005) notes that constraining discretion over the 
capitalisation of intangible assets impedes accounting to convey the economics of 
intangible investments with adverse consequences over its relevance.66 Consistent 
with the arguments in Wyatt (2005), recent empirical evidence reported in Shah et 
al. (2013) shows that that the value relevance of the capitalized R&D asset in the 
UK decreases from the pre-IFRS (SSAP 13) to the post-IFRS (IAS 38) period. 
Nevertheless, those results do not provide explicit evidence to address the issue 
of whether mandatory capitalisation under IAS 38 results in prices reflecting less 
information about the future performance of the firm than discretionary 
capitalisation.  
Summarising the discussion above, we question the improvement brought about 
by mandatory capitalisation to the information environment of U.K. firms that 
engage with R&D. To the extent that investors understand this decrease in the 
reliability of generated R&D assets, this information will be less useful for predicting 
future earnings.  That leads us to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Under a mandatory capitalisation regime, the information about future 
earnings reflected in the returns of firms presenting an R&D asset is less 
than the information under a discretionary capitalisation regime. 
                                            
66 Using Australian data, Wyatt (2005) shows that the recognition of intangibles assets which are 
subject to managerial discretion are associated with the strength of the technology affecting the firm’s 
operations, the length of the technology cycle time and property rights related factors that affect the 
firm's ability to appropriate the investment benefits. On the other hand, highly regulated intangible 
assets are less correlated with these underlying economic factors. Those results suggest that 
managerial discretion tend to improve the quality of information on financial statements.   
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5.2.2 Discretionary versus mandatory capitalisation: Implications for the quality of 
earnings information. 
The flexibility allowed by discretionary capitalisation can also be employed 
opportunistically in order to manipulate earnings. Abusing this choice implies that 
current earnings can be inflated by capitalising expenditures whose future benefits 
are unreliable, rendering future earnings subject to impairments. Prior research 
shows that this choice has been employed for earnings smoothing purposes or as 
a means to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Markarian et al., 2008; Cazavan-
Jeny et al., 2011). While this evidence comes from Italian and French firms 
respectively, the evidence in Oswald (2008) indicate that this may also be the case 
in the UK.  Specifically, his findings suggest that the determinants of the choice to 
capitalise R&D expenditure may be driven by opportunistic motivations (e.g. firms 
with higher earnings variability and loss making firms are more likely to capitalise).  
Opportunistic motivations do not appear to have adverse implications for the 
information that is communicated to the market. This is evident in the value 
relevance tests of capitalised R&D assets as well as the share price anticipation 
tests reported in Oswald and Zarowin (2007). Other prior research also argues that 
earnings management does not hinder the ability of capitalisation to communicate 
useful information (Healy et al., 2002; Chambers et al., 2003). This may be the 
case if, for instance, managers choose capitalisation in order to engage with 
earnings management for signalling purposes (Markarian et al., 2008).  
There is no evidence to date on the implications of constraining the discretion upon 
capitalisation for earnings management. Our hypothesis H1 supports that 
constraining discretion upon capitalisation has adverse consequences on the 
information about future earnings in share prices. In other words, we hypothesise 
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that the introduction of the standard results in unintended adverse consequences 
for the signalling ability of capitalisation. However, a more desirable outcome is that 
is curbs opportunism by limiting managers’ discretion.   
We investigate whether mandatory capitalisation curbs either signalling or 
opportunistic motivations by looking at a mechanism that could be employed by 
investors to identify them under a regime of discretionary capitalisation. If this 
mechanism becomes obsolete during a mandatory capitalisation, we could infer 
indirectly, that mandatory capitalisation achieves its purpose with respect to 
earnings management.  
We are motivated by Francis et al. (2007)  to argue that rational investors rely on 
additional disclosures that increase the precision of information in order to resolve 
uncertainty. We similarly argue that in the presence of uncertainty about the 
opportunistic or signalling motivation for discretionary capitalisation, investors rely 
on the disclosure of managers’ insider purchases. Prior research shows that this 
type of disclosure is associated with managers’ private information about the firm’s 
earnings persistence. Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) show that insiders trade on 
persistent earnings innovations. In a more relevant context, Beneish and Vargus 
(2002) find that managers are more likely to buy their firms’ shares when current 
earnings are driven by permanent positive accruals. Investors, on the other side, 
appear to acknowledge the information in insider purchases for earnings 
persistence and price it accordingly. For instance, Badertscher et al. (2011) find 
that market participants use the information in prior insider trading activity when 
confronted with a restatement announcement and show that  the presence of 
purchases results in less negative market reaction.   
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Being a costly signal in terms of wealth commitment and portfolio under-
diversification (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Veenman et al., 2011) and thus credible 
as well as precise, insider purchases are argued here to indicate managers’ 
information advantage. In our context, when managers have enough discretion to 
employ this accounting choice either for signalling or opportunistic purposes, they 
maintain an information advantage which then, becomes obvious in their trading. 
We hypothesise that the information precision that is inherent in insiders’ 
purchases is employed by investors in order to resolve the uncertainty surrounding 
earnings. Specifically, we investigate whether inflating current earnings, as result 
of capitalisation, is motivated by signalling or opportunism.67 Given the evidence in 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) and Beneish and Vargus (2002), we argue that the 
presence of insiders’ purchases communicates that the capitalisation (leading to 
higher earnings than expensing) is associated with signalling. We predict that the 
relationship between earnings and returns would be more pronounced for firms that 
engage with capitalisation in the presence rather than in the absence of insider 
purchases. On the contrary, capitalisation in the absence of insider purchases is 
more likely to be interpreted by market participants as possibly stemming out of 
opportunism.  
As long as the constraint over discretion under a mandatory capitalisation limits the 
scope for earnings management, there might not be a role for insider purchases 
anymore in investors’ assessments.  When capitalisation becomes subject to the 
compliance with a set of criteria instead of managers’ decision, there is no much 
                                            
67 It is always possible that insider purchases in the presence of capitalisation may also denote 
managerial overconfidence. The context of high uncertainty that is inherent in the value creation 
process of R&D projects is a fertile ground for this type of behaviour. Overconfidence though would 
provide misguided information about future earnings. 
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underlying discretion to unravel. However, insofar the standard’s application results 
to the capitalised expenditures of projects with diverse rates of success, managers’ 
information is likely to be noisy and their information advantage compromised.  
Summarising the discussion, our second hypothesis sets out that: 
H2a: Under a discretionary capitalisation regime, share prices reflect more 
information about earnings in the presence of insider purchases than in 
their absence  
H2b: Under a mandatory capitalisation regime, the presence of insider 
purchase makes no difference in the information share prices reflect about 
earnings. 
Hypothesis H2 implies an unintended consequence of constraining financial 
reporting discretion over capitalisation. Allowing discretion to make accounting 
choices is also handing in a significant information advantage to insiders. This 
information advantage does not depend only their intimate knowledge of the R&D 
projects’ success rate but more important, on the heightened precision of this 
information over the precision of information that is publicly available. By 
constraining the discretion over capitalisation, capitalised assets include projects 
with various rates of success. Insiders’ information is no longer more precise than 
the information that is publicly available about the future benefits of those projects. 
Whilst eliminating insiders’ information advantage and limiting the scope for 
opportunism is a desirable outcome of constraining discretion, this appears to arise 
together with significant loss in the investors’ information set.  
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5.3 Research design  
5.3.1 Share price anticipation tests 
Our research question here is about accounting choice and the implications of 
constraining it. Accounting choice consists of a mechanism by which better 
informed insiders can impart information to less informed parties about the timing, 
magnitude and risk of future cash flows (Fields et al.,2001). Following Oswald and 
Zarowin (2007), we argue that share price anticipation tests address directly the 
inherent question in accounting choice as outlined in Fields et al. (2001). In 
particular, we test how much information about earnings is impounded in returns 
as a result of this choice, by examining the association between returns and 
revisions in earnings building upon the model proposed by Collins et al. (1994). 
The Collins et al. (1994) model assumes that that the share return over the year is 
partly due to the unexpected portion of current year’s earnings realization and partly 
due to changes in expectations about future earnings. Collins et al. (1994) capture 
the unobservable innovations about current performance and future earnings 
expectations by means of changes in current and future earnings. In a subsequent 
equivalent68 transformation, Lundholm and Myers (2002) use the level of earnings 
to proxy for the unexpected earnings.69 Following the latter and the related study 
of Oswald and Zarowin (2007), our base research design is set out below:  
ܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܧ௜ ,௧ିଵ + ܾଶܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾସܴ௜,௧ାଵ+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧   
       (5.1) 
                                            
68 Lundholm and Myers (2002, footnote 5, p.814). 
69 Lundholm and Myers (2002) argue that this allows the regression to find the best representation 
of the prior expectation for earnings, allowing this process to be either mean reverting or random 
walk. In contrast, the approach in Collins et al. (1994) implies a restriction that earnings follow a 
random walk process. 
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where, Ri,t is the firm’s i buy and hold return at time t measured over the 12 months 
ending four months after the year end; Ei,t-1 is the firm’s earnings before 
extraordinary items in year t-1; Ei,t is the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items 
in year t; and Ei,t+1 is the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items in year t+1; Ri,t+1 
is subsequent one year buy and hold return. In equation (5.1), the coefficient b3 or 
the future earnings response coefficient (FERC), represents the information about 
future earnings that is impounded in current returns. The coefficients b2 and b1 
jointly capture the surprise in current realised earnings over prior expectations at 
the beginning of the year and they are expected to be positive and negative 
respectively. A further variable, Rt+1, is also added in (5.1) to mitigate the error-in-
variables bias introduced by the fact that we replace the unobservable expected 
earnings by realised future earnings (Collins et al.,1994).  
Prior literature (e.g. Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; 
Lundholm and Myers, 2002) employs similar models in order to investigate whether 
disclosure “brings the future forward”. In our context, we follow Oswald and Zarowin 
(2007) and we take a different approach to ask firstly, whether an accounting choice 
“brings the future forward” and secondly, whether constraining this choice entails a 
loss of information about future earnings for market participants. To this end, we 
extend (5.1) as follows:  
ܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܧ௜ ,௧ିଵ + ܾଶܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾସܴ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾହܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ 	+ ܾ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ +
ܾ଻ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜ ,௧ + ଼ܾܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଽܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧   
                   (5.2) 
Equation (5.2) accommodates the effect of capitalisation by introducing a binary 
variable CAP, taking the value of one when a firm presents R&D assets on its 
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balance sheet and zero when a firm expenses all its R&D costs. We introduce CAP 
both as a main effect as well as an interaction with all the independent variables in 
(5.1). In (5.2), the coefficient b3 now stands for the FERC of firms which expense 
all their R&D costs under a discretionary capitalisation regime. In addition, the 
coefficient b8 stands for the incremental FERC of firms that exhibit R&D assets on 
their balance sheet. 70 A positive and significant coefficient b8 would denote that 
capitalisation has the ability to convey managers’ private information about the 
future benefits of R&D.  
A possible caveat is that managers who do not engage with capitalisation may 
convey their private information through voluntary disclosure or other means. The 
extent to which that disclosure can substitute an accounting choice may work 
against our prediction for the coefficient b8. However, we believe that recognition 
conveys a much more credible signal than disclosure here since recognised 
amounts are subject to audit. Moreover, recognition, as opposed to disclosure, 
exposes them to potential penalties in case expected benefits are not realised. 
Such costs may involve future impairments with the associated market penalties or 
even, litigation.  
Equation (5.2) informs about the benefits of capitalisation in terms of share price 
informativeness. However, the focus of the present study is on the implications of 
the constraint in discretion upon capitalisation employing the UK as a natural 
experiment. To this end, we run equation (5.2) separately for the two regimes of 
                                            
70 In order to make the results of the regression comparable between firms which capitalise R&D 
with those expensing R&D, we adjust earnings on an “expense pro-forma” basis. Similarly to 
Oswald and Zarowin (2007) and Oswald (2008), we subtract the excess (or add the deficit) of after 
tax amount of development costs capitalised minus amortisation expense from reported net income. 
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discretionary and mandatory capitalisation. 71 Under the regime of discretionary 
capitalisation, we expect the coefficients of b3 and b8 to be both positive and 
significant. A positive and significant coefficient b8 confirms the evidence in Oswald 
and Zarowin (2007) that capitalising R&D costs results to returns impounding more 
information about future earnings than expensing R&D under a discretionary 
capitalisation regime. On the other hand, under mandatory capitalisation, the 
corresponding coefficient b8 is predicted to be affected by the constraint in 
accounting choice. In line with our hypothesis, we argue that investors do not 
perceive the R&D asset as a reliable indicator of sustainable future earnings. This 
would lead to a loss in the information provided by mandatory capitalisation and 
will be reflected in the coefficient of b8. Consequently, we expect the magnitude of 
b8 to be lower under the regime of mandatory capitalisation compared to the 
discretionary capitalisation regime. We make a similar prediction with respect to 
the comparison of the overall FERC of firms that exhibit R&D assets on their 
balance sheet given by the sum of b3+b8.  
Oswald and Zarowin (2007) as well as prior research which employs the Collins et 
al. (1994) research design and its variations focus on the future earnings response 
coefficient. This research design provides also evidence on the current earnings 
response coefficient which allows inferences on the quality of reported earnings. 
However, so far we have not put forth any prediction with respect to the market 
response to reported earnings. Based on the discussion preceding the 
development of our second hypothesis, we argue that the coefficients of b6 and b7 
                                            
71 Applying a model which allows the coefficients to vary across the two periods yields the same 
results. We prefer this approach as it allows standard errors to vary across the two periods.  
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in equation (2) reflect an aggregated influence of opportunism and signalling in 
reported earnings.  
Our second hypothesis postulates that insider purchases under discretionary 
capitalisation consist of a costly and precise signal whose presence can 
discriminate between cases where this accounting choice is associated with 
signalling from cases where this is more likely to be motivated by opportunism. 
More importantly, the second hypothesis sets out that this mechanism becomes 
useless as insiders lose their information advantage.  
We test our second hypothesis’ predictions by extending equation (5.2) to 
incorporate the influence of insider purchases. We introduce a binary variable BUY, 
taking the value of one when managers engage in net purchases during the 
financial year t and zero otherwise. We introduce BUY both as a main effect as well 
as an interaction with all the independent variables in (5.2), as follows: 
ܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܧ௜ ,௧ିଵ + ܾଶܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾସܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾହܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ 	+ ܾ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ +
ܾ଻ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜ ,௧ + ଼ܾܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଽܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵ଴ܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଵଵܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗
ܧ௜ ,௧ + ܾଵଶܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜ ,௧ାଵ + ܾଵଷܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵସܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜ ,௧ିଵ + ܾଵହܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗
ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜ ,௧ + ܾଵ଺ܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜ ,௧ାଵ + ܾଵ଻ܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ +
	ߝ௜,௧               (5.3)                                                                               
Under a discretionary capitalisation regime, we predict that the interaction between 
insider purchases and capitalisation conveys signalling. Therefore, we expect to 
find a more pronounced and positive relation between earnings and returns for 
firms that engage with capitalisation in the presence of net purchases, denoted by 
the positive and significant coefficients b14, b15 and b16.On the other hand, under a 
mandatory capitalisation regime, we expect that insiders’ information advantage is 
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mitigated and thus, the corresponding coefficients b14, b15 and b16 will be no longer 
significant.  
Finally, as Oswald and Zarowin (2007) point out, an inherent feature of accounting 
choice is endogeneity.  Similarly, to Oswald and Zarowin (2007) equations (5.2) 
and (5.3) include a control for endogeneity in the form of the inverse Mills ratio.72 
Acknowledging that the determinants of capitalisation change between the 
discretionary and mandatory regime, we estimate the inverse Mills ratio separately 
for the two reporting regimes. This is important because mandatory capitalisation 
does not entirely remove managers’ discretion over capitalisation. Managers are 
still permitted to apply their judgement in deciding whether the, mostly qualitative, 
conditions for capitalisation have been satisfied (Prencipe et al., 2008).   
5.4 Data  
5.4.1 Sample selection 
Our initial sample includes all companies reporting R&D expense or R&D asset in 
Datastream or Extel, from 1992 to 2008.73 This search yields a sample of 7,541 
firm year observations. The sample is reduced by 1,153 observations due to 
missing accounting data. Furthermore, the sample is further reduced by 1,378 
observations due missing returns data from Datastream. In order to prevent our 
inferences to be confounded by the transition to IFRS, we exclude the first year of 
                                            
72 The model and its empirical application is presented and discussed further in the Appendix.  
73 While prior research in the UK utilise either Worldscope (e.g. Shah et al., 2013) or Extel (e.g. 
Anagnostopoulou, 2010), we employ both. We begin with collecting data from Datastream 
/Worldscope for R&D asset (Worldscope Code: WC02504) and R&D amortisation (Worldscope 
Code: WC01153). We note that the coverage in Worldscope is limited at the early years of our 
sample. We supplement our sample with R&D asset and amortisation from Extel, which is available 
from the online platform of Thomson One Banker. We acknowledge, however, that Oswald and 
Zarowin (2007) employ Datastream Items, which are no longer available since Worldscope acquired 
Datastream. Consequently, the results presented in this study can be replicated.  
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IFRS adoption and the last year of UK GAAP.74 We also exclude 2,064 observation 
because the lack of data availability before and after the adoption of IFRS. Finally, 
to limit the influence of extreme observation we exclude 85 observations 
characterised as outliers using studentised residuals.75 After the above exclusions, 
the final consists of 2,190 firm year observations. Table 5.1, Panel A summarises 
the sample selection procedure, while Table 5.1, Panel B reports the number of 
companies expensing R&D expenditure (expensers) and the number of companies 
capitalising R&D expenditure in any given year (capitalisers). Similar to prior 
research (e.g. Green et al., 1996; Oswald, 2008) we find that prior to the adoption 
of IFRS, only a small percentage of companies choose to capitalise R&D 
expenditures. With regards to the period after the adoption of IFRS, we find that 
capitalisation occurs more often.76 This initial evidence appears to corroborate the 
argument that under a discretionary capitalisation regime, managers appear to be 
reluctant to capitalise R&D expenditures, even in cases where the criteria of the 
standard were fulfilled. Oswald and Zarowin (2007) point out to concerns about 
analysts, accounting quality as well as measurement and record keeping costs. On 
the other hand, the relatively widespread capitalisation under a mandatory 
capitalisation regime reflects the implications of constraining this accounting 
                                            
74 We exclude the last year of reporting under the UK GAAP because we measure FERC by the 
coefficient of future earnings on current returns and we require future earnings to be reported under 
the same regime as current and past earnings.  
75 The critical values for characterising an observation as highly influential are defined by using the 
Bonferroni adjustment. 
76 Comparison with prior research is not very clear. For instance, Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas (2011) 
use a sample of R&D intensive companies and find that 48% of the firms in their sample capitalise 
R&D after the adoption of IFRS. On the other hand, Shah et al. (2013) employs all companies which 
engage in R&D and show that R&D asset has increased after the adoption of IFRs and R&D 
expense decreases. They conclude that firms tend to capitalise more R&D expenditure following 
the adoption of IFRS. However, we acknowledge that they do not provide further descriptive 
statistics to compare our sample with theirs in a more meaningful way.  
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choice. In Appendix, we explore further the issue of the determinants of the 
capitalisation choice and their differences across the two regimes.  
Table 5.1: Sample observations 
Panel A: Sample selection     
Initial sample 7,541 
Missing accounting data 1,153 
Missing market data 1,378 
Excluding transition year 671 
Excluding observations that do not have at least 
one observation in the pre and post IFRS period 2,064 
Outliers 85 
Final sample 2,190 (238 firms) 
    
Panel B: Sample distribution   
  Pre IFRS Post IFRS 
Firm year observations with no R&D asset 
(expensers) (207firms) (123 firms) 
Firm year observations with R&D asset 
(capitalisers) (31 firms)  (115 firms) 
Final sample 238 238 
 
5.4.2 Insider trading  
We obtain information on directors’ trading from the Hemmington Scott Directors’ 
Trading Dataset for the period from 1996-2008 and before that from Directus Ltd. 
In line with prior research in the UK (e.g. Pope et al., 1990; Gregory et al., 1994; 
Hillier and Marshall, 2002b; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), we define insider transactions as 
purchases or sales by both executive and non-executive directors.77 Motivated by 
prior literature (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Core et al., 2006; Sawicki and Shrestha, 
2008; Beneish et al., 2012), we use a firm-specific net measure of inside trading 
aggregating all directors’ trading activity taking place during the fiscal year end. 
Following prior research (e.g. John and Lang, 1991; Beneish, 1999), we calculate 
the net purchases ratio (NPR) defined as follows: 
                                            
77 We do not examine illegal insider trading; rather, we focus on legal insider trading by directors.  
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NPR = [PURCHASES – SALES]/[ PURCHASES+SALES] 
 
where, PURCHASES are the number of shares purchased by directors and SALES 
are the number of shares sold. A positive NPR could be the result of directors 
purchasing more shares or selling fewer shares and vice versa for a negative NPR. 
A positive NPR indicates net insider buying, whereas a negative NPR indicates net 
insider selling.78 In order to ensure that the trades that are observed are associated 
with insiders’ private information, the insider trading measure is estimated by using 
only open market purchases and sales of common shares, since those trades are 
more likely to be informative about the future prospects of the firm.  The need to 
focus on open market transactions is also confirmed by the findings in Veenman et 
al. (2011) who show that only open market purchases are associated with positive 
future news as opposed to stock options conversions. The main interest of the 
present study is insider trading transactions that occur contemporaneously with the 
decision to capitalise R&D, similar to Beneish and Vargus (2002) and Sawicki and 
Shrestha (2008). We establish directors purchases in 654 cases in the pre IFRS 
period of which 44 relate to capitalisers and 273 cases in the post IFRS period of 
which 116 relate to capitalisers.  
5.5 Analysis 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A of Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample, while Panel 
B and Panel C show the statistics of the sample prior and after the adoption of IFRS 
                                            
78 We have also used the value of shares purchased and sold and the results are qualitative the 
same.   
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respectively. We note an obvious contrast in the profitability of firms between the 
capitalisation regimes. Consistent with Oswald and Zarowin (2007), companies 
which choose to expense R&D prior to the adoption of IFRS and under a 
discretionary capitalisation regime are more profitable. Following Oswald (2008), it 
appears that firms with lower profitability capitalize their development expenditures 
in order to avoid reducing their net income by expensing R&D and profitable firms 
are more likely to expense development expenditures to signal their financial 
health. In contrast, under the mandatory capitalisation regime following the 
adoption of IFRS, firms that capitalise their R&D expenses tend to be more 
profitable than firms that expense their R&D.  This result should be interpreted by 
taking into consideration that mandatory capitalisation has led to a more extensive 
application of this accounting treatment than discretionary capitalisation. A more 
insightful discussion of the comparative features of firms that expense and 
capitalise R&D relates those to the capitalisation decision.  
The results of the probit regression (reported in the Appendix) examining the 
capitalisation decision show that opportunistic motivations to capitalise 
development expenditures are very likely during a discretionary capitalisation 
regime as the coefficient of earnings variability is positive and significant (0.0355, 
p-value<0.01). A similar motivation is no longer likely to be relevant under a 
mandatory capitalisation regime, whereby this coefficient is negative and not 
significantly different from zero (-0.0043, p-value>0.10). A result that is also in line 
with this inference is shown with respect to the direction of the firm’s profitability, 
albeit with those coefficients being insignificant in either periods. We note also that 
under the discretionary capitalisation regime, we have statistically significant 
evidence that the capitalisation decision is negatively associated with size, R&D 
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intensity and R&D value. Overall, those indications point to small firms with not 
established R&D record and reputation (as denoted by R&D intensity and R&D 
value) taking the costly option to capitalise R&D in order to signal their prospects. 
Those results suggest that both signalling and opportunistic motivations for 
engaging with capitalisation co-exist when discretion is allowed.  
On the other hand, under a mandatory capitalisation regime, the determinants of 
this accounting choice that are statistically significant do not point out opportunistic 
or signalling motivations. More specifically, we observe a negative relation with the 
book to market ratio, a similar relation with the R&D value as well as a positive 
relation with the firm’s beta. Overall, those results are in line with our intuition that 
mandatory capitalisation results to an arbitrary uncertainty threshold that allows 
more risky projects with less reliable future benefits to find their way to the balance 
sheet.  
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Table 5.2: descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Median 
  Expensers Capitalisers  Difference Expensers Capitalisers  Difference 
Full sample 
Et+1 0.0558 0.0409 -0.0149* 0.0849 0.0661 -0.0188*** 
Et 0.0380 0.0360 -0.0020 0.0852 0.0677 -0.0175*** 
Et-1 0.0175 0.0251 0.0076 0.0787 0.0594 -0.0193*** 
Rt 0.0163 -0.0951 -0.1115*** -0.0020 -0.0855 -0.0835*** 
EARN_VAR 0.0290 0.0359 0.0069* 0.0046 0.0051 0.0005*** 
SIZE 5.0689 4.7999 -0.2690** 5.0196 4.3628 -0.6569** 
BM 0.5596 0.6072 0.0476 0.4135 0.4211 0.0076 
RDINT 0.0699 0.0516 -0.0183*** 0.0288 0.0206 -0.0082*** 
RDVALUE 53.3421 56.4163 3.0741 10.2259 6.6833 -3.5426*** 
BETA 0.9747 1.0838 0.1091** 0.8825 0.9843 0.1018*** 
Pre IFRS 
Et+1 0.0666 0.0314 -0.0353** 0.0937 0.0676 -0.0261*** 
Et 0.0503 0.0282 -0.0220 0.0920 0.0663 -0.0257*** 
Et-1 0.0319 0.0279 -0.0040 0.0877 0.0588 -0.0289*** 
Rt 0.0292 0.0133 -0.0160 0.0065 -0.0153 -0.0218 
EARN_VAR 0.0245 0.0192 -0.0053 0.0044 0.0044 0.0000 
SIZE 5.0978 5.0735 -0.0244 5.0654 4.8324 -0.2330 
BM 0.5842 0.5951 0.0109 0.4309 0.3993 -0.0316 
RDINT 0.0646 0.0282 -0.0364*** 0.0287 0.0077 -0.0210*** 
RDVALUE 35.8835 20.6873 -15.1963 10.6551 7.4291 -3.2260 
BETA 0.9477 0.9810 0.0333 0.8509 0.9802 0.1293 
Post IFRS 
Et+1 0.0098 0.0444 0.0346** 0.0573 0.0646 0.0073 
Et -0.0140 0.0389 0.0528*** 0.0573 0.0680 0.0108* 
Et-1 -0.0434 0.0240 0.0674*** 0.0445 0.0600 0.0155*** 
Rt -0.0381 -0.1354 -0.0972*** -0.0633 -0.1456 -0.0822** 
EARN_VAR 0.0478 0.0421 -0.0057 0.0068 0.0063 -0.0005 
SIZE 4.9468 4.6984 -0.2484 4.6031 4.1526 -0.4505 
BM 0.4555 0.6116 0.1561** 0.3783 0.4298 0.0514** 
RDINT 0.0920 0.0603 -0.0317** 0.0295 0.0242 -0.0054*** 
RDVALUE 127.0730 69.6726 -57.4004* 8.9466 6.2415 -2.7051*** 
BETA 1.0885 1.1219 0.0334 1.0098 0.9935 -0.0163 
 
Notes: 
Ei,t+1 is earnings at time t+1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t is earnings at time t (adjusted 
to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t-1 is earnings at time t-1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for 
capitalisers); Ri,t  is the buy and hold return measured over the 12 months ending four months after the year 
end; EARN_VAR is firm i’s earnings variance w calculated using all available data requiring at least three 
observations per firm; SIZE i is the natural logarithm of market value of the firm i’s measured at the fiscal year 
end; BM is firm i’s book to market ratio within each firm’s industry-year; RDINT is R&D expenditure divided by 
total assets (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers) ; RDVALUE is the difference between the market 
value of equity and book value of equity (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers) divided by the sum 
of current and lagged annual R&D expenditure; BETA firm i’s beta estimated using the market model and 
employing monthly returns ending at the month of the fiscal year end (we require at least 12 months and 
maximum 60 months to estimate the beta); test of difference is based on t-test for the means and on Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test for medians while *, ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%.  
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5.5.2 Discussion of findings  
Table 5.3 presents the results from the empirical implementation of equation 
(5.2).79 Discretionary capitalisation results in prices reflecting more forward looking 
earnings information as denoted by the positive coefficient of Capt*Et+1   (0. 8348, 
p-value <0.01). In contrast, mandatory capitalisation results in prices that do not 
reflect forward looking earnings information as denoted by the insignificant 
coefficient of Capt*Et+1 (0.2525, p-value>0.10). Moreover, our results suggest that 
the capitalisers’ overall future earnings response coefficient under a regime of 
mandatory capitalisation is significantly lower than the corresponding coefficient 
under a regime of discretionary capitalisation (-0.9260, p-value<0.05). Those 
results confirm both the evidence reported in prior research with respect to 
discretionary capitalisation and support our hypothesis. Moreover, the expensers’ 
future earnings response coefficient is positive and significant under both the 
discretionary and mandatory regimes (0.7422, p-value<0.001 and 0.3985, p-
value<0.10, respectively) and their difference is not statistically significant either (-
0.3437, p-value>0.10).  Those results suggest that the significant difference 
observed with respect to firms that engage with capitalisation across regimes is not 
likely to be driven by any omitted variables (e.g., macroeconomic circumstances, 
the impact of other accounting standards that were also introduced during the 
transition to IFRS) affecting the relation between returns and future earnings.  
  
                                            
79 The model presented in equation (5.2) and all the models presented in this study include fixed 
effects for industry and year which are omitted for brevity. We also cluster standard errors at the 
firm level. 
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Table 5.3: R&D capitalisation and the future earnings response coefficient 
ܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଶܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾସ ௜ܴ,௧ିଵ + ܾହܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ 	+ ܾ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾ଻ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧+ ଼ܾܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଽܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
 Rt UK GAAP IFRS 
 
  
Et+1 0.7422*** 0.3985* 
 (0.0000) (0.0575) 
Et 0.5645*** 0.5416*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0077) 
Et-1 -0.5744*** -0.0629 
 (0.0000) (0.5838) 
Rt+1 -0.0743** -0.1616*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0019) 
Capt*Et+1 0.8348*** 0.2525 
 (0.0096) (0.5041) 
Capt *Et 0.6654 0.1617 
 (0.1474) (0.5976) 
Capt *Et-1 -1.3607** -0.4438* 
 (0.0135) (0.0572) 
Capt *Rt+1 0.0434 0.0922 
 (0.6056) (0.1178) 
Capt 0.4052 0.1075 
 (0.1755) (0.4944) 
IMRt 0.1380*** 0.2923** 
 (0.0002) (0.0195) 
Capt *IMRt -0.2000 -0.2070 
 (0.1971) (0.2583) 
Constant 0.1801* -0.0860 
 (0.0590) (0.4374) 
Observations 1,562 628 
Adjusted R- 
squared 0.283 0.370 
F test 127.91*** 70.51*** 
 
FERC testing Coef. p-value 
Expensers UKGAAP=IFRS -0.3437 0.192 
Capitalisers UKGAAP=IFRS -0.9260** 0.029 
 
Notes: 
Ei,t+1 is earnings at time t+1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t is earnings at time t (adjusted 
to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t-1 is earnings at time t-1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for 
capitalisers); Ri,t  is the buy and hold return measured over the 12 months ending four months after the year 
end;  Capi,t  equals to one if a company is classified as a capitalizer and zero otherwise; Buyi,t equals to one if 
directors’ were purchasing shares during the fiscal year end; IMRi,t is the inverted mills ratio estimated from 
the Probit model; p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
  
 159 
 
In Table 5.4, we present further evidence that the results reported in Table 5.3 are 
not driven by firm characteristics either. This is a pertinent issue given the different 
uncertainty thresholds set out by mandatory and discretionary capitalisation. We 
argue that this difference has also implications for the subset of firms that adopt 
this accounting choice. An extension of the subset of firms that capitalise 
development expenditures under a mandatory capitalisation regime is likely to 
result in the inclusion of firms with different characteristics from the subsample of 
firms that do so under a discretionary capitalisation regime.  Following Ettredge et 
al. (2005), we control for firms’ characteristics that may affect the incorporation of 
information about earnings in returns. This exercise allows us to confirm that the 
results reported in Table 5.3 are driven by the accounting standards and not from 
the sample composition. To this end, we control for earnings persistence using a 
dummy variable that equals one if current earnings are negative, and zero 
otherwise.80 The underlying reasoning here is that losses are more difficult for the 
market to predict than profits, which are more likely to be more persistent in a going 
concern firm. In a similar vein, we control for earnings variability using the percentile 
rank of firm i’s earnings variance within each firm’s industry while earnings variance 
is calculated using all available data requiring at least three observations per firm. 
Finally, we control for the firm’s information environment, in terms of size and for 
growth in terms of the book to market ratio. We extent the model in equation (5.2) 
to include the interactions of each of those controls with future, current and lagged 
earnings as well as future returns. The results reported in Table 5.481 suggest that 
our inferences about the impact of mandatory capitalisation in the share price 
                                            
80 We have also used a dummy variable if future earnings are negative and our results are 
qualitatively similar. 
81 In Table 5.4, we don’t report the interactions between our controls and future, current, lagged 
earnings as well as future returns for the sake of brevity.  
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anticipation of future earnings are not influenced by firm characteristics and firm 
composition and this holds uniformly throughout all our tests here.  
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Table 5.4: R&D capitalisation and the future earnings response coefficient 
ܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଶܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾସ ௜ܴ,௧ିଵ + ܾହܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ 	+ ܾ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾ଻ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧+ ଼ܾܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଽܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵ଴ܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଵଵܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܧ௜,௧+ ܾଵଶܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵଷܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧ 
 Losses Earn_Var Size Growth 
 Rt UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS 
 
  
      
Et+1 1.3034*** 1.0198*** 1.5372*** 0.9855*** 0.3062 -0.1482 0.4135 -0.2327 
 (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0070) (0.1668) (0.6370) (0.2192) (0.3552) 
Et 0.2663 0.2450 -0.4387 0.7563* 1.0217*** 0.9038*** 0.3593 0.5488** 
 (0.5480) (0.5900) (0.2662) (0.0889) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.3043) (0.0184) 
Et-1 -1.2553*** -0.3728 -0.2782 -0.7415** -0.3150 0.0083 -0.4614*** 0.1305 
 (0.0000) (0.1312) (0.3908) (0.0130) (0.1031) (0.9522) (0.0045) (0.3045) 
Rt+1 -0.0828** -0.1909*** -0.1789*** -0.2613*** -0.0023 -0.1676** -0.1485* -0.1593* 
 (0.0495) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0006) (0.9623) (0.0325) (0.0506) (0.0617) 
Capt*Et+1 0.7823** -0.0297 1.0003*** 0.1493 0.9512*** 0.0728 0.5562 0.2236 
 (0.0235) (0.9362) (0.0078) (0.6836) (0.0069) (0.8374) (0.1039) (0.5389) 
Capt *Et 0.3975 0.1588 0.6390 0.1796 0.4857 0.1125 0.8472* -0.0851 
 (0.3863) (0.6340) (0.1686) (0.5301) (0.3630) (0.7171) (0.0685) (0.8003) 
Capt *Et-1 -0.9666 -0.2027 -1.5830*** -0.3506* -1.3109** -0.2985 -1.3764** -0.2115 
 (0.1226) (0.3739) (0.0068) (0.0877) (0.0182) (0.1861) (0.0146) (0.2628) 
Capt *Rt+1 0.0601 0.0960* -0.0270 0.1140* 0.0207 0.0928* 0.0676 0.1066* 
 (0.4979) (0.0912) (0.7431) (0.0566) (0.8133) (0.0924) (0.4730) (0.0610) 
Capt 0.3926 0.0626 0.3488 0.1647 0.3499 0.1815 0.3846 0.0636 
 (0.2101) (0.6914) (0.2190) (0.2796) (0.2185) (0.2428) (0.2065) (0.6712) 
IMRt 0.1236*** 0.2082 0.1266*** 0.3605*** 0.1149*** 0.3723*** 0.1581*** 0.1221 
 (0.0006) (0.1120) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0011) (0.0045) (0.0001) (0.3311) 
Capt *IMRt -0.1995 -0.1361 -0.1695 -0.2659 -0.1765 -0.2848 -0.1867 -0.1558 
 (0.2171) (0.4499) (0.2494) (0.1332) (0.2342) (0.1085) (0.2353) (0.3629) 
Constant 0.2349** -0.2955** 0.1878* -0.0918 0.1615* -0.5183*** 0.2116** -0.1122 
 (0.0117) (0.0143) (0.0845) (0.3920) (0.0803) (0.0001) (0.0360) (0.3927) 
Observations 1,562 628 1,562 628 1,562 628 1,562 628 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.315 0.401 0.291 0.391 0.307 0.400 0.301 0.430 
F test 143.37*** 129.55*** 111.07*** 94.54*** 114.22*** 50.17*** 117.44*** 68.52*** 
 
FERC testing Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Expensers 
UKGAAP=IFRS -0.2836 0.514 -0.5517 0.248 -0.4544 0.218 -0.6462 0.122 
Capitalisers 
UKGAAP=IFRS 
        
-1.0957** 0.028 -1.4027** 0.032 -1.3327*** 0.008 -0.9788* 0.0840 
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Notes: 
Ei,t+1 is earnings at time t+1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t is earnings at time 
t (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t-1 is earnings at time t-1 (adjusted to “as if 
expense” basis for capitalisers); Ri,t  is the buy and hold return measured over the 12 months ending 
four months after the year end;  Capi,t  equals to one if a company is classified as a capitalizer and 
zero otherwise; Buyi,t equals to one if directors’ were purchasing shares during the fiscal year end; 
IMRi,t is the inverted mills ratio estimated from the Probit model; Losses equals to one if a firm 
reports losses; EARN_VAR is firm i’s earnings variance w calculated using all available data 
requiring at least three observations per firm; SIZE i is the natural logarithm of market value of the 
firm i’s measured at the fiscal year end; Growth is firm i’s book to market ratio within each firm’s 
industry-year;  p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Our second hypothesis predicts that under a discretionary capitalisation regime, 
the credible and precise information in insider purchases enhance the signalling 
interpretation of capitalisation. According to this prediction, we expect to find a more 
pronounced and positive relation between earnings and returns for firms that 
engage with capitalisation in the presence of net purchases. The results reported 
in Table 5.5 suggest that this takes place only with respect to the coefficient of 
Buyt*Capt*Et-1. As already discussed, the coefficients of current and lagged 
earnings jointly capture the unexpected portion of current year’s earnings 
realization. More particularly, we interpret the positive and significant coefficient of 
Buyt*Capt*Et-1 (2.5223, p-value<0.05) as evidence that investors consider 
capitalisation as signalling that the earnings’ inflation due to capitalisation is a 
permanent component. This comes at a contrast to the negative and significant 
coefficient of Capt*Et-1 (-1.4742, p-value<0.05) which denotes that investors view 
capitalisation under an unfavourable light. Interestingly, those results are robust to 
further controls for firm characteristics, which further reinforce our inferences. 
Notably, we don’t find any significant evidence with respect to future earnings 
expectations. While this is not consistent with our predictions, we acknowledge that 
discretionary capitalisation is an already costly signal about future earnings and as 
such, it may subsume any further information in insider purchases. Moreover, while 
we have no related predictions about the firms which expense all their R&D costs, 
we find that insider purchases do not enable investors to unravel the uncertainty 
with respect to future benefits. Again, we attribute this to accounting choice 
subsuming the information in insider purchases.  
On the other hand, we don’t establish any further statistically significant impact of 
the information in insider purchases in terms of the relation between current and 
 164 
 
future earnings. Based on those results, we conclude that under a regime of 
discretionary capitalisation, insider purchases enable investors to evaluate the 
level of reported earnings and the extent to which the effects of capitalisation are 
permanent or transitory. Specifically, this information allows them to evaluate 
whether the inflation in reported earnings that is due to capitalisation arises from 
signalling or opportunistic motivations. More importantly, the ability of insiders’ 
purchases to discriminate among those two motivations disappears under a regime 
of mandatory capitalisation with the respective coefficients being not only 
statistically insignificant but also, exhibiting signs that are not consistent. Further 
robustness tests taking into account the impact of firm characteristics on the 
incorporation of information in returns, deliver mixed and inconclusive evidence in 
this respect.  
Summarising the results in Table 5.5, we find that opportunistic and signalling 
motivations for capitalisation co-exist under a discretionary capitalisation regime. 
Moreover, investors appear to seek guidance in insiders’ information advantage 
with respect to the motivation of capitalisation. However, we don’t find any evidence 
to suggest that insiders maintain an information advantage during a mandatory 
capitalisation regime as investors no longer use them in evaluating reported 
earnings. Taking into account the results reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we 
conclude that constraining discretion in capitalisation seems to eliminate insiders’ 
information advantage but in doing so, it also results to a significant loss of 
information about future earnings.  
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Table 5.5: R&D capitalisation, directors’ purchases and the future earnings response coefficient 
ܴ௜,௧ = ܾ଴ + ܾଵܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଶܧ௜,௧ + ܾଷܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾସ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ + ܾହܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ 	+ ܾ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾ଻ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ + ଼ܾܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଽܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵ଴ܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ +
ܾଵଵܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ + ܾଵଶܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵଷܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵସܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଵହܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ + ܾଵ଺ܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵ଻ܤܷ ௜ܻ,௧ ∗ ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ ∗
ܴ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଵ଼ܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ܾଵଽܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ + ܾଶ଴ܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܧ௜,௧ାଵ + ܾଶଵܥܴܶܮ ∗ ܴ௜,௧ାଵ+ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + 	 ߝ௜,௧  
 No control Losses Earn_Var Size Growth 
 Rt UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS UK GAAP IFRS 
   
  
      
Et+1 0.6265*** 0.6574* 1.2146*** 1.0961*** 1.5274*** 1.3184*** -0.0519 0.1888 0.3236 0.1212 
 
(0.0084) (0.0829) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0042) (0.8501) (0.6566) (0.3895) (0.7624) 
Et 0.7663*** 0.1496 0.5032 -0.0817 -0.3115 0.1670 1.4216*** 0.6227** 0.5610 0.0856 
 
(0.0022) (0.6322) (0.3190) (0.8420) (0.5021) (0.7122) (0.0000) (0.0433) (0.1305) (0.8161) 
Et-1 -0.7126*** 0.0861 -1.3842*** -0.3844 -0.4537 -0.4778 -0.3817** 0.2385 -0.6301*** 0.2357 
 
(0.0000) (0.5714) (0.0001) (0.1039) (0.1295) (0.1138) (0.0418) (0.1953) (0.0064) (0.1185) 
Rt+1 -0.0285 -0.1361** -0.0579 -0.1431** -0.1364* -0.2444*** 0.0775 -0.1758** -0.1119 -0.0851 
 
(0.5309) (0.0162) (0.2934) (0.0120) (0.0516) (0.0028) (0.2023) (0.0284) (0.1549) (0.3467) 
Capt*Et+1 0.9688** 0.3664 0.9762** 0.0495 1.0617** 0.2259 1.3335*** 0.4143 0.7366* 0.1785 
 
(0.0123) (0.4708) (0.0225) (0.9152) (0.0152) (0.6327) (0.0019) (0.3234) (0.0714) (0.7283) 
Capt *Et 0.6476 0.6402 0.3860 0.5310 0.7369 0.6335 0.2532 0.4309 0.8140 0.1931 
 
(0.2109) (0.1732) (0.4574) (0.1807) (0.1459) (0.1551) (0.6759) (0.3150) (0.1137) (0.6995) 
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Capt *Et-1 -1.4742** -0.2114 -1.1671* 0.0750 -1.7310*** -0.0839 -1.4727** -0.0492 -1.4791** 0.0248 
 
(0.0115) (0.4493) (0.0852) (0.7533) (0.0071) (0.7687) (0.0116) (0.8470) (0.0106) (0.9395) 
Capt *Rt+1 0.0243 0.0210 0.0613 0.0196 -0.0517 0.0510 -0.0260 0.0346 0.0552 0.0121 
 
(0.8062) (0.7841) (0.5610) (0.7951) (0.6012) (0.5079) (0.8033) (0.6230) (0.6145) (0.8689) 
Buyt*Et+1 0.2862 -0.3941 0.2501 -0.3001 0.0731 -0.4092 0.5607* -0.2147 0.3675 -0.5140 
 
(0.4058) (0.3998) (0.4568) (0.5272) (0.8315) (0.3288) (0.0777) (0.6078) (0.2713) (0.1838) 
Buyt*Et -0.3299 0.7177 -0.3810 0.6038 -0.1243 0.7034* -0.5302* 0.6737* -0.3515 0.7606* 
 
(0.2938) (0.1072) (0.1995) (0.1740) (0.6793) (0.0894) (0.0724) (0.0736) (0.2796) (0.0762) 
Buyt*Et-1 0.2158 -0.2040 0.2259 -0.1417 0.1763 -0.1487 0.0851 -0.2603 0.2162 -0.0495 
 
(0.2907) (0.3826) (0.2348) (0.4918) (0.3561) (0.4621) (0.6672) (0.1878) (0.3340) (0.8260) 
Buyt*Rt+1 -0.1075 -0.0873 -0.0675 -0.1060 -0.0965 -0.0725 -0.1340** -0.0815 -0.1145* -0.1449* 
 (0.1047) (0.2368) (0.3047) (0.1359) (0.1459) (0.3400) (0.0355) (0.2423) (0.0840) (0.0515) 
Buyt*Capt*Et+1 -0.1077 0.1461 -0.5257 0.2611 0.0955 0.2502 -0.9686 -0.3391 -0.5323 0.2651 
 
(0.9307) (0.8207) (0.6745) (0.6960) (0.9449) (0.6742) (0.4496) (0.5708) (0.6521) (0.6715) 
Buyt*Capt *Et -1.4378 -0.6453 -1.7006 -0.5007 -1.7173 -0.6513 -0.3752 -0.4233 -1.5135 -0.3759 
 
(0.2193) (0.3411) (0.1531) (0.4416) (0.1852) (0.3110) (0.7619) (0.4975) (0.1702) (0.5699) 
Buyt*Capt *Et-1 2.5223** -0.6860 3.2789** -0.7793** 2.6277** -0.7509* 2.2476* -0.7329* 2.0497* -0.6181 
 
(0.0355) (0.1459) (0.0105) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0838) (0.0713) (0.0854) (0.0861) (0.2177) 
Buyt*Capt *Rt+1 -0.1511 0.1607 -0.2143 0.1783 -0.0825 0.1352 -0.0665 0.1350 -0.1887 0.2404** 
 (0.5308) (0.1529) (0.3727) (0.1035) (0.7289) (0.2332) (0.7942) (0.2043) (0.4513) (0.0340) 
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Capt 0.4375 0.1976 0.4410 0.1235 0.3740 0.2576 0.3501 0.2817* 0.4394 0.1201 
 (0.1962) (0.2388) (0.2147) (0.4525) (0.2478) (0.1161) (0.2894) (0.0782) (0.2074) (0.4675) 
Buyt 0.0441* 0.0719* 0.0446* 0.0586 0.0473* 0.0651* 0.0397* 0.0872** 0.0458* 0.0962*** 
 
(0.0707) (0.0788) (0.0550) (0.1390) (0.0529) (0.0942) (0.0943) (0.0297) (0.0595) (0.0076) 
Capt*Buyt 
0.1031 -0.0973 0.0247 -0.0762 0.0948 -0.1421 0.1724 -0.1255 0.1945 -0.0634 
 
(0.8475) (0.5976) (0.9640) (0.7024) (0.8556) (0.4404) (0.7324) (0.4832) (0.7112) (0.7474) 
IMRt 0.1461*** 0.3495*** 0.1312*** 0.2704** 0.1404*** 0.4035*** 0.1169*** 0.4383*** 0.1709*** 0.1832 
 
(0.0001) (0.0062) (0.0004) (0.0365) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.1474) 
Capt *IMRt -0.2058 -0.3622* -0.2097 -0.2443 -0.1705 -0.4256** -0.1626 -0.4466** -0.2088 -0.2420 
 
(0.2259) (0.0560) (0.2404) (0.1892) (0.2961) (0.0222) (0.3337) (0.0144) (0.2342) (0.2008) 
Buyt *Capt 
*IMRt 
-0.0987 0.1306 -0.0614 0.0938 -0.0984 0.1910 -0.1409 0.1611 -0.1083 0.0674 
 
(0.7483) (0.5250) (0.8411) (0.6744) (0.7438) (0.3536) (0.6242) (0.4283) (0.7170) (0.7633) 
Constant 0.1725* -0.4387*** 0.2181** -0.3569*** 0.1639 -0.1538 0.1706* -0.6371*** 0.2050** -0.1860 
 
(0.0759) (0.0004) (0.0228) (0.0029) (0.1446) (0.1864) (0.0747) (0.0000) (0.0478) (0.1601) 
Observations 1,562 628 1,562 628 1,562 628 1,562 628 1,562 628 
R-squared(adj.) 0.2840 0.4000 0.3170 0.4200 0.2920 0.4190 0.3090 0.4390 0.3040 0.4500 
F test 110.36*** 35.44*** 110.28*** 121.30*** 98.78*** 78.69*** 106.19*** 31.39*** 125.21*** 71.14*** 
 
 
 
FERC testing Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
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Non Buys           
Expensers  0.0309 0.943 -0.1185 0.802 -0.2090 0.714 0.2406 0.625 -0.2024 0.701 
Capitalisers -0.5715 0.249 -1.0453* 0.080 -1.0449 0.108 -0.6785 0.219 -0.7606 0.225 
Buys           
Expensers -0.6494* 0.099 -0.6687 0.202 -0.6913 0.192 -0.5347 0.206 -1.0839** 0.017 
Capitalisers -0.9981 0.377 -0.8086 0.467 -1.3725 0.296 -0.8245 0.490 -0.8446 0.448 
 
Notes: 
Ri,t  is the buy and hold return measured over the 12 months ending four months after the year end; Ei,t+1 is earnings at time t+1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); 
Ei,t is earnings at time t (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ei,t-1 is earnings at time t-1 (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers); Ri,t+1 is the buy and hold 
future return measured over one year starting four months after the year end; Capi,t  equals to one if a company is classified as a capitalizer and zero otherwise; Buyi,t equals to 
one if directors’ were purchasing shares during the fiscal year end; IMRi,t is the inverted mills ratio estimated from the Probit model; p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
Discretion upon financial reporting enables managers to communicate relevant 
private information to market participants and thus, enhances market efficiency. 
However, discretion under uncertainty also hands in a significant information 
advantage to insiders. The presence of insiders’ information advantage then 
introduces a different aspect of uncertainty with respect to its signalling or 
opportunistic use and implies related information processing costs.  An obvious 
reaction to those information processing costs is to constraint the level of discretion 
up to a level that curbs the opportunities for opportunistic earnings management 
and in the same time, allows for the communication of private information.  
We identify the setting of the transition from a discretionary capitalisation (SSAP13) 
to a mandatory capitalisation (IAS 38) regime in the UK as an opportunity to 
investigate the implications of constraining discretion. In line with prior research, 
we show that discretion over this accounting choice provides relevant information 
to the market. Furthermore, we establish that under a discretionary capitalisation 
regime, insiders have an information advantage which can be employed by market 
participants to assess whether the motivations underlying this choice are 
opportunistic or signalling. Following the introduction of a mandatory capitalisation 
regime, we argue that insiders’ information advantage is suppressed and 
subsequently, the opportunities for self-serving behaviour. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of constraining discretion come at the expense of the reliability of private 
information that is communicated to the markets by means of capitalisation. Our 
findings suggest a significant loss of information with respect to future earnings 
which may have sub-optimal implications for the overall market efficiency.  
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We acknowledge that the present study’s inferences may be subject to limitations. 
First, as Fields et al. (2001) discuss, there is an array of market imperfections which 
influence accounting choices stemming out of agency costs, information 
asymmetries, and externalities affecting non-contracting parties. A more 
comprehensive investigation may test the hypotheses here taking into account a 
richer set of accounting choice determinants. Second, the extent to which 
capitalisation is employed with an opportunistic motive may be subject to the 
availability of alternative methods for earnings management under managers’ 
discretion. Third, our inferences may have been influenced by the implications of 
the IFRS introduction in terms of the enhancement of the overall firms’ information 
environment. More specifically, according to Brochet (2010) increased 
comparability improves investors’ ability to understand a firm’s relative 
performance and concurrently diminish insiders’ informational advantage. 
However, as already pointed out, outsiders cannot easily infer relevant information 
by observing the productivity of R&D projects of peer firms and therefore, it is 
unlikely that the comparability improvements may affect our inference here. On 
other hand, it could be argued that IFRS has brought about an increase in 
disclosure requirements. Our research design is able to capture the extent to which 
overall disclosure enhances the share price anticipation of future earnings. The 
empirical findings do not support such a conjecture about the IFRS influence in our 
setting.  
The results of the present study point to a loss of information about future earnings 
as a result of constraining discretion. While this could be considered an adverse 
development for market efficiency, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
the loss of information is also translated to capital misallocation. Further research 
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could also corroborate our inferences about the loss of insiders’ information 
advantage by observing abnormal returns following insider purchases. Those two 
ideas for further research could be of interest to standard setters as well. For the 
moment, our main contribution is to identify the costs associated with the 
exogenous constraint over capitalization; we assume that the benefits in terms of 
suppressing opportunistic motivations are already considered by accounting 
standard setters. We acknowledge that the outcome of accounting standard setting 
depends on a cost and benefits analysis. In this respect, the present study sheds 
further light into both dimensions.  
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6 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis presents three empirical chapters examining the capital market effects 
of the interplay between financial reporting discretion and insider trading. The 
material presented here aims to provide answers to an array of questions that are 
set out in the beginning of this thesis.  
One of those questions refers to the long standing controversy about the role of 
insider trading in supporting or compromising market efficiency. The research 
presented in Chapter 3 addresses this question directly by testing hypotheses in 
the context of a well-established market anomaly, namely the post earnings 
announcement drift. We provide only partial support for the argument that capital 
markets benefit from insider trading and more specifically, only with reference to 
transactions that prior research has identified as informative. We then introduce 
the role of financial reporting discretion from the perspective of information 
acquisition costs and the ensuing information uncertainty.  Interestingly, the initial 
results are robust to this factor. This finding highlights also an adverse role for 
insider trading in relation to market efficiency. It is shown that the disclosure of 
informative insider trading in this setting subsumes the efforts of market 
participants to use financial reporting information to interpret the earnings surprise. 
While this implies a sub-optimal mechanism of price discovery in the case of 
informative trades, this becomes insidious in the case of non-informative trades.  
Another question set out at the beginning of this thesis asks what can be learned 
about the managers’ motivations for engaging with financial reporting discretion by 
looking at their insider trades. In Chapter 4, this question is examined in the context 
of stock acquisitions. The findings suggest that the presence and the timing of 
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directors’ net purchases can be employed to identify overconfident managers, or 
managers who overestimate the magnitude of the combined entity’s earnings and 
underestimate the adverse consequences of aggressive accounting during the 
integration process.  
The issue is especially pertinent for stock acquisitions where earnings 
management is employed to enhance the exchange ratio for the benefit of the 
acquirer’s shareholders. In the same time, overconfident managers underestimate 
the probability of new, difficult or contentious accounting issues and possible 
business integration problems that may compound those issues. Given this 
information uncertainty associated with the integration period, overconfident 
managers’ subjective estimates tend to be unjustifiably precise. We show that 
market participants understand both the incentives and the opportunities for 
earnings management and adjust share prices during the acquisition 
announcement. We also show that the post-acquisition reaction to earnings 
management is a reaction to the precision by which managers’ optimistic 
expectations have been initially conveyed. The findings reported here also suggest 
that market participants understand both the incentives and the opportunities for 
earnings management and adjust share prices during the acquisition 
announcement. Moreover, contrary to prior research which attributed  the post-
acquisition  market reaction to earnings management to mispricing, the tests 
reported here show that this is a reaction to the precision by which overconfident 
managers’ expectations have been initially conveyed. Those results are also in line 
with the recent developments in the finance literature which engages with the role 
of managerial overconfidence in acquisitions’ underperformance. The research in 
Chapter 4 suggests that it is important to take into account financial reporting 
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discretion into account for the overconfidence explanation to be consistent with its 
definition.  
A final question that is also set out in the beginning of the thesis asks under which 
circumstances insider trading can assist market participants to interpret financial 
reporting discretion. The research reported in Chapter 5 aims to answer this 
question through the perspective of changing levels of allowed financial reporting 
discretion. More particularly, the research in this Chapter employs the setting of the 
transition from a discretionary capitalisation (SSAP13) to a mandatory 
capitalisation (IAS 38) regime in the UK as an opportunity to investigate the 
implications of constraining discretion. In line with prior research, the findings 
demonstrate that discretion over this accounting choice provides relevant 
information to the market. Furthermore, under a discretionary capitalisation regime, 
insiders have an information advantage which can be employed by market 
participants to assess whether the motivations underlying this choice are 
opportunistic or signalling. Following the introduction of a mandatory capitalisation 
regime, insiders’ information advantage is suppressed and subsequently, the 
opportunities for self-serving behaviour. Nevertheless, the benefits of constraining 
discretion come at the expense of the reliability of private information that is 
communicated to the markets by means of capitalisation. While the findings overall 
support a significant loss of information that can be inferred by the capitalisation 
choice, it is also shown that under such circumstances, market participants can no 
longer use the information in insider trading disclosure to assess the information in 
earnings.  
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6.1 Limitations and avenue for further research 
The three empirical studies presented in this thesis are subject to a number of 
limitations. Firstly, all three empirical chapters employ insider trading taking place 
in the UK prior to 2009 when the Financial Service Authority first successful criminal 
prosecution for insider trading. Considering that we have no means to establish 
illegal insider trading within the database we employ, our sample may include 
undetected cases. To the extent that the undetected cases drive our results, then 
it is possible that the results may not be generalizable in other contexts where 
enforcement is stronger (e.g. the U.S.A) or in more contemporaneous periods 
when the enforcement has become tougher. This is an open empirical question for 
future research. Secondly, the first two studies focus on the interaction between 
insider trading and accruals based earnings management. We acknowledge that 
managers could also engage in real earnings management by, for example, cutting 
down discretionary expenses, increasing production to lower the cost of goods sold 
or accelerating the timing of sales through increased price discounts. Further 
research could investigate how the trade-off between real and accrual earnings 
management could have affected the inferences drawn in this thesis. For instance, 
it would be interesting to investigate whether and how insider trading informs 
market participants about the future implications of cuts in R&D expenditures when 
such expenditures are subject to different levels of allowed discretion with respect 
to their capitalisation. However, initial findings in this respect by recently published 
research (Sawicki and Shrestha, 2014) does not establish any relation between 
insider trading and real earnings management.  
Thirdly, the thesis focuses on financial reporting discretion which may be an 
endogenous decision. To the extent that this is a serious concern the estimates 
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would be incorrect and could lead to statistically insignificant coefficients in the 
models. For instance, it is still an open question whether the level of discretionary 
accruals is determined jointly with the direction of the directors’ trades around the 
earnings announcement. Could non-informative trades be deliberately associated 
with an attempt to mislead investors by discretion upon accruals? Could 
capitalisation decisions be driven by managers’ trading decisions? Such questions 
could be undertaken by future research and are beyond the scope of this thesis.    
In a related vein, a firm’s decision may also stem out from an array of other 
considerations which have not been investigated in this thesis. This issue may be 
more pertinent to the research reported in Chapter 5. While this chapter focuses 
on the capital market consequences of management’s decision to capitalise R&D, 
it is acknowledged that a firm’s decision may be driven by other factors which were 
not considered in this thesis. For instance, a firm may be reluctant towards 
capitalisation of R&D since its disclosure would reveal proprietary information to 
competitors about the success of product development.   
The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 relies on measures of earnings management 
which are based on the regression residuals of Jones’ type models.82 While those 
types of models are widely used and accepted in the literature, they have also been 
criticised about their ability to identify the discretionary component of accruals. For 
instance, Bernard and Skinner (1996) argue that Jones’ type models are subject to 
measurement errors since they fail to decompose accruals correctly. 
Consequently, discretionary accruals include a large component of normal (non-
                                            
82 It could be said that the IFRS introduction may also affect the inferences here. Unreported tests 
have examined this possibility. There is no obvious effect from the IFRS introduction in the results 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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discretionary) accruals. Similarly, Guay et al. (1996) show that the Jones’ type 
models estimate the discretionary component of accruals with considerable 
imprecision. More recent research (e.g. Hribar and Collins, 2002; Owens et al., 
2013) shows that acquisitions are “non-articulation” events associated with 
significant business shocks which introduce significant biases into the estimation 
of discretionary accruals. Therefore, in an attempt to minimise the measurement 
errors, the models employed in this thesis to estimate “normal” accruals exclude 
firm year observations with acquisitions. Considering the measurement errors 
associated with Jones’ type model, it can be argued that relying on an alternative 
methodology, for example, the methodology in Dechow and Dichev (2002), may 
have been appropriate. However, applying a Dechow and Dichev type models as 
a proxy for information acquisition costs in chapter 3 would have resulted in a 
significant loss of observations. Furthermore, applying this type of models in 
chapter 4, which focus on corporate acquisition, would have been problematic as 
the design involves cash flow figures that need to be taken from the post-acquisition 
period. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn in Francis et al. (2007), with reference 
to the information acquisition costs, and Veenman (2012), with reference to the 
precision of earnings, are robust to these alternative models. Apart from these 
general limitations, there are also specific caveats pertaining to each empirical 
chapter.  
The sample size across all empirical chapters is relatively small. For instance, in 
chapter 3, the subsample of active informative trading in the lowest earnings 
surprise portfolio has 20 observations while the subsample of passive informative 
trading at the top earnings surprise portfolio has 24 observations. The results 
presented in Chapter 4 with regards to the directors’ purchasing occurring after the 
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earnings announcement but before the acquisition announcement rely on 33 
acquisitions. However, the observed adverse relation between post acquisition and 
pre-acquisition earnings management are consistent with the long term 
underperformance of these acquisitions. In line with prior research, Chapter 5 
shows that only a small sample of UK firms chooses to capitalise R&D 
(approximately 13% of the companies) prior to the adoption of IFRS. Despite the 
small sample, the results are similar to those presented in prior research.  
Moreover, the regressions reported in this thesis do not exhibit significant problems 
(e.g., insignificant F-tests). This issue also relates to the data availability for 
conducting this research.  
The results presented in chapter 3 are subject to the specific practises and 
guidelines in the UK. Directors in the UK have to receive a clearance to trade by 
the board which increase the timeliness for the disclosure of their trades to the 
market. Furthermore, the London Stock Exchange Model Code (1977) prohibits 
insiders from trading up to two months preceding an annual earnings 
announcement. Consequently, replicating the analysis of this study in other 
markets may be challenging given these unique institutional characteristics. For 
instance, in the US blackout periods of insider trading are voluntarily imposed by 
the firms and their duration and time period may vary across companies (Bettis et 
al., 2000).  
The conclusions from the findings reported in Chapter 4 allude to managers’ 
overconfidence explaining the under-performance of stock financed acquisitions. 
However, managers’ overconfidence may be influenced by the probability of 
lawsuits and the potential litigation costs. For instance, the US is a highly litigious 
environment and stock financed acquirers tend to face a lawsuit for issuing 
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misleading statements. In contrast, the UK is less a litigious setting which may 
encourage overconfident managers. Thus, the results of this study may not be 
generalizable due to the differences in the litigiousness and other institutional 
features across jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to examine the 
extent to which differences in litigiousness across two “common law” countries 
affects managerial overconfidence in this setting.  
The investigation in Chapter 5 with regards to the amount of information about 
future earnings impounded in current prices is limited to one year ahead due the 
availability of the data and the research design. Consequently, employing a 
relatively short period may not fully capture the benefits of R&D which may take 
longer to unravel. Despite this limitation, the empirical evidence in the pre-IFRS 
period is in line with the results presented in prior research which alleviate, at least 
to some extent, this concern. 
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Appendix 
In this section, we present the results on the determinants of the capitalisation 
choice across the two reporting regimes which we employed in order to control for 
the endogeneous decision to capitalise R&D. Following Oswald and Zarawin 
(2007), we compute the inverse Mills ratio from the parameters estimated from the 
Probit model which examines the decision to capitalise R&D expenditure as a 
function of a firm’s life cycle and whether the firm meets the conditions for 
capitalisation. Lev et al. (2005) show a firm’s life cycle is related to the effect of 
capitalisation on profitability. Thus, relating the decision to capitalise R&D to a firm’s 
life cycle is deemed important (Oswald and Zarowin, 2007; Oswald, 2008).  We 
control for the success of R&D and the ability to capitalise using the R&D value, 
while to capture life cycle we include earnings variability as a measure of risk and 
persistence, profitability, size, book to market ratio, as a measure of risk and 
growth, R&D intensity and beta, which proxies for the firm’s discount rate, because 
the coefficient on earnings is related to the rate at which earnings are discounted 
(Collins and Kothari, 1989): 
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CAP୧,୲ = 	b଴ + bଵEARN_SIGN୧,୲ + bଶEARN_VAR୧,୲ + bଷSIZE୧,୲ + bସBM୧,୲ + bହRDINT୧,୲+ bହRDVALUE୧,୲ + 	 ε୧,୲ 
 Pre IFRS Post IFRS 
EARN_SIGN 0.0816 -0.0592 
 
(0.5432) (0.6420) 
EARN_VAR 0.0355*** -0.0043 
 
(0.0003) (0.6915) 
SIZE -1.1967*** -0.0761 
 
(0.0000) (0.7803) 
BM 0.2163 -0.3361* 
 
(0.2740) (0.0875) 
RDINT -0.8797*** -0.4190 
 
(0.0018) (0.1311) 
RDVALUE -1.3160*** -0.9801*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
BETA -0.2203 0.4189* 
 (0.3569) (0.0600) 
Constant -0.2143 0.6343* 
 
(0.5509) (0.0796) 
Observations 1,562 628 
Chi squared 54.00 29.94 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0702 0.0346 
Notes: 
CAP equals to one if a company is classified as a capitalizer and zero otherwise; EARN_SIGN equals 
to one if earnings are positive (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers), and zero otherwise; 
EARN_VAR is the percentile rank of firm i’s earnings variance within each firm’s industry while earnings 
variance is calculated using all available data requiring at least three observations per firm; SIZE is the 
percentile rank of firm i’s size within each firm’s industry-year  while size is the natural logarithm of 
market value of the company measured at the fiscal year end; BM is the percentile rank of firm i’s book 
to market ratio within each firm’s industry-year; RDINT is the percentile rank of firm i’s R&D intensity 
within each firm’s industry-year while R&D intensity is R&D expenditure divided by total assets (adjusted 
to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers) ; RDVALUE is the percentile rank of firm i’s R&D value within 
each firm’s industry-year while R&D value is the difference between the market value of equity and 
book value of equity (adjusted to “as if expense” basis for capitalisers) divided by the sum of current 
and lagged annual R&D expenditure; BETA is the percentile rank of firm i’s beta within each firm’s 
industry-year while beta is estimated using the market model and employing monthly returns ending at 
the month of the fiscal year end (we require at least 12 months and maximum 60 months to estimate 
the beta). p-values in brackets; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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